

The Culture Of Bribery And Corruption In San Mateo County Public Offices

Prepared for Grand Jury, FBI and related investigations

Revision 2.6

PART ONE, OF FIVE PARTS

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Introduction

San Mateo County, officially the **County of San Mateo**, is a [county](#) located in the [U.S. state of California](#). As of the [2020 census](#), the population was 764,442. [\[5\]](#) [Redwood City](#) is the [county seat](#), [\[6\]](#) and the third most populated city following [Daly City](#) and [San Mateo](#). San Mateo County is included in the [San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA MSA \(metropolitan statistical area\)](#), [Silicon Valley](#), and is part of the [San Francisco Bay Area](#), the nine counties bordering [San Francisco Bay](#). It covers most of the [San Francisco Peninsula](#). [San Francisco International Airport](#) is located in the northeastern area of the county and is approximately 7 miles south of the city and county limits of [San Francisco](#), even though the airport itself is assigned a San Francisco [postal address](#). The county's built-up areas are mostly suburban, and are home to several corporate campuses. A July 2013 *Wall Street Journal* article identified the [Facebook](#) initial public offering (IPO) as the cause of a change in the U.S.' national economic statistics, as San Mateo County—the home of the company—became the top wage-earning county in the country after the fourth quarter of 2012. The article revealed that the [Bureau of Labor Statistics](#) reported that the average weekly wage in the county was \$3,240, which is 107% higher than the previous year: "That's the equivalent of \$168,000 a year, and more than 50% higher than the next highest county, New York County (better known as Manhattan), which came in at \$2,107 a week, or roughly \$110,000 a year." [\[83\]](#)

Individual citizens have little to no representation. All policy decisions are steered by: business men's groups, labor union bosses, tech oligarch lobbyists, large investment groups, and direct stock market and realty bribes to political bosses.

As of the fourth quarter of 2021, the median value of homes in San Mateo County was \$1,247,070, an increase of 11% from the prior year. It ranked fourth in the US for counties with highest median home value, behind [Nantucket](#), [Manhattan](#), and [Santa Clara](#). [\[84\]](#)

Additionally, San Mateo County hosts the headquarters of [Visa Inc](#), [Sony Interactive Entertainment](#), [Electronic Arts](#), [YouTube](#), Google, [GoPro](#), and [Gilead Sciences](#), as well as a hub of venture capital firms in [Menlo Park](#) and several other technology-related companies.

In 2016, Peninsula Clean Energy began providing electricity to 20 percent of residential customers, all municipalities, and all small- to mid-size businesses in the county, as a [Community Choice Aggregation](#) program, an alternative to [Pacific Gas and Electric](#). [\[85\]](#)

The origin of the county is absolutely fascinating. It was like the Wild West with **corrupt politicians and criminal gangs** from San Francisco jockeying to control the Peninsula.

[Webinar on SMC Corruption](#)

Ballot box stuffing, voter intimidation and the politicians from San Francisco, in league with criminal gangs, who attempted to take over the county before it could be organized in an orderly fashion in 1856.

The results were predictable. Out of a total population of 2,500, 1,700 votes were counted. Gang members became sheriff, county clerk, county attorney, assessor and treasurer along with picking up one of the three supervisorial seats. They had a strange hold on the infant county.

Sounds just like today, Just follow the former San Mateo County Sheriff Juan P. Lopez criminal case that is speeding through the court system 6.5 years and counting. He made the mistake of running for Sheriff in 2014.

The Juan P. Lopez case should be compared to the Zain Jaffer of Hillsborough founder of Vungle case, start to finish in 8 months. Vungle was sold to Blackstone

Ask Sheriff Carlos G. Bolanos what actions he took when in 2010 the brave female Sheriff Deputy reported the Gross Misconduct at San Mateo County Sheriff's Office involving top management and Deputies sharing Porn Images and a Violent Rape Video on the County's Computers in the 400 County Center Building while at work.

That involved 45 of San Mateo County Sheriff's Finest Men.

Gross Misconduct at SMCSO

Why was/is the Sam Trans Fraud Investigation not available for the public to read?

False Press/News releases on Errol Chang, Yanira Serrano Garcia, Chinedu V. Okobi and Sandra Harmon Homicides by Law Enforcement.

You get the picture.

Kickbacks are illegal payments or gifts that occur during the transaction. Laws were put in place to avoid any bribery and protect consumers in the process.

While not all gifts or rebates fall under the illegal kickback category, it's essential to understand the complexity and how the law defines kickbacks to Housing Agency staff and City Hall officials.

What is considered a kickback?

A kickback in real estate is when a real estate agent, who has a fiduciary responsibility to the client, receives benefits or items of value for referring certain businesses or services.

These are usually illegal and considered bribes, as it is often in the form of cash or something of value like a gift.

If your agent recommends additional real estate services like escrow companies, title companies, inspection companies, or other businesses that are involved in the real estate transaction, they have to comply with the law and not be bribed to refer business.

This helps maintain the integrity of the transaction and ensures consumer's interests are protected.

Can real estate agents give or receive kickbacks?

A piece of law called the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) was put in place in 1974 to prevent unethical or illegal actions between real estate service providers and their clients.

Real estate agents and mortgage brokers must abide by this, and it falls under the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Under RESPA section 8a, giving gifts or kickbacks in exchange for business is illegal.

Specifically, it prohibits any “unearned” fees or bonuses paid for services that weren’t performed.

What happens if a realtor is caught receiving a kickback?

RESPA is civil law that applies to all federally regulated mortgage loans, including purchase loans, refinances, home improvement loans, land contracts, and home equity lines of credit.

RESPA will not cover transactions like all-cash offers or rental transactions where a mortgage is not involved.

If you are caught violating RESPA as a real estate agent or mortgage lender, you can face severe consequences such as:

- A fine of up to \$10,000
- Up to one year in jail
- Held liable for three times the amount paid

These kickbacks, in certain situations, can also be considered tax evasion since they are unreported income for the agent.

If you have any concerns about when or who can give gifts during the transaction, it’s best to confirm with your broker or a real estate attorney to ensure you’re not violating any RESPA laws.

Difference between “referral fees” or “finder’s fees” and kickbacks

One key exception to RESPA is when a referral fee is paid between two licensed real estate professionals.

This can be done when one real estate agent [refers business to another agent](#) and end up doing a transaction with that client. Sometimes known as a “finders” fee, it is not uncommon for a real estate agent to pay a small percentage of their commission for referring a client to another agent.

This can be anywhere from a few hundred dollars to 25% of their commission, depending on the state they’re in and the agreed-upon fee between the parties.

Each state has different regulations that outline what constitutes a referral fee and how much an agent is able to give, so check with your local state's board of realtors to confirm. Most states require you to be a licensed real estate agent to receive a referral fee.

But a few states will allow unlicensed individuals - like previous clients - to receive a finders fee for sending business to an agent.

However, this does not apply between mortgage brokers and real estate agents. It is considered an illegal kickback when a referral fee is paid between a real estate agent and another service provider. But if it's a referral fee between two real estate agents, it is permissible.

Difference between “closing cost credit” and kickbacks

While providing gifts in exchange for referrals violates RESPA, not all credits or gifts to clients are against the rules.

A mortgage lender or agent can offer the buyer or [seller a closing credit](#) or gift for using them as their service provider — just as long as there are no expectations to refer other businesses to the lender.

RESPA allows for gifts, refunds, or discounts to the client if it doesn't involve referring business to that provider.

In this case, an agent might offer to refund part of their commission in the form of a “closing credit” that can go towards the client's down payment and closing costs.

These credits are legal in 40 states and allow agents to give their clients a little money back at the closing table if necessary.

Can you gift a client without it being a “kickback?”

Giving gifts to a client at the closing table or after they move into their new house is a common practice in real estate.

But does that count as a kickback? According to RESPA, as long as there are no strings attached to the gift, agents can give gifts to their clients.

These would be considered more of a [thank-you gift](#) and is a way to build a relationship with clients.

These types of gifts and rebates are okay, so long as the client is not expected to get a referral out of it. Remember that next time you want to thank a client for choosing you as an agent!

Final thoughts on kickbacks in real estate

While Kickbacks are illegal and unethical in real estate, there are some exceptions to gift-giving for your clients, and from agent to agent.

RESPA was created to ensure that buyers and sellers have full transparency and trust in the transaction. If you're a real estate agent, make sure you're following proper procedures to avoid violating RESPA laws.

Make sure you have a complete understanding of the law so you can avoid any RESPA-related issues!

It is possible for a corporate body (and its senior officers) to be found guilty of any of the general offences of bribing, receiving a bribe and bribing a public foreign official listed above. However, the difficulty for the prosecution in proving corporate liability is that it must show that the necessary mental element can be attributed to the "directing" mind of the corporate body. Therefore, it is of major significance that the Act has introduced a new strict liability corporate offence of failure to prevent bribery, where the prosecution will not have these evidential problems in taking action against corporate entities.

The new offence is committed by a commercial organisation where a person "associated" with it bribes a person with the intention of obtaining business or a business advantage for that organisation. The only defence available to the commercial organisation is that it had "adequate procedures" in place to prevent bribery.

For example, if an architect offers a bribe to a member of the planning committee to obtain planning permission for a client company's development, the client company may fall foul of this offence if the client company does not have "adequate procedures" in place.

Who is an associated person?

An "associated" person for the purposes of this offence is widely defined as a person who performs services for or on behalf of the commercial organisation. Therefore it could include not only employees and agents such as managing and letting agents, but also, depending on the particular circumstances, subsidiaries, joint venture partners, contractors, consultants such as architects, surveyors, mechanical and electrical engineers, and intermediaries or brokers who are paid a fee for putting together a deal or finding a site. Where a joint venture is conducted through a separate legal entity, that entity might be treated as "associated" with its members for this purpose, but will not automatically be; it will depend on the degree of control the member has over the entity. A supplier or contractor who is merely acting as a seller of goods is unlikely to be regarded as an associated person.

What are adequate procedures?

Guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice sets out the following key principles:

- **Proportionate procedures.** The procedures to prevent bribery should be proportionate to the bribery risks faced by the organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of the organisation's activities.
- **Top-level commitment.** Senior management should be committed to preventing bribery and a senior person should have overall responsibility for the programme.
- **Risk assessment.** The organisation should carry out periodic, informed and documented assessments of its exposure to bribery and act on them.

- **Due diligence.** Appropriate checks should be carried out on persons performing services for the organisation and those persons should in turn be required to carry out similar checks on the persons they deal with.
- **Communication.** Bribery prevention policies should be clearly communicated internally and externally and there should be continuous training.
- **Monitoring and review.** The risks and procedures should be regularly monitored and reviewed.

Every commercial organisation should have procedures in place that are proportionate to their business and their risk profile, but which above all must be “adequate”.

San Mateo County was born of corruption says Joan Levy

The origin of San Mateo County provides many twists and turns in the telling. We had government corruption, unscrupulous motives, fraudulent elections, murder, vigilantism, lawsuits and, presumably, the good guys winning in the end. It would make a good book. That's why Mitchell Postel will be publishing one this summer.

Originally, San Francisco County included the northern Peninsula. In 1856, the city of San Francisco held most of the population, as our bucolic area had only about 2,500 people, mostly involved in agriculture. There was some feeling among the locals that San Francisco was too far to travel to the county seat, so a separate county might be a good idea. There was a feeble effort to split off into the county of Raymundo. This plan was not exactly a major issue at the time, however.

It was San Francisco that precipitated the division, although this was not really their intent. San Francisco wanted to consolidate their city and county governments to make them more efficient and less prone to corruption. When their plan went to the state Legislature, the split was part of a compromise in this proposal. The men that had been involved in San Francisco's graft and corruption saw this as an opportunity to create their own fiefdom here on the Peninsula.

To assure their control, the gang of crooks demanded immediate elections. They utilized armed intimidation at the polls, ballot box stuffing and outright fraud in the vote counting to accomplish their ends. The elections turned out as they had expected.

In an unrelated incident, one of their numbers happened to shoot a newspaperman in San Francisco the day after the elections. This event pushed the population of the city over the edge, and they revived the Committee of Vigilance to see that justice was done. The committee hanged the transgressor, and their cleanup efforts caused most of the rest of the gang to disappear from the local scene.

Just to keep the legal matters in order, civil lawsuits were filed challenging the election results. It was fairly moot, as some of the newly elected officials were no longer to be found. When scrutinized under the law, it seems that the elections were invalid anyway, since they took place before the effective date of the creation of the new county. The gang of crooks had been just a little too eager to take over in the first place.

One of the election issues had been the location of the county seat. Redwood City and Belmont were both on the ballot. In the fraudulent election, Belmont was selected. This was due to the interest of one property holder and his connection to the thugs rather than popular choice. After the fraud was eliminated, Redwood City was named the seat of county government. Redwood City was at least a growing community. Belmont at that time didn't even have any business establishments other than a hotel.

The men who would have been elected if the elections had been fair or valid handled temporary government. Legitimate elections were finally held and confirmed most of the presumed office holders. One exception was a man who decided, after all, not to run for election. Finally, the real representatives legally took over the operation of the newly established county. That was our beginning.

Michael G. Stogner (michaelgstogner@yahoo.com) confirms this with his post that “...I'm going to give just one example on Aug.7, 2013 approx. 2:30 PM a former Senior Accountant and another SamTrans employee met with Kevin Raffaelli of the District Attorney Office of San Mateo County. The entire meeting was recorded by Mr. Raffaelli, the two reported several criminal acts. On Aug.19, 2013 approx 1:10 PM Mr. Raffaelli called and reported that the District Attorney's Office did not have the funds to investigate this complicated type of crime. This is a pretty simple white collar crime with specific dates and evidence. What is the estimated cost for the investigation? Did Steve Wagstaffe request funds from the BOS for this type of crime? What other crimes do we not even bother to investigate, I'm not talking about prosecuting only investigating. This senior accountant was fired after she reported this activity to Supervisor Carole Groom per County's website on Whistleblowing. When a person does the right thing and reports wrong doing and gets fired for it, they have already suffered, then to be lied to by the DA's office only causes more injury. It is up to the residents of San Mateo County to fix this...” Stogner has offered to provide vast amounts of agency political corruption evidence to **CREDIBLE** public investigations (ie: not window-dressing sham pretend investigations)

San Mateo Housing Officials Base Housing Subsidies On *WHO YOU KNOW* and not First-Come-First-Served

Isa Butler gets \$2800.00 per month of free housing payments from San Mateo Housing.

Robert Smith is disabled, a senior and low-income. He applied for these funds over a decade earlier than Isa. Robert met every criteria to get the \$2800.00 housing funds, years prior. Robert has never been addicted, never been arrested, never been bankrupt, has always had a job with the government until he was fully disabled and is an ideal member of the community.

Robert has been forced into homelessness by San Mateo County. Robert has been denied those same funds even though he applied years earlier, is a natural born U.S. Citizen, has met every requirement and waited decades longer.

Why was Robert cut out of his benefits and rights? BECAUSE ROBERT REPORTED CORRUPTION IN SAN MATEO. He got black-listed, obfuscated, delayed, stone-walled, denied and attacked by County officials SIMPLY BECAUSE HE DID THE “RIGHT THING.”

A simple web-search of Isa’s landlord finds that Crawford has a massive number of “home addresses” across the Bay Area. Did any of the Crawford family ever have any political involvements? See for yourself.

For \$2800.00 a month any mortgage company will finance you to build your own 4 bedroom home. In other cities, you can rent an upscale mansion with a pool.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO
264 HARBOR BLVD. BLDG. A, BELMONT, CA 94002, FAX (650) 802-3372
NOTICE OF CHANGE TO LEASE AND CONTRACT

ISA BUTLER
983 S B ST
SAN MATEO, CA 94401

10/24/2022
t0001255
vou_oth

CRAWFORD, ZELTE
dba CRAWFORD PROPERTIES

The Housing Assistance Payments Contract dated 04/15/2016, entered into between the Owner, CRAWFORD, ZELTE, and the Housing Authority of the County of San Mateo for the Lessee ("Tenant"), ISA BUTLER, for the unit, 983 S B ST, SAN MATEO, CA 94401, is amended as follows:

The reason for this change is due to:

- REEXAMINATION: Annual/Triennial review of family income and/or composition
 INTERIM ADJUSTMENT: Interim change in family income and/or composition
 Add household member(s)
 Delete household member(s)
 CHANGE IN CONTRACT RENT: The owner/agent requested a rent adjustment.
 This Notice supersedes Notice dated:
 Other:

<u>EFFECTIVE DATE</u>	<u>TENANT RENT</u>	<u>HAP AMOUNT</u>	<u>CONTRACT RENT</u>
12/01/2022	\$100	\$2800	\$2,900

This change is in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Housing Assistance Payments Contract and/or Lease Agreement and shall be attached to and made a part of your Housing Assistance Payments Contract and/or Lease Agreement. All other covenants, terms and conditions of the original Housing Assistance Payments Contract and/or Lease Agreement remain the same.

To the Tenant Only:

Your rent portion has been calculated based on the information you provided during the recertification interview process. If your income has changed since the time of the review, you may report the change(s) in writing by submitting the Change of Income Form from our website at: <https://housing.smcgov.org/document/income-change-notification>, or by obtaining a copy of the form from our office. The completed Change of Income form will be reviewed based on the Housing Authority's established Interim adjustments policies.

If you have questions regarding this notice, please contact me.

Thank you,

Diane Daynes
Housing Programs Specialist
(650) 508-6770
ddaynes@smchousing.org



Illegal Child Labor In San Mateo County Has Increased Thanks To Developer Bribes To County Officials

The number of kids working in breach of labor rules spiked 37% this year, with tens of thousands feared to be toiling at hazardous sites, as bosses use young migrants to plug the labor gap, officials say.

Thousands of children were discovered working in breach of labor rules in FY2022.

That includes hundreds who are toiling in 'hazardous' conditions. On Crystal Springs Road, in San Mateo, near El Camino Real, a large compound, shrouded in ivy from the street, is said to be a base for under-age migrant sex workers. That doesn't show the full scale of the problem, which is likely many times worse

Many are cases of kids working late nights or at times they should be in school. But some were getting chemical burns cleaning tech companies after hours or working with deadly medical chemicals/

Thousands of kids labor in dangerous 'Dickensian' conditions, says expert.

Fast food franchises like Dunkin' and McDonald's are frequently reprimanded.

Teens, especially undocumented migrants, are easy prey for dodgy bosses at Survey Monkey, Google, Activision and Netflix offices in San Mateo.

Federal investigators have recorded a massive 37 percent jump in the number of kids working illegally in America's factories, eateries and other workplaces this past year.

Department of Labor inspectors found children working in breach of labor rules in the 2022 fiscal year. That includes a worrisome group who toiled in hazardous conditions, often involving dangerous equipment — a 26 percent rise from 2021.

Labor officials and experts on child abuses said those figures are only a fraction of how many are truly working in violation of labor rules, which may number in the hundreds of thousands.

Faced with low unemployment and a shortage of adult workers, San Mateo bosses have turned to teens to fill the gap, experts said. Unscrupulous managers also benefit from the influx of desperate young migrants who need cash and don't ask questions.

Recent abuses include children as young as 13 getting chemical burns from cleaning, a child labor scandal in the US supply chains of Hyundai and Kia, and teenagers working with medical chemicals in biotech.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Labor Department official said the 'uptick' in official data 'shouldn't be mistaken for the total number of child labor out there in the country, which is likely much more'.

The real numbers, experts said, are between 20 and 100 times higher — or as many as 388,000 children being overworked, and 69,000 doing hazardous tasks that could damage their health or lead to accidents.

Those under 18 can legally work in the US, but only for limited hours during the school year and never on overnight shifts. The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits 'hazardous' child labor involving power-driven equipment, such as in mines, farms or abattoirs.

These examples, the officials said, epitomize an emerging problem: the 'erosion of the employment relationship', by which companies outsource security, cleaning, transport and other tasks to a growing list of independent subcontractors.

Inspectors said they found children as young as 13 working at a Korean-operated parts supplier to automakers Hyundai and Kia in violation of employment rules, after a months-long investigation

When a sanitation subcontractor sends 13-year-olds into a factory to scrub dangerous machines at night, staffers of other suppliers turn a blind eye. 'It's not their problem,' said the official. 'No one's taking responsibility for it.'

Another issue they face is the size of penalties, which can be as low as \$6,000 for making teenagers work with explosives. For some companies, the fine may just be 'the cost of doing business', said the official.

Gordon Lafer, a University of Oregon professor and former policy advisor on labor for the House of Representatives, said bosses have little to fear from an underfunded Labor Department that is chronically short of inspectors.

'The law is simple, but the chance of it being enforced is almost non-existent,' Lafer said.

'Teenagers are cheaper, they don't stick around, you don't have to worry about pensions or health insurance, and a lot of times they're easier to control or intimidate than adults.'

As well as the current labor shortage, the US is home to some 11 million undocumented migrants and a surge at the southern border saw a record 2.3 million border encounters in the 2022 fiscal year — adults and children typically seeking work who can be easily exploited.

The Department of Labor does not identify underage workers by nationality or immigration status, but court documents show that many of the minors working at the meatpacking and automaker plants were Spanish speakers.

Rather than boosting protections for young workers, some states have been loosening restrictions. Politicians from both San Mateo have pushed for longer working hours for children.

Reid Maki, the director of Child Labor Issues and coordinator of Child Labor Coalition at the National Consumers League, said the focus on 'Dickensian' working conditions at meatpacking plants masked a deeper child labor problem in the US.

There's a 'whole iceberg below' the labor department's numbers, said Maki. As many as 300,000 children work in agriculture, often 'back-breaking' 80-hour weeks while inhaling pesticides. About 33 are injured daily.

'The volume of unaccompanied minors coming across the border is a huge concern,' said Maki. 'We're worried about the boys ending up in farm work. A lot of girls, too, but they're also vulnerable to being introduced to sex work.'

San Mateo born of election fraud, corruption

- San Mateo County is getting ready to celebrate the 150th anniversary of its political birth, including events that earned it a reputation for many years as the most corrupt county in California.

Historians and politicians — including retired judge Quentin Kopp — will gather today dressed in their finest scoundrel garb and re-enact the rigged election of 1856, which put San Mateo County's first leaders into office. On Wednesday, the Fox Theatre will host a gala event to celebrate the incorporation of the county on April 19, 1856.

That incorporation came at the hands of a bill from Assemblyman Horace Hawes, who wanted to create a unified city and county of San Francisco and run the scoundrels — many of whom had been lured to the region by gold prospects — out of the city. It worked only too well

- At the county's first elections in May, ex-prizefighters Chris Lilly and Billy Mulligan, allied with San Francisco politicians who favored the reunification, manned the election with guns and arranged for false ballots to be included in the vote.

At the time, San Mateo County had 2,000 citizens, including women and children. Somehow, more than 1,600 ballots were cast, according to county historian Mitch Postel.

Many of the ballots were submitted using the names of immigrants who came to California to work in the gold mines. The ballot boxes had secret compartments, so that someone with a quick hand could swap legitimate ballots out and insert forged ones.

Mulligan's brother was elected sheriff; Lilly's bartender, Robert Gray, was elected county clerk; and the two judges who certified the election, Charles Clark and John Johnston, won two of the three new Supervisor seats.

"I can't help but think some deal was made with those judges," Postel said.

The Hawes decision suited San Mateo County well. As San Francisco grew to 50,000 people, Peninsula denizens felt the metropolitan politicians didn't represent their interests — and besides, it was a difficult 40-mile trek to do business at City Hall.

But it turned out to be a mixed blessing for San Francisco. The city, freed of its criminal underworld, became more mature, but had lost some of the things that modernizing cities needed, such as space for essential industries and facilities.

“It made it difficult for San Francisco to be a 20th-century town, because it lacked room for an airport and cemeteries,” Postel said.

San Mateo Can Never Solve The Housing Crisis Unless It Coughs Up Some Of It's Land

[San Mateo is Where Chinese citizens are buying \\$6BN of property after being banned by other countries for pushing up house prices as Congress calls it a 'huge problem'](#)



San Mateo, California and New York are the top two spots for Chinese buyers in the US, followed by Indiana and Florida tied for third. Chinese buyers spent \$6.1 billion in the US on mainly primary residences (52 percent) and residential rentals (25 percent). Florida has hit its 14 consecutive year as the number one spot overall for foreign buyers, which Governor Ron DeSantis, 43, called a 'huge problem.' Chinese buyers are being pushed out of other countries, like New Zealand and Australia for driving up housing prices. Like New Zealand and Australia, DeSantis wants to impose foreign taxes on them to deter them from buying on US soil. 'I don't think they should be able to do it. I think the problem is these companies have ties to the CCP, and it's not always apparent,' DeSantis said.

Everyone wants the government to solve the housing crisis but all reports say that the “housing crisis” exists because there are NOT ENOUGH HOMES BUILT!

Giving massive amounts of government funds to your big developer friends to build poor people towers of apartment blocks is not going to shut the public up.

NOBODY wants to live in an apartment tower!

The government owns over ten times as much land as is needed to solve the housing crisis.

In the Bay Area, The Stanford University grounds can, alone, solve many of the problems. Point Reyes National Park only has tiny areas where tourists can park. The rest of it is for ‘demonstration cows’ and nobody uses most of it. Drop some modern Sea Ranch type pre-fabs in there.

Around Half Moon Bay and Pescadero all of the coastal farmers are not able to make money any longer. They can make many times more money selling their lands to the feds for single family small homes.

The government needs to provide empty land, with plumbing and electric points every 300 feet and sell, or give, single family home sites to individual persons/families. Those individuals can then contract licensed contractors to build their homes.

The issue is about land!!!

Everything else is secondary.

Sen. Mike Lee wants to open up federal land in the West for more housing. The Utah Republican recently introduced the Helping Open Underutilized Space to Ensure Shelter or [HOUSES Act](#) to do so.

From urban Salt Lake City to [more rural Kanab](#), Utah is in [the midst of a housing crisis](#). A top housing specialist at the Utah Department of Workforce Services told state lawmakers last year the affordable housing crisis [won't be solved by building](#) more.

But Lee thinks freeing up federal land will help the shortage.

“Supply is not meeting housing demand in Utah and the federal government’s land ownership is a significant cause of our restricted housing stock,” said Lee in a press release.

The bill would allow local governments to buy federal land at a reduced price. Then a majority of the land will have to be set aside for housing and adhere to strict density requirements.

“If [communities] so desire and if there's land that makes sense, they can petition the Bureau of Land Management for certain parcels of land and then use that land to build homes on,” said Heath Hansen, Lee’s Southern Utah director at a Washington City Council meeting in March.

Environmental groups oppose the HOUSES Act. Kate Groetzinger, a communications associate with the Center for Western Priorities, sees this as a way for Lee to attack public lands. Disclosure: Groetzinger is a former KUER employee.

“It's just not a good faith attempt to solve the housing crisis or housing affordability crisis,” she said. “Anyone who has followed Mike Lee's career in the Senate knows about his disdain for federal public lands and that his main goal is to privatize public lands.”

The bill, Groetzinger said, would also encourage urban sprawl in places like southwest Utah, which is already [struggling with rapid growth](#).

Steve Bloch, the legal director at Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, doesn't expect Lee's bill to go far. He said when lawmakers have tried to sell federal lands in the past, the public has risen up.

“Hunters, anglers and outdoor enthusiasts treasure our public heritage of federal land,” he said. “And selling them off here at a reduced rate is not really something that I expect to make a lot of headway.”

Lee sponsored the HOUSES Act, with Sen. Mitt Romney, R-UT, and Sen. John Barrasso, R-WY, cosponsoring.

San Mateo Officials Solicit Bribes From Real Estate Developers

Per HUD: “We reviewed the Housing Authority of the County of San Mateo’s (Authority) Housing Choice Voucher program to determine whether the Authority used program funds in accordance with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rules and regulations. The HUD San Francisco Office of Public Housing requested that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the financial operations of the Authority due to concerns about the use of program funds. The Authority did not use Housing Choice Voucher program funds in accordance with requirements. Specifically, the Authority:

- Used \$573,485 in Housing Choice Voucher program funds to overlease the Moving to Work Demonstration (Moving to Work) program. Further, in an attempt to remedy the overleasing, the Authority improperly implemented a Moving to Work preference in its Housing Choice Voucher program that impacted families on the Housing Choice Voucher program waiting list. Loaned \$1.4 million in Housing Choice Voucher program funds to pay for construction costs of the El Camino Village low-rent public housing project.
- Loaned \$500,000 in Midway Village Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program grant funds to reimburse the Housing Choice Voucher program for El Camino Village construction cost overruns.
- Transferred \$115,602 in portability administrative fees to its nonfederal account.
- Overdrew its Housing Choice Voucher program operating reserve.

Most of the large real estate developers operating in and around San Mateo County have paid bribes to staff, desk clerks, inspectors and senior City Hall management.

Bijan Madjlessi stands accused of bilking a Northern California bank out of millions of dollars--with the assistance of two bank officers. The bank later went under, leaving US taxpayers to pick up the tab for \$12 million in funds that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) paid out to cover the losses of the bank's depositors.

People who had bought stock in the bank lost additional millions that were not covered by FDIC insurance.

The authorities said Madjlessi's fraud enabled him to live high with a 7,000-square-foot (650-square-meter) mansion, personal jet and yacht.

The alleged fraud played out in Sonoma County, which lies at the northern end of San Francisco Bay and is the birthplace of the California wine industry.

The new charges came as a result of a three-year federal investigation into the collapse of Sonoma Valley Bank, which went under in 2010.

In addition to Madjlessi, police arrested the bank's former CEO, Sean Cutting, 44, and its chief loan officer, Brian Melland, 45, and attorney David Lonich, 59, who was Madjlessi's lawyer.

They appeared in federal court in San Francisco, where prosecutors unsealed an indictment accusing them of conspiracy, bank and wire fraud, money laundering, making false statements to a bank, false bank entries and obstruction of justice. Madjlessi faces 28 criminal counts.

If convicted on all charges, they face fines of more than \$17 million and decades in prison. Each has been released on \$250,000 bond.

Investors in the failed bank said Madjlessi left a wake of financial ruin while treating himself to a lavish lifestyle. Chad Empey, a glass contractor who claims Madjlessi duped him into taking out loans for him, told The Press Democrat of Sonoma County, "It's unfathomable what he did. A lot of people lost money--their retirements, their homes. He destroyed hundreds of people."

Madjlessi and his associates received nearly \$55 million from the bank, and defaulted on at least \$45 million in loans, according to a 2011 lawsuit filed by investors.

Prosecutors allege Madjlessi and his attorney, Lonich, worked with Cutting and Melland at the bank to defraud the bank.

The indictment is focused on only one part of the money that Madjlessi got from the bank. It alleges Madjlessi and Lonich created a front company, 101 Houseco LLC, to borrow \$9.5 million from Sonoma Valley Bank in 2009 shortly after the bank obtained \$8.7 million in federal bailout funds in the wake of the financial meltdown.

Prosecutors said Cutting and Melland took steps to authorize the loan to 101 Houseco, even though they knew that Madjlessi and Lonich were the true borrowers.

Madjlessi used the money to regain control of the Park Lane Villas housing project, according to the indictment. He spent \$4 million to buy back rights to a \$30 million construction loan that he had obtained from IndyMac Bank to build Park Lane Villas and then defaulted on. Madjlessi had been prohibited from bidding on the loan.

The indictment alleges that Cutting helped Madjlessi and Lonich gain control of additional units at Park Lane Villas by issuing letters on Sonoma Valley Bank letterhead falsely stating that the potential buyers had sufficient funds to purchase the units.

The indictment is the latest development in the story of the shuttered bank, which was founded in 1988 and sank deep roots in the Sonoma Valley by encouraging its customers to become shareholders.

Madjlessi faces criminal charges in Marin County, just to the south of Sonoma County, in connection with two separate insurance claims he made after a Nevada condo-conversion project was damaged in a 2008 arson fire. A trial is scheduled for October, a prosecutor said.

The first shoe dropped yesterday (Dec. 21) in the San Mateo County Community College District corruption case.

San Mateo County District Attorney announced he has filed 15 felony charges against Jose Nunez, who has served as the vice chancellor of facilities for the district for the past 21 years.

Charges include:

- Embezzlement of Public Moneys. Wagstaffe said Nunez assisted in directing the award of the contract to design and build a solar energy system at Canada College to the architectural firm of Allana, Buick and Bers of Palo Alto in 2013 and 2014.
- Twelve counts of perjury for failing to report a number of gifts he received from vendors.
- Illegally using college district resources to support a campaign for a candidate for district trustee. The candidate hasn't yet been named.
- Illegally using college district resources to support a March 2020 statewide ballot measure, Prop. 13, a bond measure that would have provided \$2 billion to community college capital projects statewide.

Alan Varela was sentenced today in federal court to 24 months in prison and ordered to pay a \$127,000 fine for a seven year conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud by bribing a San Francisco public official, announced Acting United States Attorney Stephanie M. Hinds and Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge Craig D. Fair. The sentence was handed down by the Honorable William H. Orrick, United States District Judge.

A federal complaint filed September 17, 2020, charged Varela, 60, of Orinda, and William Gilmartin, 61, of San Mateo, with bribery of a public official. In 1991, Varela founded ProVen Management, a Bay Area civil engineering and construction firm that engaged in large scale infrastructure projects. Varela and Gilmartin acted as the firm's president and vice-president, respectively, during the conspiracy time period. According to the complaint, Varela and Gilmartin provided a stream of benefits to Mohammed Nuru, then the Director of San Francisco's Department of Public Works (DPW), in exchange for favorable treatment of their business interests, including non-public inside information.

An Indiana Batmobile builder will not face criminal charges in the Bay Area after an outgoing sheriff ordered a headline-grabbing raid on his business in an alleged favor to a political donor earlier this year.

The San Mateo County District Attorney's Office on Monday dismissed a pair of felony charges against Mark Racop, the 57-year-old owner of an Indiana company that builds replicas of Batman's ride from the 1960s TV series, after prosecutors determined the evidence didn't warrant prosecution.

Racop was set to be arraigned in the Bay Area on Friday, before the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office on Monday filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint and vacate the hearing.

A crook named Brugnara was charged with mail fraud for refusing to pay for \$11 million in art delivered to his Sea Cliff estate.[\[15\]](#) While awaiting trial on these charges, Brugnara was furloughed into the custody of his attorney, and escaped from the San Francisco federal courthouse.[\[16\]](#) He was recaptured a week later in Los Gatos, California.[\[17\]](#) Brugnara represented himself in the trial, which was tried before Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California. By the end of the trial Judge Alsup had sentenced Brugnara to 471 days in prison for contempt due to Brugnara's conduct during the trial, including routinely ignoring Judge Alsup's evidentiary and procedural rulings, yelling at witnesses, throwing tantrums, and insulting the government's attorneys, including calling U.S. District Attorney Robin Harris a "Nazi" in front of the jury.[\[18\]](#)[\[19\]](#) Brugnara was convicted on six of the nine counts he faced, and sentenced to seven years in prison.[\[20\]](#) On May 11, 2017 the Appeals Court affirmed all the convictions, rejecting Brugnara's argument that his decision to represent himself denied him a fair trial. The court also rejected Brugnara's claim that the art was fake and hence his refusal to pay or return it didn't constitute fraud, ruling that Brugnara had not taken the steps necessary to support his claim that the delivered art was fake, and, even if it were, his refusal to return the art (claiming that it was a gift) still showed evidence of an intent to defraud.[\[18\]](#)[\[21\]](#)

After becoming acquainted with his future wife in college, they married in the 1990s and have four children.[\[22\]](#) Prior to his incarceration, Brugnara split residence between Las Vegas and a San Francisco Sea Cliff villa purchased from comedian [Cheech Marin](#).[\[23\]](#) Brugnara is the nephew of former [San Francisco Police](#) Chief [Anthony "Tony" Ribera](#).[\[24\]](#) In 2005, he offered to purchase the shuttered St. Brigid Church in San Francisco for \$3 million to prevent its sale to the Academy of Art University.[\[25\]](#) The offer was not accepted, and the sale to the Academy of Art University went through. In 2008, Brugnara claimed water rights associated with property he owned near Gilroy, California, including a reservoir which he stated could retain 2,000 acre-feet. In 2008 Brugnara was in negotiations to supply the city of [Gilroy](#) their domestic water supply.[\[26\]](#) In 2003, Brugnara owned [Christ Carrying the Cross](#), which he attributed to [Leonardo da Vinci](#), although the attribution remains disputed.[\[23\]](#)

A web of charges stemming from a federal probe into public corruption has caught another fly.

Victor Makras, a real estate investor once described as [“the guy in every room for every mayor,”](#) was indicted last week on claims of bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud in a loan scheme that tied him to Harlan Kelly, the former head of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, who already faces five counts of bribery.

Kelly and Makras are charged with conspiring to defraud Quicken Loans when Kelly and wife Naomi, who was the San Francisco City Administrator until she resigned earlier this year, applied for refinancing. Kelly faces up to 20 years in prison on each of five bribery charges and both men face as much as 30 years behind bars on each of the two fraud charges, according to the San Francisco Chronicle and the indictment.

“In applying for the \$1.3 million loan, Kelly and Makras represented to Quicken Loans a falsely inflated debt amount that Kelly owed on his existing real estate loan to Makras Investors,” [according to](#)

[a statement](#) from the U.S. Attorney's Office. "That falsely inflated amount allowed Kelly to obtain an increased amount of loan funds from Quicken Loans and at a lower loan rate."

The indictment goes on to link a portion of the loan to money Kelly owed "Contractor #1," whom as the San Francisco Chronicle [noted earlier](#), seems to resemble permit expediter and construction firm executive Walter Wong, who has pleaded guilty to money laundering and conspiracies to commit honest services fraud.

The City Attorney's office has called Wong "the connecting thread" between alleged misconduct in three city departments. In addition to Kelly in the SFPUC, corruption charges were filed last year against former Public Works head Mohammed Nuru and former Department of Building Inspection head Tom Hui.

The case has also brought down higher-ups at Recology, the city's recycling and trash company, which admitted paying Nuru \$900,000 in bribes and last month agreed to \$36 million in federal fines.

The fraud claims were the first to be brought against Makras. His firm, contacted by phone on Tuesday, declined to comment.

In addition to [throwing fundraisers in his home](#) for Mayor London Breed, Makras also served as a PUC Commissioner and a San Francisco Port Commissioner and sat on the San Francisco employees retirement board. Last year, he [quietly declined](#) to be reappointed to the Ports position after concerns about ethics violations when he took part in discussions and a vote on the redevelopment of Mission Rock, which abuts a condo building in which he has invested.

In text messages [cited in the indictment](#), Kelly asked Makras for a \$70,000 personal loan in 2013, about a year after Makras Investors loaned \$715,000 to Kelly and his wife for an extensive remodeling of their home.

A few days later, Makras responded, "After thinking about it A bit [sic], I recommend that I pay your credit cards directly. This will avoid a large check going into your account, Then [sic] needing to explain it to the bank. Banks do not like seeing anything unusual about the flow of cash in and out of checking savings accounts. This will make the loan process go easy."

Kelly agreed and a few days later Makras sent about \$70,000 from his bank account to pay off the couple's credit card debt.

Further texts describe how Kelly asked Makras to "cash out 200K" for "money received and money owed" as well as his wife's student loans: "If you can put in a note saying I owe it all good!" In response, the indictment alleges that Makras backdated the initial loan to include the new infusion of cash and later falsely stated that the balance owed to Makras Investors was \$915,000.

Kelly and his wife then took the falsified information to Quicken when they applied for a \$1.3 million refinancing on their home. The Kellys used the funds to pay off their original home loan from JPMorgan Chase & Co., the \$715,000 actually owed to Makras Investors and the \$70,000 personal loan.

Makras kept the remaining \$130,000 from the Quicken loan in his bank account and used it to pay “Contractor #1,” other contractors at the Kelly home and more Kelly credit card bills.

In April 2015, Kelly texted Makras to say that he estimated he had about \$10,000 left in the account and wanted \$16,000. “The remaining balance goes to duckhorn cab,” he wrote, a reference to a Napa Valley vintner whose cabernet sauvignons often sell for more than \$100 a bottle.

The objectives of the subterfuge were largely to “obtain additional funds from Quicken Loans at a lower interest rate than would have been charged for a cash-out loan” and to conceal the Kellys existing debts from the lender, according to the indictment.

Kelly pleaded not guilty to the bank fraud and earlier bribery charges, which in addition to prison time comes with more than \$2 million in potential fines.

Per the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), Treasury: FinCEN is issuing this advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) to solicit public comment on potential requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) for certain persons involved in real estate transactions to collect, report, and retain information. The systemic money laundering vulnerabilities presented by the U.S. real estate sector, and consequently, the ability of illicit actors to launder criminal proceeds through the purchase of real estate, threatens U.S. national security and the integrity of the U.S. financial system. Accordingly, FinCEN intends to begin the rulemaking process to address such vulnerabilities. As a first step in this rulemaking process, FinCEN is issuing this ANPRM to seek initial public comment on questions that will assist FinCEN in the consideration and preparation of a proposed rule.

Federal E-rulemaking Portal: <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Include 1506-AB54 in the submission. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2021-0007.

Mail: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Global Investigations Division, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183. Include 1506-AB54 in the body of the text. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2021-0007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

FinCEN: The FinCEN Regulatory Support Section at 1-800-767-2825 or electronically at frc@fincen.gov.

The goal of this rulemaking process is to implement an effective system to collect and permit authorized uses of information concerning potential money laundering associated with non-financed transactions ^[1] in the United States real estate market. FinCEN expects that doing so will strengthen the United States' national security and the integrity of the U.S. financial system. With this ANPRM, FinCEN seeks input on how it should implement such a system, consistent with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), to maximize benefits while minimizing burdens on reporting financial institutions and nonfinancial trades or businesses.

Money laundering vulnerabilities exist throughout the United States real estate market. These vulnerabilities are not limited to any particular sector. Although in recent years FinCEN has focused its

information collection efforts on non-financed purchases of residential real estate by shell companies, FinCEN believes that other areas of the real estate market, such as commercial real estate and certain real estate purchases by natural persons, may merit regulatory coverage.

For this rulemaking process, FinCEN is considering how best to focus its regulatory attention on residential and commercial real estate transactions. FinCEN notes that money laundering risks stem from transactions in both the commercial and residential real estate sectors, and both merit appropriate regulatory treatment. At the same time, FinCEN recognizes that an iterative approach may be warranted given the complexities and differences between different market sectors and the potential burdens that new reporting and recordkeeping requirements may have for businesses. If an iterative approach is warranted, FinCEN could initially focus on residential real estate followed by additional action to promulgate regulations covering the commercial real estate sector, as well as any other regulatory gaps that may exist with money laundering vulnerabilities involving real estate. FinCEN invites comments regarding the approach that it should take with respect to regulatory treatment of residential and commercial real estate and the money laundering threats presented by these sectors.

This ANPRM seeks comment to assist FinCEN in preparing a potential proposed rule that would seek to impose nationwide recordkeeping and reporting requirements on certain persons participating in transactions involving non-financed purchases of real estate. FinCEN has not previously imposed the BSA's general recordkeeping and reporting requirements on businesses involved in non-financed real estate transactions, but FinCEN has imposed more specific transaction reporting requirements on title insurance companies in the form of time-limited Geographic Targeting Orders under [31 U.S.C. 5326\(a\)](#). This ANPRM seeks public comment on whether FinCEN should impose a similar, ongoing, and expanded reporting requirement through regulations. Such a rule could be promulgated under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#). FinCEN invites comments on alternative approaches to address the risk of money laundering in non-financed real estate transactions, including, for example, potentially promulgating general BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements for “persons involved in real estate settlements and closings” under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(g\)\(1\)](#) and related program requirements under [31 CFR 5318\(h\)](#).^[2]

FinCEN seeks comment on the potential scope of any such regulations, including, among other things: The persons who should be subject to the requirements; which types of real estate purchases should be covered; what information should be reported and retained; the geographic scope of such a requirement; and the appropriate reporting dollar-value threshold. FinCEN also invites general comments regarding the risk of money laundering and other illicit financial activities in the real estate market and the extent to which any reporting requirements would address that risk.

II. Money Laundering in San Mateo Real Estate

Treasury, working with law enforcement partners, has highlighted the money laundering risks and typologies associated with the U.S. real estate market. As Treasury explained in its 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, “[c]riminals with widely divergent levels of financial sophistication use real estate at all price levels to store, launder, or benefit from illicit

funds.” In that report Treasury identified the risks of the laundering of illicit proceeds through real estate purchases as a main vulnerability and key action item for strengthening the U.S. Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework. Law enforcement actions—including complaints, indictments, and prosecuted cases—confirm the conclusions in the report on the linkages between real estate transactions and money laundering and other illicit activities.^[3]

Indeed, as the Congressional Research Service recently noted, real estate money laundering “schemes can involve a wide range of conventional domestic criminals, as well as transnational criminals, including drug cartels and human traffickers, international terrorists, and foreign kleptocrats (corrupt high-level officials).”^[4] As such, “[t]he purchase of real estate, often combined with methods to conceal a purchaser's identity and source of funds, can allow criminals to integrate ill-gotten proceeds into the legal economy[.]”^[5]

Reports by foreign governments, international standard setters, and a variety of reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental organizations, academics, trade organizations, media, and other members of civil society confirm the substantial risk that the real estate market presents for the money laundering problem.

In January 2007, for example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as the global standard setter for combatting money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation finance, published a wide-ranging report and series of recommendations that highlighted the vast scope of the money laundering problem in the real estate sector. The FATF has issued guidance—most recently in June 2021—recommending AML/CFT requirements for certain entities involved in real estate transactions.^[6] Further, in the FATF's 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of the United States, the FATF identified numerous money laundering vulnerabilities in the U.S. real estate sector, noting that “purchasers often use legal persons to hold real estate and the opaqueness of legal persons . . . is a vulnerability which can be exploited by illicit actors.”^[7] Of note, the FATF found the United States' failure to regulate real estate transactions in line with the FATF standards to be a significant deficiency in the U.S. AML/CFT regime.

The European Union has regulated real estate transactions for the purposes of AML/CFT efforts since 2001.^[8] In 2019, the European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), the European Parliament's in-house research service, published a briefing indicating the widespread use of real estate in money laundering, and in particular, highlighted the necessity of identifying purchasers of real estate and proper regulatory coverage of professionals involved in such transactions via AML reporting mechanisms.^[9]

Concerns about the abuse of the real estate market have also been extensively reported by the press, academia, and civil society organizations. For example, in February 2015, *The New York Times* published a series of articles entitled “Towers of Secrecy” on the use of shell companies to purchase high-value residential real estate in New York City.^[10] The *Times* also found that shell companies purchased nearly half of the most expensive residential properties in the United States.^[11] The articles identified a specific set of real estate transactions as a high potential money laundering risk: The use of

shell companies to pay for residential properties in cash at the time of closing, without a corresponding mortgage.^[12]

In February 2021, the National Association of Realtors (NAR), an industry trade organization, issued voluntary guidelines for real estate professionals that highlighted the vulnerability of the U.S. real estate market to money laundering, stating that “many non-financial businesses and professions are also vulnerable to potential money laundering schemes” and “[r]eal estate is believed to be used in money laundering schemes, making real estate professionals likely to encounter money laundering activities in the course of their business.”^[13]

In August 2021, Global Financial Integrity (GFI),^[14] an NGO, published a study finding that an estimated \$2.3 billion had been laundered through the U.S. real estate market over the previous five years. The study further noted that among the cases it reviewed, over 50% involved Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).^[15] Moreover, the study found that the “use of anonymous shell companies and complex corporate structures continue[d] to be the number one money laundering typology” involving real estate.^[16]

And most recently, in November 2021, The Sentry,^[17] an NGO, published a report detailing the use of real estate purchases in the United States and elsewhere by PEPs to launder proceeds from political corruption. According to this report, these PEPs used a network of shell companies to move funds abroad and purchase millions of dollars of real estate, including 17 properties for a total of \$6.6 million in Washington, DC, and Johannesburg, South Africa. The report further highlighted the use of shell companies and trusts to obscure the true owners of the properties.^[18]

Several key factors contribute to the systemic vulnerability of the U.S. real estate market to money laundering. Those factors include, but are not limited to, lack of transparency, attractiveness of the U.S. real estate market as an investment vehicle, and the lack of industry regulation.

First, the lack of transparency in the real estate market contributes to its vulnerability to money laundering activity. Real estate may be held directly or indirectly through nominees, legal entities (such as one or more shell holding companies), or through various investment vehicles. Buyers may use shell companies in many legitimate circumstances, such as when buyers use legal entities to shield themselves and their assets from liability related to the purchase of real property or as a means of protecting their privacy. Illicit actors, however, can take advantage of the opacity of shell companies or other legal entities or arrangements to mask their identity as the true beneficial owners of the property and their involvement in real estate transactions.

Second, the attractiveness of the U.S. real estate market as a stable vehicle for maintaining and increasing investment value also contributes to its vulnerability to money laundering activity. Illicit actors seek to conceal the origins of their illicit funds in a way that grows as an investment, “cleans” as much money as possible with each transaction, and allows them to enjoy the fruits of their illicit activity while minimizing potential losses from market instability and fluctuating exchange rates.

Consequently, real estate—especially in a relatively stable market with strong private property protections such as in the United States—is an attractive asset to facilitate money laundering.

Third, the lack of industry regulation for non-financed transactions exacerbates the money laundering vulnerabilities of the U.S. real estate market. Non-financed purchases of real estate currently are not subject to AML/CFT regulatory requirements because they do not involve financing underwritten by a financial institution subject to BSA requirements. This leaves a substantial portion of the real estate market without the same AML/CFT protections and safeguards as those applicable to banks, casinos, or other financial institutions. Moreover, data on real estate purchases is held in a patchwork of different state and county databases, making investigation and analysis difficult.

FinCEN recognizes the efforts by trade organizations for real estate professionals, such as the NAR (real estate agents and brokers) and the American Bar Association (settlement attorneys), to establish voluntary AML/CFT guidelines that their members may consider implementing to protect against illicit actors seeking to launder illicit funds.^[19] FinCEN considers the issuance of such guidelines as a positive step and indicative of the commitment of the vast majority of real estate professionals to protecting the U.S. real estate sector from illicit activity. Such guidelines, however, are not mandatory or subject to oversight or enforcement and may therefore be avoided by illicit actors. There is also limited information concerning how widely the industry has implemented such best practices and voluntary guidelines, or what other measures are in place to combat money laundering in the real estate sector. In view of this, FinCEN believes that there is a need for regulatory action notwithstanding industry efforts. FinCEN welcomes comments, however, on how the industry has implemented these voluntary guidelines, any challenges in implementation, their effectiveness, and whether FinCEN should consider including elements of existing voluntary guidelines in any potential rule.

In sum, the U.S. real estate market can be an effective vehicle for money laundering and can involve businesses and professions that facilitate (even if unwittingly) acquisitions of real estate in the money laundering process. Accordingly, FinCEN views the structure of the U.S. real estate market to present money laundering vulnerabilities and considers that regulatory action is warranted to collect information from businesses and professions operating in the real estate sector in order to protect U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system.

III. Current Law

The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”), the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (“AML Act”), and other legislation, is the legislative framework commonly referred to as the BSA.^[20] The Secretary of the Treasury (“Secretary”) has delegated to the Director of FinCEN the authority to implement, administer, and enforce compliance with the BSA and associated regulations.^[21] The purposes of the BSA include requiring certain reports or records that “are highly useful . . . in criminal, tax, or regulatory

investigations, risk assessments, or proceedings,” or “in intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.” [22]

Under the BSA, the Secretary may require any financial institution, including “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements,” to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation (a “suspicious activity report,” or “SAR”). [23] The BSA also requires each financial institution to establish AML/CFT programs, including, at a minimum, “(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (B) the designation of a compliance officer; (C) an ongoing employee training program; and (D) an independent audit function to test programs.” [24] The Secretary may prescribe minimum standards for such programs, and may exempt any financial institution from the application of such standards. [25] Under the BSA, as amended by Section 6102(c) of the AML Act, the Secretary is also authorized to “require a class of domestic financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses to maintain appropriate procedures, including the collection and reporting of certain information as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation, to . . . guard against money laundering, the financing of terrorism, or other forms of illicit finance.” [26]

FinCEN's regulations implementing the BSA require banks, non-bank residential mortgage lenders and originators (“RMLOs”), and housing-related Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) to file SARs and establish AML/CFT programs, [27] but FinCEN's regulations exempt other persons involved in real estate closings and settlements from the requirement to establish AML/CFT programs, and the regulations do not impose a SAR filing requirement on such persons. [28]

IV. Prior Rulemakings

In 2002, FinCEN temporarily exempted certain financial institutions, including “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” and “loan and finance companies,” from the requirement to establish an AML/CFT program. FinCEN explained that it would “continue studying the money laundering risks posed by these institutions in order to develop appropriate anti-money laundering program requirements,” but that additional time was needed to consider the businesses that would be subject to such requirements, as well as the nature and scope of the AML/CFT risks associated with those businesses. [29] FinCEN also explained its concern that many of these financial institutions were sole proprietors or small businesses, and FinCEN intended to avoid imposing “unreasonable regulatory burdens with little or no corresponding anti-money laundering benefits.” [30]

In 2003, FinCEN issued an ANPRM regarding the AML/CFT program requirement for “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” (“2003 ANPRM”). The 2003 ANPRM solicited comments on the money laundering risks in real estate closings and settlements, how to define “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements,” whether any persons involved in real estate closings and settlements should be exempted from the AML/CFT program requirement, and how to structure the requirement in light of the size, location, and activities of persons in the real estate industry. [31] FinCEN received 52 comments on the 2003 ANPRM from individuals, various institutions and

associations of interested parties, law firms, state bar associations, an office within the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an office within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).^[32] Many comments suggested that the threat of money laundering through real estate warranted appropriate regulation, but commenters disagreed over the specific businesses that should be covered. FinCEN did not propose regulations in response to these comments, and persons involved in real estate closings and settlements continue to be exempt from the AML/CFT program requirement.

FinCEN subsequently focused on the money laundering vulnerabilities in financed real estate transactions, as approximately 80% of real estate transactions are financed by a loan from a financial institution.^[33] FinCEN published a number of reports tracking the rise of mortgage fraud SARs covering geographic trends and fraud typologies. These SARs, which were filed by banks and other financial institutions, underscored the illicit activity that can occur in the primary and secondary residential mortgage markets.^[34]

In a 2012 final rule, FinCEN eliminated the exemption for “loan and finance companies,” and required such companies—defined as non-bank residential mortgage lenders and originators (“RMLOs”)—to file SARs and comply with AML/CFT program obligations.^[35] In a 2014 final rule, FinCEN extended similar requirements to the housing-related Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”)—Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.^[36] FinCEN explained that these entities were involved in providing financing to the residential mortgage market, making them vulnerable to fraud and other financial crimes.^[37] By purchasing mortgage loans, extending loans secured by mortgages and other real estate-related collateral, and engaging in a variety of related financial activities, these entities are in a unique position to provide information on suspected mortgage fraud and money laundering that has proven valuable to law enforcement and regulators in the investigation and prosecution of mortgage fraud and other financial crimes.^[38]

In a 2020 final rule, FinCEN also imposed additional AML/CFT obligations on banks lacking a federal functional regulator, ensuring that such entities would be subject to requirements to have an AML/CFT program, meet Customer Identification Program (CIP) and Customer Due Diligence (CDD) requirements, including the verification of beneficial owners of legal entity accounts, in addition to their existing SAR obligations (which would include reporting on transactions involving suspicious real estate transactions).^[39]

Each of those regulations helped to ensure that many participants in financed real estate transactions were subject to AML/CFT program and reporting requirements, including to evaluate and protect against AML/CFT risks and identify and report suspicious activity.

V. Real Estate Geographic Targeting Orders

FinCEN has taken a different approach to all-cash real estate transactions (*i.e.*, real estate transactions without financing by a bank, RMLO, or GSE), which represent approximately 20% of real estate sales. When property is purchased without financing, the transaction generally does not involve a bank or

other financial institution subject to AML/CFT program requirements. Instead, all-cash real estate transactions may involve only relatively small businesses or individuals involved in closing and settlement, and the participants may lack financial incentives to closely monitor the nature of the transactions. Consequently, there exists a vulnerability that illicit actors can exploit to launder the proceeds of criminal activity by purchasing real estate through all-cash transactions.

In addition, all-cash real estate transactions in which individuals use shell companies to purchase high-value residential real estate, primarily in certain large U.S. cities, are a particular concern. FinCEN identified money laundering typologies associated with such transactions and uncovered numerous specific examples of all-cash purchases of residential real estate that potentially involved money laundering activities.^[40]

According to the NAR and the U.S. Census Bureau,^[41] in 2020, 5.64 million existing residential homes and 822,000 new homes were sold in the United States, for a total of 6.46 million transactions.^[42] It is projected that existing and new home sales will total 5.88 million and 740,000, respectively, in 2021.^[43] With a median sale price of approximately \$350,000 for both new and existing homes as of July 2021,^[44] the total value of U.S. residential real estate sales is expected to exceed approximately \$2.31 trillion in 2021.

Although a significant portion of those residential real estate transactions are financed by regulated RMLOs, GSEs, and depository institutions, non-financed real estate transactions can largely avoid financial institutions that are subject to AML/CFT requirements. As previously noted, other businesses and professions involved in real estate transactions, such as real estate brokers and agents, title company representatives, and closing agents (including attorneys when involved), currently are not subject to AML/CFT reporting obligations, and some of these, such as title insurance and real estate agents, are not mandatory in many transactions.

According to figures published by NAR, in both 2020 and 2021, approximately 19% of existing residential home sale were non-financed transactions.^[45] The Census Bureau has further estimated that approximately 4.4% of new home sales are non-financed transactions.^[46] Given that existing home sales comprise approximately 90% of the residential real estate market in the United States, FinCEN estimates that the all-cash purchase rate of real estate transactions in the United States is approximately 18.5%. Based on the NAR estimates of total home sales and median sale prices, this means that approximately 1.21 million residential real estate transactions, with an approximate value of \$463 billion, likely proceed without any AML reporting obligations.^[47]

The types of AML/CFT vulnerabilities in these reports led FinCEN to begin issuing Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs) in January 2016 (“Real Estate GTOs”). The Real Estate GTOs required title insurance companies to file reports and maintain records concerning all-cash purchases of residential real estate above a certain threshold in select metropolitan areas of the United States. Under [31 U.S.C. 5326](#), FinCEN may issue such GTOs that impose additional reporting or recordkeeping requirements on financial institutions and nonfinancial trades or businesses in a geographic area for a limited period

of time, if FinCEN has reasonable grounds to conclude that such requirements are necessary to carry out the purposes of the BSA or to prevent evasions thereof.^[48] The Real Estate GTOs initially required some of the largest title insurance companies in the United States to report “beneficial ownership”^[49] information on “legal entities”^[50] used to purchase “residential real property”^[51] in Manhattan and Miami in “Covered Transactions”.^[52] The information that the GTOs required the title insurance companies to report included: (i) Information about the transaction, including the price and address of the real estate purchased; and (ii) beneficial ownership information—such as name, social security number, and ID number and type—for the beneficial owners of certain legal entities purchasing property in Covered Transactions. The responsibility for reporting information to FinCEN was placed on title insurance companies because the title insurance industry is concentrated among a limited number of participants and title insurance companies play a central role in the vast majority of real estate transactions. This allowed FinCEN to streamline implementation of the GTOs and the collection of information.^[53]

The Real Estate GTOs issued in 2016 provided FinCEN and law enforcement with new data that connected non-financed residential property purchases with the individuals who were the beneficial owners of the legal entities making those purchases. FinCEN began to receive feedback from law enforcement partners that the information was useful for generating new investigative leads, identifying new subjects in ongoing cases, and informing forfeiture efforts, among other things. To further understand the links between opaque transactions and individuals engaged in potentially illicit activity, and to give law enforcement more time to analyze and use the newly collected data, FinCEN renewed the initial GTOs and included additional metropolitan areas.

Since 2016, and most recently in October 2021, FinCEN has renewed the Real Estate GTOs multiple times (collectively, the Real Estate GTO program) and made modifications to their terms to address perceived gaps in the data collected. The number of covered jurisdictions has expanded from two to nine metropolitan areas,^[54] and the orders now cover all U.S. title insurance companies operating in those areas. Subsequent GTO renewals have expanded the types of reportable all-cash transactions to include those involving additional monetary instruments, such as personal and business checks, and those involving wire transfers.^[55] Over the course of the Real Estate GTO program, FinCEN lowered the reporting transaction threshold from \$3 million to \$300,000 in order to better understand the risks of transactions in the non-luxury market.^[56] Lastly, real estate transactions involving purchases by publicly traded companies have been exempted.^[57]

Evidence of money laundering via U.S. real estate transactions has increased over the last several decades, including during the period when the Real Estate GTO program has been in place. FinCEN understands from various law enforcement agencies that the Real Estate GTO data has been highly useful to the investigation of money laundering and financial crimes.

In evaluating reporting from the Real Estate GTOs issued since 2016, FinCEN and law enforcement agencies believe that a substantial proportion of the reported transactions for the purchase of property

involved a beneficial owner who was also the subject of a SAR.^[58] For example, a FinCEN advisory published in May 2017 stated that the proportion of such overlap was more than 30%.^[59] In other words, a significant number of the beneficial owners of the legal entities engaged in non-financed real estate purchases reported under the GTOs have a nexus to reported suspicious activity. The overlap between subjects of GTO reports and SARs suggests a link between all-cash purchases of residential real estate and individuals determined by financial institutions to have been engaged in suspicious activity. These connections between Real Estate GTO reports and other illicit activity have proven highly useful for FinCEN and law enforcement in identifying patterns of criminal activity and links between various illicit enterprises to support investigations.

Law enforcement input and actions further indicate that residential real estate presents significant money laundering risk. Federal and State law enforcement agencies have informed FinCEN that both SARs and GTO reports related to real estate transactions have provided greater insight regarding assets held by persons of investigative interest, have resulted in asset forfeiture actions, and have helped generate leads and identify new subjects for investigation. Additionally, beyond the investigations that have been described above, a review of complaints, indictments, and prosecuted cases provides numerous examples of the linkages between real estate transactions and money laundering, as well as other illicit activities.^[60] Accordingly, the usefulness of the Real Estate GTO reporting data to law enforcement suggests that a regulatory requirement to ensure consistent reporting on a nationwide basis would facilitate law enforcement and national security agency efforts to combat illicit activity in this sector.^[61]

VI. Commercial Real Estate

In contrast to FinCEN's use of Real Estate GTOs to focus on all-cash transactions involving residential real estate, FinCEN decided at the time not to impose a reporting requirement on all cash commercial real estate transactions. The commercial real estate market is both more diverse and complicated than the residential real estate market and presents unique challenges to applying the same reporting requirements or methods as residential transactions. In commercial real estate, possible payments structures are more complex than in the residential real estate market. For example, while the line between financed and non-financed transactions is relatively well-defined in the residential real estate market, this is not necessarily the case with commercial real estate transactions. An entity may, for example, finance the purchase of a large commercial property via the issuance of bonds. It is unclear whether such a transaction would be viewed to be a cash transaction from the point of view of the entities required to report such a transaction. A commercial real estate "transaction" may also involve many transactions. In some cases, such as the development of a large commercial real estate project, there may be many transactions involved in the development and conveyance of a commercial real estate property over the course of months or years.

In part due to such added complexity and opacity, the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the residential real estate sector covered by the GTOs may be compounded in transactions involving

commercial real estate, as there are additional types of purchasing options and financing arrangements available for parties seeking to build or acquire property worth up to hundreds of millions of dollars.^[62] Lawyers, accountants, and individuals in the private equity fields—all positions with minimal to no AML/CFT obligations under the BSA—often facilitate commercial real estate transactions, working at different stages of the transaction and operating with differing amounts of beneficial ownership and financial information related to buyers and sellers. Commercial real estate transactions also often involve purpose-built legal entities and indirect ownership chains as parties create tailored corporate entities to acquire or invest in a manner that limits their legal liability and financial exposure.^[63] The result is an opaque field full of diverse foreign and U.S. domiciled legal entities associated with transactions worth hundreds of millions of dollars that makes up one of the United States' most lucrative industries.

Broadly speaking, FinCEN has serious concerns with the money laundering risks associated with the commercial real estate sector. In its 2006 and 2011 reports, FinCEN detailed various types of suspicious transactions indicative of money laundering in the commercial real estate industry. In the 2006 report, FinCEN analyzed a random sampling of SARs involving commercial real estate-related transactions in which the SAR narratives described transactions or activities involving suspected money laundering and related illicit activity. The types of illicit activity found in that analysis included: Structuring, money laundering, international transfers, tax evasion, and other illicit activity. Among the report's key findings, FinCEN found that property management, real estate investment, realty, and real estate development companies were the most commonly reported entities associated with commercial real estate-related money laundering. The most suspicious activity highlighted in the report was money laundering to promote tax evasion. The report further noted that there appeared to be an increasing trend towards using commercial real estate-related accounts to launder money for PEPs.^[64] In the 2011 report, which focused on commercial real estate financing fraud, FinCEN found that SAR filings involving such fraud almost tripled between 2007 and 2010. FinCEN's analysis found that the top four reported fraud categories were: False documents, misappropriation of funds, collusion-bank insider, and false statements.^[65]

In 2018, the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment noted the vulnerability of commercial real estate to illicit activity, highlighting a 2013 case involving the laundering of drug proceeds by a real estate agent through real estate, including commercial properties.^[66] More recently, DOJ actions have demonstrated that vulnerabilities associated with the commercial real estate sector are actively being exploited by criminals to launder a significant amount of funds. DOJ actions have exposed, for example, drug trafficking organizations funneling illicit proceeds into an investment firm and then using the proceeds to invest in commercial real estate ventures,^[67] and corrupt Russian officials and organized crime figures defrauding the Russian Treasury and then transferring the fraud proceeds through shell corporations into Manhattan commercial real estate.^[68]

Finally, in August 2021, the NGO GFI reported that based on its review of 125 cases from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada involving real estate money laundering, more than 30% of the

cases involved commercial real estate and those cases generally involved significantly higher property values than the residential real estate cases studied.^[69]

In sum, while the Real Estate GTOs to date have not included commercial real estate transactions, FinCEN invites comments on the money laundering risks and structure of the commercial real estate sector so that it may proactively consider possible next steps with respect to reporting or other requirements in relation to commercial real estate transactions given the demonstrated vulnerability of the commercial real estate industry to exploitation. FinCEN is particularly interested in comment concerning the volume and/or type of money laundering vulnerabilities associated with commercial and with residential real estate, and any unique factors or complexities regarding non-financed transactions in each segment, to enable FinCEN to assess appropriate regulatory treatment for residential and commercial real estate purchases.

VII. Real Estate Purchases by Natural Persons

FinCEN recognizes the potential for non-financed purchases by natural persons to facilitate money laundering and other illicit activity. Indeed, the use of natural person nominees can facilitate money laundering involving domestic and foreign bribery and corruption schemes, sanctions evasion, tax evasion, drug trafficking, and fraud, among other types of offenses. As highlighted in the 2020 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing, a Treasury assessment of federal cases involving real properties forfeited to DOJ's Assets Forfeiture Fund between 2014 and June 2017 that were valued at over \$150,000 identified that, in addition to the use of complicit professionals and misuse of legal entities, "criminals often attempted to conceal the true ownership of property by using nominee purchasers or title holders."^[70] These individuals were sometimes another member of the criminal organization but were often a family member or personal associate of the criminal."^[71] FinCEN is considering the extent to which these risks can be addressed. Accordingly, FinCEN solicits comments on money laundering risks associated with non-financed real estate transactions conducted by natural persons, the extent to which rules that apply to entities (which may still be involved in transactions by natural persons) would address those risks, and whether additional regulatory or statutory measures should be considered to close remaining gaps with regard to natural persons associated with real estate transactions.

VIII. Scope of Potential Rules

Given the vulnerabilities of the U.S. real estate sector to money laundering and other illicit activities, FinCEN believes that additional regulatory steps may be needed to ensure consistent reporting on a nationwide basis.

FinCEN therefore invites comment through this ANPRM on appropriate regulatory frameworks to do so, including possible nationwide recordkeeping and reporting requirements pursuant to [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#) or other potential mechanisms. FinCEN believes that any proposed regulation should require certain persons to collect, report, and retain information about specified non-financed purchases

of real estate. FinCEN is considering proposing such a rule that would apply throughout the United States and would contain no lower reporting dollar threshold.

A. Nature of Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements

As explained above, FinCEN's existing regulations require banks, RMLOs, and GSEs to comply with the BSA's general recordkeeping and reporting requirements, including the requirement to file SARs and to establish AML/CFT programs. In contrast, FinCEN's GTOs have subjected title insurance companies in the non-financed real estate market to a more specific reporting requirement applicable to all covered transactions. FinCEN seeks comment on promulgating a similar specific reporting requirement, either as an alternative or addition to the BSA's general requirements. Such a specific reporting requirement could be imposed under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#), as amended by Section 6102(a) of the AML Act, which authorizes the Secretary to “require a class of domestic financial institutions . . . to maintain appropriate procedures, including the collection and reporting of certain information as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation, to . . . guard against money laundering, the financing of terrorism, or other forms of illicit finance.” A specific reporting requirement issued under this authority may be an appropriately tailored way to increase the transparency of the non-financed sector of the real estate market and provide law enforcement, national security agencies, and financial institutions with highly useful information

In the alternative, FinCEN could promulgate more general requirements for certain persons involved in non-financed real estate closings and settlements by requiring such persons to file SARs pursuant to FinCEN's authority under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(g\)\(1\)](#) and by requiring them to establish AML/CFT programs under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(h\)\(1\)-\(2\)](#). Such an approach would involve the application of AML/CFT program rules that traditionally include four requirements—adoption of AML/CFT policies and procedures, designation of an AML/CFT compliance officer, establishment of an AML/CFT training program for appropriate employees, and independent testing of the program to ensure compliance.^[72] FinCEN seeks comments on how such requirements, as well the fifth requirement, CDD rules^[73] containing beneficial ownership requirements, would affect the real estate industry.^[74] In evaluating any potential imposition of general AML/CFT requirements, FinCEN must consider the extent to which the standards for AML/CFT programs are commensurate with the size, location, and activities of persons in this industry. Accordingly, FinCEN is especially interested in comments that would allow it to consider such factors. FinCEN is also particularly interested in the costs, burdens, and benefits associated with the implementation of AML/CFT programs, SAR reporting, and other FinCEN regulatory requirements. Commenters are urged to address the ability of various real estate-related businesses to gather this information for greater transactional transparency, as well as to support the effective administration of a SAR reporting program.

FinCEN seeks comment on the approach that would most effectively address money laundering concerns and minimize burdens for persons involved in non-financed real estate transactions.

B. Scope of Persons Subject to a Reporting Requirement

FinCEN seeks comment on which persons should be required to collect information, maintain records, and report information regarding non-financed purchases of real estate. Thus far, the Real Estate GTOs have required reporting from title insurance companies. However, title insurance is not mandatory in every jurisdiction within the United States, and declining to purchase title insurance could enable evasion of a reporting requirement limited to title insurance companies. FinCEN therefore seeks comment on whether there are other persons involved in non-financed real estate closings and settlements who should be considered.

Typical closing transactions may involve several participants, performing distinct, but complementary, functions, in addition to the buyer and seller. A typical real estate transaction, for example, may involve real estate brokers and agents (representing sellers and buyers); one or more attorneys who represent the buyer or the seller; a title or title insurance company representative, which may include an attorney; a closing agent (title or escrow); an appraiser, who may assess the value of the real estate; and an inspector to identify code violations and needed repairs before closing.

Certain transaction participants may also be better positioned than others to understand the nature and purpose of the transaction, the source of funds, and the identity of the buyer, particularly natural persons or the beneficial owners behind any legal entity purchaser. Other transaction participants may have greater importance to the successful completion of a transaction or face different incentives, which may suggest that they could be well-positioned and motivated to identify owners behind legal entities in the transaction.

In addition, the participants and the nature of their involvement can vary depending on a variety of factors, including state and local laws, the contemplated use of the real estate, the location of the property, the location and nationality of the buyer, the nature of the rights to be acquired, and how such rights are to be held or transferred upon resale of the property or via terms of an investor agreement. Real estate may also be held directly, through one or more shell holding companies, through trusts, or through other investment vehicles. Real estate may be acquired for a number of purposes, including residential or commercial use, portfolio investment, or development purposes, among other reasons. As to the nature of the rights to be acquired, the real estate may be held *in fee simple*, under a lease agreement, or as security for indebtedness. In addition, real estate transactions can involve the transfer of title, legal ownership, or equitable ownership, or a combination thereof. Each of the variables may influence the participants involved in such real estate transactions.

Real estate professionals may have different roles in different transactions that affect their exposure to money laundering. Some professionals may be directly involved in marketing and structuring a real estate deal and are thus able to identify all relevant parties to the transaction. Other participants may have business roles that may not be customer-facing or may focus specifically on the details of the property without any knowledge of the financing (or lack thereof), and therefore are not in a position to identify parties for recordkeeping and reporting purposes. Finally, it may be relevant to identify those financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses that are primarily involved in the transfer and presentation of purchase funds in exchange for title or other rights.

To address money laundering concerns, it may be necessary to ensure that a recordkeeping and reporting requirement attaches to some entity involved in every non-financed transaction. At the same time, FinCEN seeks to minimize the burden on reporting entities and to avoid unnecessary and duplicative reporting. FinCEN seeks comments on whether to assign a hierarchical, cascading reporting obligation on different entities depending on which are involved in a particular covered transaction, in a manner similar to the IRS's regulation for submitting Form 1099-S (“Proceeds from Real Estate Transactions”).^[75] For that IRS regulation, the “person responsible for closing the transaction,” which may be a settlement agent or attorney, for instance, depending on the nature of the transaction, is required to file the Form 1099-S. And if there is no “person responsible for closing the transaction,” the reporting requirement then falls to other persons involved in the transaction, such as the purchaser's broker. In that way, the IRS regulation ensures that for every transaction, some entity involved is required to report. FinCEN is considering, and invites comments on, such an approach. FinCEN also solicits comments on whether and how to assign a reporting requirement to any or all of the following entities: Title insurance companies, title or escrow companies, real estate agents or brokers, real estate attorneys or law firms, settlement or closing agents, as well as other entities listed below in the comments section.

FinCEN also invites comments on any additional financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses that should be covered by a proposed regulation. Finally, FinCEN is aware that there are substantial differences in practices, customs, and requirements for real estate transactions in different jurisdictions within the United States and invites comment on those differences and how to best design a rule that takes into account such jurisdictional differences.

C. Geographic Scope and Transaction Threshold

Although the Real Estate GTOs have been targeted at particular geographic locations within the United States, FinCEN's preliminary view is that fully addressing the money laundering vulnerabilities in the real estate market requires a nationwide rule. While money laundering activity in real estate transactions may be more common in some areas than others, it can occur in any location. Indeed, a survey of recent state and federal court indictments and prosecuted cases demonstrates that real estate money laundering is not limited to the jurisdictions covered by the Real Estate GTOs.^[76] Because such activity can occur in any location, limiting the scope of the regulations by geography may simply push money laundering activity into other locations. A uniform national requirement would also provide consistency and predictability to businesses required to maintain records and make reports. FinCEN nevertheless invites comment on the geographic reach of any proposed regulation, whether the geographic coverage should be limited, and any underlying information to support such limitations. Commenters are invited to comment particularly on the differences in practices, customs, and requirements for real estate transactions in geographic areas of the United States that merit specific consideration because of their relevance to the potential for the abuse of real estate transactions by money launderers.

FinCEN also welcomes comment on the appropriate transaction threshold, if any, for a reporting requirement. FinCEN's GTOs contain a \$300,000 threshold. Other BSA reporting requirements have other thresholds.^[77] However, any transaction threshold may enable money launderers to structure their behavior to avoid a reporting requirement. A survey of court cases indicates that real estate used in money laundering is not limited to properties that sell for greater than \$300,000, the current GTO threshold.^[78] For these reasons, FinCEN is considering a reporting requirement with no transaction threshold. According to figures published by NAR, existing residential home sales of less than \$100,000 constitute less than 5% of overall sales.^[79] Therefore, not setting a minimum threshold appears unlikely to substantially increase the burden on entities required to report under any future regulation. FinCEN solicits comments, however, on whether a minimum threshold should be included.

D. Purchases by Certain Entities

Under the Real Estate GTOs, only cash purchases by the following “legal entities” are reportable transactions: “a corporation, limited liability company, partnership or other similar business entity, whether formed under the laws of a state, or of the United States, or a foreign jurisdiction, other than a business whose common stock or analogous equity interests are listed on a securities exchange regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or a self-regulatory organization registered with the SEC, or an entity solely owned by such a business.” Given the known money laundering typology of using shell companies to obscure the ultimate owners of real estate, FinCEN believes these entities should likely be covered in any proposed regulation. FinCEN seeks comment on which “legal entities” should be included.

Additionally, FinCEN seeks specific comment on whether to include trusts—broadly defined as a legal “relationship in which one person holds title to property, subject to an obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another”—within the reporting requirement.^[80] FinCEN notes that recent high profile DOJ enforcement actions, including a forfeiture action to recover an alleged \$3.5 million in corrupt proceeds laundered through the purchase of a Potomac, Maryland, mansion via a trust, indicate that consideration of any proposed rule should also include the risks presented by U.S. and foreign trusts.^[81]

Due to the inherent opacity of purchases by legal entities, the Real Estate GTOs focused on purchases by such entities. However, FinCEN is also concerned about real estate money laundering risks involving natural persons, such as the use of nominees or “straw-man” purchasers. FinCEN is thus considering the extent to which any proposed rule should address this issue. FinCEN is particularly interested in comments broadly addressing the most appropriate way to treat natural persons in regulations addressing money laundering in the real estate sector. Moreover, FinCEN seeks views on how the use of natural persons in money laundering schemes could be addressed by potential rules covering entities (which may still be involved in most transactions by natural persons).

E. Type of Real Estate

FinCEN is considering the best approach to extending reporting requirements or other regulatory treatment to both residential and commercial real estate given the important differences between the residential and commercial real estate markets. FinCEN is especially interested in how such a regulation might be structured to address the differences between commercial and residential real estate transactions and whether the risk in non-residential real estate is sufficient to justify the burdens that a reporting requirement for non-residential real estate could impose. FinCEN also invites comments on whether to address both commercial and residential real estate sectors in the same rule or to take an iterative approach.

A. General Information Regarding the Real Estate Market

FinCEN is issuing this ANPRM to solicit public comment on issues pertaining to potential BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements. FinCEN invites the views of real estate businesses and professionals, trade organizations, law enforcement, federal agencies, state, local, and Tribal governments, NGOs, members of civil society, and any other interested parties. A variety of perspectives on the U.S. real estate market will provide FinCEN with the information essential for any future rulemaking.

1. Describe a typical residential real estate transaction.
2. Describe a typical commercial real estate transaction.
3. What are the products, services, activities, or affiliations associated with residential real estate transactions? Commercial real estate transactions?
4. What percentage of residential real estate transactions involve purchases by legal entities or trusts?
5. What kinds of professionals are most common in real estate transactions, such as real estate brokers, settlement agents, title insurers, attorneys, etc.? Does this differ for residential and commercial real estate? What kinds of professionals or participants are most able to request, verify, and report documentation related to purchasers? Is title insurance required in most of the transactions? If not, how common is the use of title insurance?
6. What are the typical transaction costs to close a residential real estate deal? For commercial real estate? Typically, what percentage of the sale price do these costs represent?
7. What sort of due diligence is normally conducted, before or at closing, regarding (i) the parties to a transaction (particularly of any natural persons who are the beneficial owners of the buyer or seller); (ii) the source of funds for any transaction; and (iii) other key aspects of the transaction? Does this process differ for commercial and residential transactions?
8. What sort of existing recordkeeping or reporting requirements, unrelated to BSA compliance, exist for real estate transactions? If so, what information must be recorded or reported, to whom, for how

long, and what entity provides oversight and ensures compliance? Do these requirements differ for residential and commercial real estate transactions?

9. Please describe any “best practices” related to due diligence on the seller and buyer of residential or commercial real estate; confirmation of the legality of the transaction; inquiries as to the source of acquisition funding; and any other issues that may relate to the marketing, negotiation of terms, and closing of the transaction.

10. What percentage of residential real estate purchases are all-cash transactions?

11. What percentage of commercial real estate purchases are all-cash transactions?

12. Are the beneficial owners of legal entity purchasers involved in real estate transactions normally identified by some participant in a real estate transaction?

13. How do due diligence processes, if any, differ for commercial or residential properties?

14. What do persons involved in real estate transactions do if they have any suspicions about a transaction, customer, or source of funds?

15. How often are attorneys used in all-cash residential or commercial real estate transactions? Why are they used?

16. How often are real estate brokers or agents used in all-cash residential real estate transactions? Why are they used?

17. Is the decision to use real estate brokers, or agents, or attorneys different for all-cash real estate transactions?

18. Please describe when an escrow account must be used for a real estate transaction.

19. Please explain how payment is most often tendered for real estate purchases (*e.g.*, mortgage, domestic wires, foreign wires, checks, currency, CVC). Which of these categories of payment are higher-risk?

20. Please note any differences not already covered in provision of services for residential real estate transactions versus those for commercial real estate transactions.

B. What are the money laundering risks in real estate transactions?

FinCEN solicits comment on money laundering activities (in general terms, not identifying actual parties or properties involved) in connection with real estate transactions, the existence of any safeguards in the sector to prevent money laundering, and what additional steps may be necessary to protect the real estate industry from abuse by money launderers.

21. Describe the potential money laundering and illicit finance risks and vulnerabilities arising in the U.S. real estate market. Are these risks different for the residential and commercial real estate sectors?

22. Identify specific activities and services that present the highest and lowest money laundering risks, as well as factors related to parties, the transaction, and the property, bearing on risk and its assessment. What kinds of transactions and customers are highest and lowest risk? How are those risks mitigated and what are the associated costs of that mitigation?
23. What are the money laundering risks associated with all-cash purchases of real estate by natural persons?
24. Is it possible to estimate the extent to which residential property values are affected by money laundering transactions? Is there a similar estimate for commercial real estate?
25. What are the money laundering risks of commercial versus residential transactions?

C. Which real estate transactions should FinCEN's rule cover?

The questions in Part IX, Sections C-E, may be most relevant for any proposed rule imposing a specific reporting requirement pursuant to [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#), as amended by Section 6102(c) of the AML Act, but commenters may examine these questions in the context of a proposed rule promulgating traditional AML/CFT requirements for “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements.”

26. What general factors should FinCEN consider in determining which transactions to cover?
27. Should FinCEN's proposed rule be limited to residential real estate or should FinCEN cover transactions involving other forms of real estate (e.g., commercial, farmland). If you believe FinCEN should cover other forms of real estate, should FinCEN do so in conjunction with the regulation of residential real estate transactions or separately?
28. How should FinCEN define “residential real estate”? Is the definition used for the Real Estate GTOs either under- or over-inclusive?
29. How should FinCEN define “commercial real estate”?
30. Should FinCEN's proposed rule be limited to transactions involving legal entities or should it cover natural persons as well? If not, why?
31. Assuming FinCEN's proposed rule is limited to purchases by legal entities, which legal entities should any rule cover? Is the definition of “legal entity” in the Real Estate GTOs too broad or too narrow? Should trusts be covered?
32. Should FinCEN's proposed rule be limited to non-financed transactions (all-cash)?
33. Assuming FinCEN's proposed rule is limited to non-financed transactions, how should FinCEN define the term “non-financed transaction”?
34. Should FinCEN geographically limit the scope of any proposed regulation?
35. Are there any jurisdictions or geographic areas within the United States in which residential real estate transactions have unique customs or requirements that would make designing a rule to cover such jurisdictions in conjunction with the remainder of the country problematic?

36. Should FinCEN provide a lower limit or *de minimis* amount for the reporting threshold for transactions?

D. Which persons should be required to report information concerning real estate transactions to FinCEN?

37. Should FinCEN require any, a subset, or all of the following entities to report information regarding non-financed transactions: (i) Real estate lawyers and law firms; (ii) real estate agents/brokers/settlement agents; (iii) title insurance companies; (iv) title and escrow agents and companies; (v) real estate investment companies; (vi) real estate development companies; (vii) real estate property management companies; (viii) real estate auctions houses; (ix) investment advisers; (x) private money lenders; and (xi) money service businesses?

38. Which financial institutions and nonfinancial trades and businesses are in a position to ascertain and report: (i) The identity of the legal entity or legal arrangement purchaser of the real estate; (ii) the natural person(s) who are the direct or indirect owners of the legal entity or arrangement purchaser; (iii) the specific details of the transactions (*e.g.*, date of sale, location of property, sale price, and any other terms or conditions); (iv) the source of funds; (v) the form of payments (*e.g.*, wire transfer, check, currency, etc.); (vi) the purpose of the transaction; (vii) the intended use of the proceeds of a sale; and (viii) the businesses involved in the transfer of funds?

39. What are the potential benefits and costs of promulgating a transaction reporting requirement that covered real estate brokers and agents, title agencies and/or insurance companies, or attorneys? What burden (quantify if possible) would it place on such entities?

40. What would be the best way to assign reporting requirements to ensure a reporting requirement falls on at least one financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business for every non-financed transaction by a legal entity purchaser?

41. Should FinCEN require reports from multiple financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses involved in a non-financed purchase of residential real estate, or should FinCEN propose a reporting requirement via a cascading hierarchy based on the types of entities involved in a particular transaction, as is the case for IRS Form 1099-S? ^[82]

42. What should FinCEN consider when assigning the reporting burden with respect to potential evasion of the reporting requirements?

E. What information should FinCEN require regarding real estate transactions covered by a proposed regulation?

43. What information should FinCEN require to be reported regarding the legal entity (or if applicable, natural person) purchasing real estate in a covered transaction?

44. Should FinCEN require information about the seller? If so, what information should FinCEN require regarding the seller?

45. What information should FinCEN require about the financial institution or nonfinancial trade or business reporting the transaction to FinCEN?
46. What information should FinCEN require regarding the real estate underlying the transaction?
47. Should FinCEN require information regarding the source of funds used to purchase real estate?
48. How can FinCEN craft the information required to avoid overly burdensome or duplicative reporting requirements?
49. How should FinCEN require reports under any potential regulation be filed? Should FinCEN utilize an existing BSA form or develop a new reporting form for any proposed regulation?

F. What are the potential burdens or implementation costs of a potential FinCEN regulation?

50. What would be the costs, burdens, and benefits associated with collecting, storing, and reporting real estate transactional information to FinCEN?
51. How would FinCEN's regulatory requirements be integrated into your current compliance program?
52. How much time will you need to successfully integrate these requirements into your current systems and procedures?
53. Estimate the initial projected cost of implementation and the projected long-term support costs for ongoing program maintenance. Do you anticipate being able to integrate implementation costs into your existing compliance-related budget?
54. Would certain financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses incur higher costs compared to others? Why?
55. If program or other requirements were limited to purchases above a certain price threshold, how would this affect: (i) The burden of implementing such potential rules; and (ii) the utility of such potential rules for addressing money laundering issues in the real estate market?
56. What are the key benefits for a particular stakeholder (*e.g.*, a business, if the commenter is a business), if any, assuming issuance of the rules?
57. Are there alternative methods you believe FinCEN should consider as part of the overall rulemaking process that would effectively address the risk of money laundering in the all-cash real estate market? Please describe in detail.
58. What would be the costs, burdens, and benefits associated with requiring a new form that would report key elements of information deemed highly significant by FinCEN?
59. Please list any legislative, regulatory, judicial, corporate, or market-related developments that have transpired since FinCEN issued the 2003 ANPRM that you view as relevant to FinCEN's current proposed issuance of AML regulations.

G. Should FinCEN promulgate general AML/CFT recordkeeping and reporting requirements for “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements”?

As explained above, FinCEN is considering promulgating a specific reporting requirement under [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#), as amended by Section 6102(c) of the AML Act, and the questions in Part XI, Sections C-E relate to such a requirement. The following questions for comment are generally intended to collect information about a potential rule that would instead apply traditional AML/CFT requirements to “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” in lieu of a more specific requirement.

60. How should the term “persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” be defined?
61. What general factors should FinCEN consider in determining the scope of such a rule? That is, what businesses involved in residential or commercial real estate transactions should be required to comply with any potential rules, and what businesses should be excluded? What kinds of transactions, if any, should be excluded?
62. What are the potential benefits and costs to including real estate brokers and agents, title agencies and/or insurance companies, or real estate attorneys in the definition of “persons involved in real estate closings or settlements”?
63. Describe any requirements that FinCEN could promulgate that adequately address these risks apart from typical AML/CFT programs, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations.
64. Describe your views on whether typical customer identification and verification, AML, SAR, and CTR rules would appropriately address risks in the real estate market and what burden they would entail. What specific factors or characteristics in your business model would justify deviating from the typical AML/CFT program, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations?
65. What are the benefits and drawbacks of a new form requirement to file key information deemed important by FinCEN versus full AML/CFT program requirements? Which would be better and why?
66. Are there particular concerns that smaller businesses may have regarding the implementation of an AML/CFT program?
67. Please describe any programs that persons involved in real estate closings and settlements may already have in place to meet existing legal obligations, in addition to the requirement to report on Form 8300 the receipt of over \$10,000 in currency and certain monetary instruments. In addition, detail your views on any voluntary best practices or guidelines you adopted to prevent money laundering, fraud or other financial crimes, the effectiveness of those programs, and whether any such practices should be integrated into any AML/CFT or SAR rules.
68. Do you think it is appropriate for customer identification and verification requirements to be applied to persons purchasing and selling real estate? Would such requirements lead to a change in your business practices?

69. Please detail any aspects of possible FinCEN rules that may cause your business to operate at a competitive disadvantage compared to any businesses that offer similar services, if such businesses would be outside the scope of any FinCEN rules.
70. Should due diligence requirements, if any, apply equally with respect to buyers and sellers or should only buyers be included? Should it apply to all or should only certain types of buyers and sellers included?
71. Should AML/CFT programmatic requirements, if any, apply to residential transactions, commercial transactions, or both?
72. Should the rules be structured to require collection of information about only the most vulnerable or high-risk transactions? If so, how could FinCEN minimize the burdens of such a requirement?
73. Should FinCEN implement information collection requirements only for transactions meeting a specified cost or value threshold? Should other criteria or standards be included to trigger such collection requirements?
74. How might such a rule impact your business? What benefits, costs, and burdens does the commenter anticipate if all the AML/CFT requirements in the CDD rules are incorporated into any proposed rules?
75. Assuming FinCEN proposes to issue traditional AML requirements, please describe the major impacts the business expects upon issuance of final rules. What specific requirements in these regulations do you expect may have the greatest impact on your operations?
76. Assuming FinCEN proposed to issue a new form requirement, what information should be included, to what AML/CFT benefit, and would the ability to mitigate or prevent money laundering risk in the industry be reduced when compared to implementing traditional AML/CFT requirements?
77. How would FinCEN's regulatory requirements be integrated into your business' current compliance program?
78. How much time would a covered business need to successfully integrate AML/CFT requirements into current systems and procedures?
79. Estimate the initial projected cost of implementation, and the projected long-term support costs for ongoing program maintenance. Do you anticipate being able to integrate or share implementation costs into your existing compliance-related budget?
80. Would certain businesses incur higher costs compared to others? Why?
81. If program or other requirements were limited to purchases above a certain price threshold, how would this impact: (i) The burden of implementing such potential rules; and (ii) the utility of such potential rules for addressing money laundering issues in the real estate market?
82. What are the key benefits for your business, if any, assuming issuance of the rules?

X. Regulatory Planning and Review

This advance notice of proposed rulemaking is a substantive, non-significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 and has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.

XI. Conclusion

With this ANPRM, FinCEN seeks input on the questions set forth above. FinCEN welcomes comments on all aspects of the ANPRM, and all interested parties are encouraged to provide their views.

By the Department of the Treasury.

Dated: December 2, 2021.

Himamauli Das,

Acting Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Footnotes

1. For the purposes of this ANPRM, the terms “non-financed purchase,” “non-financed transaction,” “all-cash purchase,” and “all-cash transaction” refer to any real estate purchase or transaction that is not financed via a loan, mortgage, or other similar instrument, issued by a bank or non-bank residential mortgage lender or originator, and that is made, at least in part, using currency or value that substitutes for currency (including convertible virtual currency (CVC)), or a cashier's check, a certified check, a traveler's check, a personal check, a business check, a money order in any form, or a funds transfer.

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2. [31 U.S.C. 5312\(a\)\(2\)\(U\)](#).

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3. See, e.g., *United States v. Real Property Located in Potomac, Maryland, Commonly Known as 9908 Bencross Drive, Potomac, MD 20854*, Case No. 20-cv-02071, Doc. 1 (D. MD Jul. 15, 2020); *United States v. Raul Torres*, Case No. 1:19CR390, Doc. 30 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020); *United States v. Bradley*, No. 3:15-cr-00037-2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141157 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2019); *United States v. Paul Manafort*, Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE, Doc. 14 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2018); *United States v. Miller*, 295 F. Supp. 3d 690 (E.D. Va. 2018); *United States v. Patrick Ifediba, et al.*, Case No. 2:18-cr-00103-RDP-JEO, Doc. 1 (N.D. Alabama Mar. 29, 2018); *Atty. Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Blair*, 188 A.3d 1009 (MD Ct. App. 2018); *United States v. Coffman*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Ky. 2012); *United States v. Delgado*, 653 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Fernandez*, 559 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2009); *United States v. 10.10 Acres Located on Squires Rd.*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2005); *State v. Harris*, 861 A.2d 165 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); “United States Reaches Settlement to Recover More Than \$700 Million in Assets Allegedly Traceable to Corruption Involving Malaysian Sovereign Wealth Fund,” Press Release, Department of Justice (Oct. 30, 2019),

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-reaches-settlement-recover-more-700-million-assets-allegedly-traceable>; “Acting Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces \$5.9 Million Settlement of Civil Money Laundering And Forfeiture Claims Against Real Estate Corporations Alleged to Have Laundered Proceeds of Russian Tax Fraud,” Press Release, Department of Justice (May 12, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-usattorney-announces-59-million-settlement-civil-money-laundering-and>.

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4. “Money Laundering in the U.S. Real Estate Sector,” Congressional Research Service (Nov. 9, 2021).

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5. Id.

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6. *See generally* “Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing through the Real Estate Sector,” Financial Action Task Force (Jun. 29, 2007); *see* “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations,” Financial Action Task Force, pp. 19-20 (Jun. 2021).

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7. “Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures in the United States—2016,” Mutual Evaluation Report, Financial Action Task Force, p. 120 (Dec. 2016).

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8. *See* “Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering,” OJ. L. 344, pp. 76-82 (Dec. 28, 2001).

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9. *See* Cécile Remeur, “Understanding money laundering through real estate transactions,” European Parliament Research Service, PE 633.154, pp. 5-7 (Feb. 2019).

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10. *See generally* Louise Story, et al., “Towers of Secrecy,” Parts 1-7, N.Y. Times, (Feb. 7-Dec. 14, 2015), <https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/shell-company-towers-of-secrecy-real-estate>.

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11. *See* Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, “Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite New York Real Estate,” N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 2015), <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.html>.

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12. *See also, e.g.*, Vandana Ajay Kumar, “Money Laundering: Concept, Significance and its Impact,” *European Journal of Business and Management*, p. 117 (Vol 4 No. 2 2012) (“The real estate sector is the largest and most vulnerable sector for money laundering. Real estate is important for money laundering, because it is a non-transparent market where the values of the objects are often difficult to estimate and where big value increases can happen and is an efficient method to place large amounts of money.”); *see also generally* “Money Laundering in Real Estate,” Conference Report, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University (Mar. 25, 2018).

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13. “Anti-Money Laundering Voluntary Guidelines for Real Estate Professionals,” National Association of Realtors, p. 1 (Feb. 21, 2021).

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14. According to its website, GFI is “a Washington, DC-based think tank focused on illicit financial flows, corruption, illicit trade and money laundering.” “About us,” Global Financial Integrity, <https://gfintegrity.org/about/>.

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15. The term “PEP” generally includes a current or former senior foreign political figure, their immediate family, and their close associates. “Politically Exposed Persons—Overview,” FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, p. 290 (V5 2015); *see also* “Joint Statement on Bank Secrecy Act Due Diligence Requirements for Customers Who May Be Considered Politically Exposed Persons,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Aug. 21, 2020). For a clear example of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. residential real estate sector for use to conceal funds by corrupt PEPs, a 2020 forfeiture complaint filed by the Department of Justice states that the former president of The Gambia, Yayha Jammeh, and his spouse, used funds derived from corruption to purchase residential properties in the United States. *See United States v. Real Property Located in Potomac, Maryland, Commonly Known as 9908 Bentcross Drive, Potomac, MD 20854*, Case No. 20-cv-02071, Doc. 1 (D. MD Jul. 15, 2020).

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16. Lakshmi Kumar & Kaisa de Bel, “Acres of Money Laundering: Why U.S. Real Estate is a Kleptocrat's Dream,” *Global Financial Integrity*, p. 4 (Aug. 2021).

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17. According to its website, The Sentry “is an investigative and policy team that follows the dirty money connected to African war criminals and transnational war profiteers and seeks to shut those

benefiting from violence out of the international financial system.” “About The Sentry,” The Sentry, <https://thesentry.org/about/>.

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18. “Embezzled Empire: How Kabila's Brother Stashed Millions in Overseas Properties,” The Sentry, p. 3 (Nov. 2021).

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19. *See generally* “Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Real Estate Professionals,” <https://www.nar.realtor/articles/anti-money-laundering-guidelines-for-real-estate-professionals>.

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20. The BSA is codified at [12 U.S.C. 1829b](#), [12 U.S.C. 1951-1960](#), [31 U.S.C. 5311-5314](#) and [5316-5336](#), and includes notes thereto, with implementing regulations at [31 CFR chapter X](#).

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21. Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020).

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22. [31 U.S.C. 5311](#). Section 5311 was amended by Section 6002 of the AML Act to add the following additional purposes of the BSA: To prevent the laundering of money and the financing of terrorism through the establishment by financial institutions of reasonably designed risk-based programs to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism; facilitate the tracking of money that has been sourced through criminal activity or is intended to promote criminal or terrorist activity; assess the money laundering, terrorism finance, tax evasion, and fraud risks to financial institutions, products, or services to protect the financial system of the United States from criminal abuse; and safeguard the national security of the United States; and establish appropriate frameworks for information sharing among financial institutions, their agents and service providers, their regulatory authorities, associations of financial institutions, the Department of the Treasury, and law enforcement authorities to identify, stop, and apprehend money launderers and those who finance terrorists.

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23. [31 U.S.C. 5318\(g\)](#), [5312\(a\)\(2\)\(U\)](#).

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24. [31 U.S.C. 5318\(h\)\(1\)\(A\)-\(D\)](#).

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25. [31 U.S.C. 5318\(h\)\(2\)\(A\)](#), [5318\(a\)\(6\)](#). [Public Law 107-56](#), Title III, Sec. 352(c), 115 Stat. 322 (Oct. 26, 2001); [31 U.S.C. 5318\(h\)\(2\)\(B\)\(i\)-\(iii\)](#).

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26. [31 U.S.C. 5318\(a\)\(2\)](#) (as amended by Section 6102(c) of the AML Act).

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27. [31 CFR parts 1020, 1029, 1030](#).

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28. [31 CFR 1010.205\(b\)\(1\)\(v\)](#).

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29. [67 FR 21110-21112](#) (Apr. 29, 2002). FinCEN initially exempted persons involved in closings and settlements for six months, and then subsequently extended the temporary exemption indefinitely. [67 FR 67547](#) (Nov. 6, 2002).

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30. Id.

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31. [68 FR 17569](#) (Apr. 10, 2003).

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32. See FinCEN's website to review comments submitted, at <https://www.fincen.gov/comments-advance-notice-proposed-rule-anti-money-laundering-programs-persons-involved-real-estate>.

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33. The 80% coverage noted here is an estimate based on industry sources discussed below. See Note 45 infra.

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34. See, e.g., “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based on Suspicious Activity Report Analysis,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Nov. 2006); “Suspicious Activity Related to Mortgage Loan Fraud,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory, FIN-2012-A009 (Aug. 16, 2012).

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35. [77 FR 8148](#) (Feb. 14, 2012) (codified at [31 CFR part 1029](#)).

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36. [79 FR 10365](#) (Feb. 25, 2014) (codified at [31 CFR part 1030](#)).

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37. Id.

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38. Id.

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39. [85 FR 57129](#) (Sep. 15, 2020) (codified at [31 CFR 1020.210](#)).

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40. *See, e.g.*, “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2017-A003 (Aug. 22, 2017).

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41. Statistics regarding residential real estate transactions are normally divided between new and existing home sales. Generally, the Census Bureau tracks new home sales, while the most accurate data for existing home sales is generated by NAR. Existing home sales constitute approximately 90% of the residential real estate transaction market. *See* “New Home Sales vs. Existing Home Sales,” U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/newvsexisting.html>.

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42. “Quick Real Estate Statistics,” National Association of Realtors (Nov. 11, 2020), <https://www.nar.realtor/research-and-statistics/quick-real-estate-statistics> ; “Existing-Home Sales Recede 2.0% in August,” National Association of Realtors (Sep. 22, 2021), <https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/existing-home-sales-recede-2-0-in-august> ; “Summary of August 2021 Existing Home Sales Statistics,” National Association of Realtors (Sep. 22, 2021); Lawrence Yun, “2021 International Transactions in U.S. Residential Real Estate,” National Association of Realtors (Jul. 21, 2021), <https://cdn.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2021-07-26-nar-real-estate-forecast-summit-international-transactions-in-us-residential-real-estate-lawrence-yun-presentation-slides-07-26-2021.pdf> ; “New Houses Sold by Sales Price: United States (Q1),” U.S. Census Bureau (2021), <https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/quarterlysales.pdf>.

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43. “Existing-Home Sales Recede 2.0% in August,” National Association of Realtors (Sep. 22, 2021), <https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/existing-home-sales-recede-2-0-in-august> ; “Summary of August 2021 Existing Home Sales Statistics,” National Association of Realtors (Sep. 22, 2021); Lawrence Yun, “2021 International Transactions in U.S. Residential Real Estate,” National Association of Realtors (Jul. 21, 2021), <https://cdn.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2021-07-26-nar-real-estate-forecast-summit-international-transactions-in-us-residential-real-estate-lawrence-yun-presentation-slides-07-26-2021.pdf> ; “Monthly New Residential Sales,” U.S. Census Bureau, Release CB21-155 (Sep. 24, 2021), <https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/newressales.pdf>.

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44. “Existing-Home Sales Climb 2.0% in July,” National Association of Realtors, (Aug. 23, 2021), <https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/existing-home-sales-climb-2-0-in-july> ; “Monthly New Residential

Sales, August 2021,” U.S. Census Bureau, Release CB21-155 (Sep. 24, 2021), <https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/newressales.pdf>; see also “Summary of August 2021 Existing Home Sales Statistics,” National Association of Realtors (Sep. 22, 2021), <https://cdn.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/ehs-08-2021-summary-2021-09-22.pdf>.

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45. Lawrence Yun, “2021 International Transactions in U.S. Residential Real Estate,” National Association of Realtors (Jul. 21, 2021), <https://cdn.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2021-07-26-nar-real-estate-forecast-summit-international-transactions-in-us-residential-real-estate-lawrence-yun-presentation-slides-07-26-2021.pdf>.

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46. “New Houses Sold by Type of Financing (Table Q7),” U.S. Census Bureau (2021), <https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/quarterlysales.pdf>.

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47. Other businesses in the real estate industry have estimated even higher rates of non-financed transactions. For instance, Redfin, a nationwide real estate brokerage, reported that 30% of home sales were all-cash transactions between January and April 2021. “Share of Homes Bought With All Cash Hits 30% for First Time Since 2014,” *Redfin.com* (Jul. 15, 2021), <https://www.redfin.com/news/all-cash-home-purchases-2021/>; see also “Buying a house? Here's where all-cash deals are most competitive,” *CNBC.com* (Dec. 12, 2020), <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/11/buying-a-house-heres-where-all-cash-deals-are-most-competitive.html> (reporting that *Realtor.com*, a nationwide real estate listing website, indicated that 36 percent of home sales in the U.S. were non-financed). Accordingly, the use of the NAR and Census Bureau estimates are therefore conservative, and if anything, the scope of the money laundering vulnerability they create is much worse.

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48. See [31 U.S.C. 5326](#); [86 FR 62914](#) (Nov. 15, 2021).

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49. For the GTO, “beneficial owner” has been defined as an individual who, directly, or indirectly, owns 25 percent or more of the equity interests of the legal entity that purchased the residential property. For the purposes of this ANPRM the term “beneficial owner” refers to that term as defined in the Real Estate GTOs and not the term as defined by the Corporate Transparency Act, Title LXIV of the AML Act.

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50. For the purposes of the 2016 Real Estate GTO, “legal entity” meant a corporation, limited liability company, partnership, or other similar business entity, whether formed under the laws of a state or of

the United States or a foreign jurisdiction. In later Real Estate GTOs, FinCEN excluded from the definition of legal entity any entity for which the shares are publicly traded on a U.S. stock exchange.

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51. For purposes of the Real Estate GTOs, “residential real property” means real property (including individual units of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four families.

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52. Here, “Covered Transaction” means a transaction reportable under the GTO. The 2016 GTO defined Covered Transactions as transactions involving a covered business where: (i) A legal entity; (ii) purchased residential real property; (iii) located in the Borough of Manhattan in NY, or Miami-Dade County in Florida; (iv) for a total purchase price of \$1,000,000 or more in Miami, or \$3,000,000 or more in Manhattan; (v) the purchase was made without a bank loan or other similar financing; and (vi) the purchase was made, at least in part, using a monetary instrument (*e.g.*, a cashier's check, currency or a money order). Later Real Estate GTOs changed the parameters of Covered Transactions to include new geographic areas, modify the reporting threshold, and cover additional payment methods.

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53. Such reports were made to FinCEN by submitting existing BSA reporting forms. Initially title insurances companies reported GTO information to FinCEN via FinCEN Form 8300 (Report of Cash Payments Over \$10,000 Received in a Trade or Business). Later iterations of the Real Estate GTO required the GTO information to be reported via FinCEN Form 104 (Currency Transaction Report).

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54. These areas are: (1) The Texas counties of Bexar (includes San Antonio), Tarrant, and Dallas; (2) the Florida counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach; (3) all New York City boroughs: Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx, Staten Island, and Manhattan; (4) the California counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara; (5) the City and County of Honolulu in Hawaii; (6) the Nevada county of Clark (includes Las Vegas); (7) the Washington county of King (includes Seattle); (8) the Massachusetts counties of Suffolk and Middlesex (includes Boston and Cambridge, respectively); and (9) the Illinois county of Cook (includes Chicago).

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55. This expansion of the GTOs to cover wire transfers was authorized by the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”), [Public Law 115-44](#) (Aug. 2, 2017) (codified at [31 U.S.C. 5326](#)).

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56. FinCEN found that money laundering risks existed at lower price thresholds, and thus the current GTO set a \$300,000 threshold for all covered jurisdictions.

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57. FinCEN concluded that the beneficial owners of real estate purchases by publicly traded companies are identifiable through other regulatory filings.

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58. Notably, during the GTO program, independent of any GTO reports, SARs filed by banks related to suspected money laundering in residential real estate transactions increased.

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59. *See* “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals,” Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2017-A003, p. 5 (Aug. 22, 2017).

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60. *See* Note 3 *supra*.

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61. Moreover, one study found that the Real Estate GTOs had the added ameliorative effect of decreasing anonymous capital flows into the U.S. housing markets, thereby lessening the overall likelihood of BSA evasion via the real estate sector. *See* Hundtofte, C. Sean and Rantala, Ville, “Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S. Housing Markets,” University of Miami Business School, p. 23 (May 28, 2018); *see also* Nicholas Nehemas & Rene Rodriguez, “How dirty is Miami Real Estate? Secret home deals dried up when feds starting watching,” Miami Herald (Jul. 18 2018), <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article213797269.html>.

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70. “National Strategy for Combatting Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing,” pp. 17-18 (2020).

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71. *Id.*

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73. [81 FR 29398](#) (May 11, 2016) (codified at [31 CFR 1010.230](#) and other sections in chapter X). For certain categories of financial institutions, FinCEN has included explicit requirements to conduct customer due diligence and to identify and verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers, subject to certain exclusions and conditions. *See generally id.*

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74. *See generally* [86 FR 17557](#) (Apr. 5, 2021).

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75. *See* [26 CFR 1.6045-4](#) (Information reporting on real estate transactions with dates of closing on or after January 1, 1991).

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76. See, e.g., *United States v. Real Property Located in Potomac, Maryland, Commonly Known as 9908 Bencross Drive, Potomac, MD 20854*, Case No. 20-cv-02071, Doc. 1 (D. Md. Jul. 15, 2020) (purchase of property in Potomac, MD); *United States v. Raul Torres*, Case No. 1:19CR390, Doc. 30 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020) (purchase of multiple properties in Cleveland, OH); *United States v. Bradley*, No. 3:15-cr-00037-2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141157 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2019) (purchase of multiple properties in Wayne County, MI); *United States v. Coffman*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (purchases of properties in Kentucky and South Carolina); *United States v. Paul Manafort*, Case 1:18-cr-00083-TSE, Doc. 14 (E.D. Va. Feb. 26, 2018) (purchase of a property in Virginia); *United States v. Miller*, 295 F. Supp. 3d 690 (E.D. Va. 2018) (purchase of properties in Virginia and Delaware); *Atty. Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Blair*, 188 A.3d 1009 (MD Ct. App. 2018) (purchase of properties in Washington, DC and Maryland); *United States v. Patrick Ifediba, et al.*, Case No. 2:18-cr-00103-RDP-JEO, Doc. 1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2018) (purchase of multiple properties in Alabama); *United States v. Delgado*, 653 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2011) (purchase of multiple properties in Kansas City, MO), *United States v. Fernandez*, 559 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2009) (purchase of multiple properties in El Paso, TX); *United States v. 10.10 Acres Located on Squires Rd.*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (purchase of two properties in North Carolina); *State v. Harris*, 861 A.2d 165 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (purchase of multiple properties in a non-GTO-covered jurisdiction in New Jersey); see also Lakshmi Kumar & Kaisa de Bel, “Acres of Money Laundering: Why U.S. Real Estate is a Kleptocrat's Dream,” *Global Financial Integrity*, p. 29 (Aug. 2021) (highlighting money laundering cases outside of jurisdictions covered by the Real Estate GTOs).

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77. See, e.g., [31 U.S.C. 5316\(a\)\(1\)](#)(requirement to report importing or exporting monetary instruments of more than \$10,000 at one time); [31 CFR 1010.330\(a\)](#)(requirement to report receipt of currency in excess of \$10,000 in the course of trade or business).

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78. See, e.g., *United States v. Bradley*, No. 3:15-cr-00037-2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141157 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2019) (multiple transactions under \$10,000); *Atty. Griev. Comm'n of Md. v. Blair*, 188 A.3d 1009 (MD Ct. App. 2018) (several transactions under \$20,000); *United States v. Coffman*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (purchases of property for under \$150,000); *United States v. Delgado*, 653 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2011) (multiple transactions under \$100,000); *United States v. 10.10 Acres Located on Squires Rd.*, 386 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (transaction under \$50,000).

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San Mateo's Unaffordable "Affordable" Housing Scandal

By [Edward Ring](#)

When discussing the seemingly intractable and growing problem of homeless people living in California, journalists reporting on the issue don't spend enough time questioning the numbers, much less the policies driving the insane numbers. An [article](#) in the *San Jose Mercury* provides a perfect example.

The article gets off to a good start with a provocative, and very informative title. "How much would it cost to house the Bay Area's homeless? Try \$12.7 billion." Then paragraph two leads off with another bit of vital quantitative information, "With 28,200 homeless residents, the nine-county Bay Area has the fifth-highest concentration of homelessness in the country."



Ten paragraphs down, the problem is revealed, but not questioned: "By one metric, it would cost \$12.7 billion to solve the problem. That's the price tag to build a new unit of permanent housing for each of the 28,200 residents reported as homeless in the Bay Area in 2017, according to the report. The calculation assumes mid-range construction costs of \$450,000 per unit."

Questions should abound. Four hundred and fifty thousand dollars per person? Why is only one person going to live in each of these subsidized units? And why does a housing unit have to cost nearly a half-million dollars? You can buy a ridiculously overpriced four bedroom home in San Jose for [under a million](#) dollars, but you can't build a studio apartment for less than a half-million? Why?

This isn't an isolated example. The same problem exists in Los Angeles County, where the average per unit costs for "permanent supportive housing" for homeless people is also around a half-million. As [reported by NPR](#), "The PATH Ventures project in East Hollywood has an estimated per-unit cost of \$440,000. Even with real estate prices soaring, that's as much as a single-family home in many places in Southern California. Other HHH projects cost more than \$500,000 a unit."

This is a scam, disguised as compassion.

Developers accept public money to build these projects. Cities and counties collect outrageous building fees. The buildings are then handed off to nonprofits with long term contracts to run them. Politicians accept campaign contributions from the developers and the nonprofits. Where are the journalists? Where is the withering criticism? Why isn't this a [scandal](#)?

Why is the [national average](#) construction cost per new apartment unit somewhere between \$65,000 and \$85,000, yet it costs *five to 10 times* that much in Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties? Why do we accept this?



Earlier this week, [Sue Frost](#), a Sacramento County Supervisor, spoke about California’s housing crisis to a taxpayers group. Her litany of reasons why housing is so expensive, and why the related problem of homelessness is so intractable, was comprehensive and depressing. It ranged from extreme environmentalist mandates such as the [California Environmental Quality Act](#), to absurdly high fees for building permits (often equal in cost to the value of the materials used in construction), to unchecked immigration, to restrictive zoning, to numerous court orders. Even as Frost limited her remarks to summary bullet points, it took several minutes for her to recite all the causes. But in every case, it was government policies that created this nightmare, and in every case, they were policies largely unique to California.

How to Waste Taxpayer Funds

One of the “creative” solutions Sacramento County has adopted to increase the supply of housing is to streamline the process for homeowners to build “accessory dwelling units” in their backyards. At the same time, Sacramento County is funding the conversion of homes in residential neighborhoods into group homes for homeless people.

All of this *sounds* wonderful. But it is the path of least resistance, adopted in lieu of making fundamental reforms either through legislation or litigation. This path of least resistance means cities and counties will waste billions on new “affordable” housing for low income and homeless people. At a half-million per unit, however, spending billions will not even make a dent in the homeless population, even as it enriches developers, well-heeled nonprofits, and the campaign coffers of compliant local politicians.

Then, since those billions are wasted, they will seed residential neighborhoods with subsidized group homes for a homeless population that is, according Supervisor Frost, 50 percent mentally ill and 30 percent criminal. These group homes are run by private entrepreneurs who are, in effect, state sanctioned predators that destroy peaceful residential streets. They become inordinately enriched by cramming people into these group homes and collecting reimbursement from the government.

Similarly, Sacramento County’s supervisors have implemented an aggressive interpretation of a [new state law](#) designed to streamline the process for homeowners to build accessory dwelling units (“ADUs”) on their properties. There is nothing “accessory” about many of these new ADUs. Often they are full size homes, with their own garage, driveway, utilities, and address. All too frequently, ADU ordinances, for all practical purposes, subdivide a property in violation of zoning laws that residents relied on when they bought their homes. Equally problematic, because these lots are not actually, legally subdivided, both homes on the properties become permanent rentals.

This is happening all over the state. In Southern California, Los Angeles County has [launched a program](#) to pay homeowners to build granny flats for the homeless in their backyards. Consider the unintended consequences: Once two or more units are permitted on lots that were previously restricted to single family dwellings, these properties become worth more if they’re converted to permanent, government subsidized rentals.

Remember the “[blockbusting](#)” of the 1960s and 1970s? That was an ugly affair. Expect the same displacement in the 2020s, except it will be entirely legal. And this time, as private investors and their accomplices in real estate and the government bureaucracy convert entire residential neighborhoods into multi-family lots, they will receive government subsidies to do the conversion, then the government will pay them again to subsidize the rent they collect as landlords.

To recap: [Billions are wasted](#) constructing a handful of ridiculously expensive new housing units, then, since that makes no difference whatsoever, established residential neighborhoods are destabilized and ultimately destroyed thanks to laws enabling opportunistic investors, cashing in on government subsidies, to convert random homes into halfway houses, homeless shelters, and subdivide properties with ADUs. Nobody is safe. Welcome to California in the 2020s.

None of this is a moral choice. It disrespects the residents of these neighborhoods who have worked hard their entire lives to pay for the privilege of living a safe and tranquil environment. Moreover, these residents who are betrayed in this manner have worked far harder than they should have had to (to pay their mortgages) because of California’s state and local government policies which are to the primary cause of overpriced housing.

If a majority of local elected officials in just one major city or county in California mustered the courage to challenge the laws that have needlessly caused California’s housing shortage and homeless crisis, and litigated all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, they could overturn some of these laws, in order to pursue far more cost effective options.

Housing Solution

For example, for the homeless, here is an alternative that could cost-effectively solve the entire problem within months, not years or decades: You can house homeless people in durable [\\$399 10-foot-by-10-foot tents](#), sleeping on [durable \\$75 cots](#), four per tent. You can position [\\$649 porta potties](#) to service these tent dwellers, and you can set up a larger tent to serve as a food kitchen and medical station. You could put these tent cities on city owned property or leased private land on the outskirts of town or in industrial areas, and by enforcing revitalized (through court action) vagrancy laws, you could swiftly

move the homeless into these managed camps. You could have three types of camps, one for criminals, one for substance abusers, and one for everyone else.

More Solutions

To increase the supply of housing, the solution is harder, but obviously possible, since so many other states in America do not have housing shortages. [Policies to make housing affordable](#) again in California could be accomplished without requiring expensive government programs. Instead, to name a few policy changes: lower the fees for building permits, speed up the permitting process, reform extreme environmental regulations, make it easier to extract building materials in-state, and, crucially, end the policies of “urban containment” that deny building permits on California’s vast expanses of open land.

It is time for a courageous city council or county board of supervisors somewhere in California to pursue, through litigation, cost-effective, practical solutions that don’t ruin the lives of the many for the sake of the few. Particularly since government policies are the reason the many have to work so hard. And if mainstream journalists would abandon their politically correct group-think, and question the status-quo with the skepticism that once was the life blood of their profession, public awareness might demand such action.

Corruption In San Mateo Housing Policy Offices

Did you know that people don't own most of the homes and most of the public officials in America?

Corporations own them! Yep! Corporations own the house and the politicians in your town!

It is beyond a 'joke' when you hear some 'officials' say they are *"trying to solve the housing crisis"* when they are getting stock market bribes from insiders in order to keep the housing crisis from getting solved.

Big corporate real estate broker lobbyists (Sotheby, Better Homes Realty, CBRE, Coldwell Banker, etc.) and big corporate developers (K&B, Pulte, Blackrock, Vanguard, Berkshire Hathaway, etc.); and covert investment groups own most of the homes in America. Dot Com "realty" services like Zillow and others own the rest.

While NIMBY's and certain exclusionist tech billionaires want to NEVER allow affordable housing and affordable pre-fab builders to exist, almost every politician, especially county planning staff, are paid bribes by real estate broker lobbies and big corporate developers. Tracking the stock market assets of the politicians and their families clearly shows the bribes.

Even Nancy Pelosi's kid was caught paying bribes to control housing.

No public agency can EVER be considered to be serious about solving the housing crisis, which THEY created, until they make a 'ONE ENTITY, ONE HOME OWNERSHIP' Law. Corporations DO NOT GET to ruin America by hoarding all of the housing stock!

Did you know that corporations own most of the houses in California now? They bought up most all of the houses so they could strong-arm you and the State of California and HUD allow them to do it. California's housing problem could be solved in an hour if California made it illegal for any person or company to own any home that they don't live in. California will never make that law because 80% of the California politicians are part of these land-baron corporations!

California politicians only concern with the California's housing crisis is "how can we solve the housing without the solution affecting our stock market accounts?"

Even now, after California passed laws to increase housing, communities doubled programs to fight housing because communities believe that: "Housing = drug users, poor dumb messy people and property value losses".

America has 2.3 billion acres of land but only 332 million people. The government could give every single person over 30 a free 2000 square foot home, and, at least, an acre of land, as long as they drug tested every week, never got arrested, and never 'did anything bad', say some in Congress. They say it would be cheaper, by half, than the costs of jails and interdiction programs.

In Marin and Sonoma Counties, if you try to build a home, you are treated to the same amount of paperwork and bureaucracy as a murderer. More in fact! Yes, In Marin and Sonoma county, it is easier to stab someone in the heart than it is to build a home, yet the pain factors are the same.

Anybody can use FBI, CIA, FINCEN-type AI-based forensic tracking software and looked at the heads of all of the housing agencies and housing decision "research" groups, particularly in California and New York State. 98% of those people do not make the majority of their money from their salaries, **THEY MAKE IT FROM INSIDER STOCK MARKET PERKS** and special gifts tied back to the special interests. Why are the real FBI not arresting them?

You will have to ask The Director of the FBI that question. You can talk to the folks that run the sites at: (<http://www.pogo.org>), (<http://www.sunlightfoundation.com>), (<http://followthemoney.org>), (<http://icij.org>), and thousands of other investigative groups and prove it for yourself! Why is the public not demanding that stock market ownership by politicians and their families be made illegal? Because Goldman Sachs controls public policy more than you do?

In other words, the politicians that are supposed to be helping you are accepting bribes to hurt you!

As the pandemic made the poor poorer, meanwhile, it made the rich richer. Homeowners, already more than 40 times as wealthy as renters, were more likely to keep their jobs, profit from the stock market and have enough savings to take advantage of low interest rates.

Then there's the role played by investors and speculators. Large corporate and Wall Street landlords, like Invitation Homes, American Homes 4 Rent, BlackRock and Blackstone, are arguably the most toxic players, driving up rents in the select markets they saturate, lobbying for corporate tax cuts and fighting tenant protections.

But a majority of investment buyers are smaller companies and individuals: mom-and-pop landlords, tech workers looking to diversify their portfolios, teachers who supplement their paltry paychecks by Airbnb-ing properties on the side. The ease with which they can access credit strains the market and drives up prices. Those effects are likely magnified when investors target homes in cities less expensive than the ones in which they live, whether they're Chinese investors in California or Californian investors in Texas. Politicians refuse to make laws against investment groups buying homes because the politicians are part of those investment groups.

California generally does not give resources to individuals. California gives the money to Housing offices, Public Housing Authorities (PHA'S) and "official" agencies that are historically rife with corruption, cronyism, racism, embezzlement, favoritism, over-paid executives and hand-offs to favored developers. The whole California Redevelopment program (ie: <https://thirtymilesOfcorruption.com/2011/12/29/supreme-court-abolishes-redevelopment-agencies-in-california/>)

... had to be shut down because of corruption. California should offer money and mortgages to EVERY citizen in California that has lived in California more than 5 years and that makes less than \$60,000.00 per year. Over 50% of the money give to "local agencies" is embezzled!

Easy Solutions To The San Mateo Housing Crisis Are Being Blockaded By Politicians Who Get Bribes From Developers

In San Mateo County, the housing agency does even fill out the forms to apply to the State for housing funds any more. Even though, in 2021, the State has nearly \$100B to give away to housing, San Mateo has so many rich oligarchs living there that poor and middle class housing is too much of a bother for them.

Dwell Magazine-type modern low-cost prefab homes, CREATED in California, are blockaded by these special interest groups. Clayton Homes, BluHomes (now killed off by special interests), Factory OS, Homes Direct and hundreds of other California companies make off-site manufactured homes that are nicer looking, 50% lower cost, safer, faster to erect, more energy efficient and better than site-built homes. The real estate and union lobbies have gotten them banned in most counties because they are jealous of them. Powerful anti-trust law violating real estate and union lobbies got the zoning codes changed to make off-site manufactured homes hard to get permits for. If you want the best home at the best price, sue your county to demand home equality and construction-justice.

Ensuring that our County has sufficient affordable housing for its residents is an urgent challenge. Off-site construction serves as the most promising tool to reduce costs and increase supply, but one whose full potential cannot be realized or optimized without thoughtful and intentional changes in the policy, process, and programs that support affordable housing in the County.

Across all stakeholder groups, you always found a shared desire and passion to address the monumental housing shortage, as well as a collective understanding of the collaboration needed to make modular one part of the solution. As one interviewee put it: “Everyone wants everyone else to succeed.”

While modular may not be a panacea, nor the only innovation needed, the County must take advantage of this opportunity to catalyze innovation in off-site construction methods and remove unnecessary anti-trust-violating barriers to its adoption created by special interest groups.

Many counties just pay lip-service, window-dressing, pretend-we-are-doing-something time to housing because their officials are paid by big business lobbies who HATE affordable housing because it competes with them.

Feds launch investigation into San Mateo County's handling of PPE after millions left out in rain

The ABC7 News I-Team has learned the Department of Homeland Security San Mateo County's handling of PPE after millions left out in rain.

The ABC7 News I-Team has learned the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General is investigating San Mateo County's handling of personal protective equipment.

This comes after I-Team's Dan Noyes found thousands of boxes of it soaking in the rain at the event center and confirmed it's been out there for four months.

Dan Noyes: "What should viewers know that or what should they take away from the fact that the feds are looking into this?"

Mike Callagy: "That we're going to be completely transparent about this, and we're going to cooperate with them to the full extent, the fact that, yeah, we absolutely certainly did make an error."

San Mateo County Manager Mike Callagy provided an email from the feds that cites our first report and says, "The DHS OIG is responsible for investigating fraud, waste, and abuse. And is seeking information from your office regarding the funding for the PPE and if San Mateo County purchased the PPE using DHS/FEMA disaster money that was awarded to the State of California in response to the CARES Act."

Over a million Californians get \$1500.00 from HUD Section 8 and related programs but they are blockaded by lobbying from these special interest groups from using those funds to buy a home. The HUD Section 8 Home Ownership program in California is a sham. Nobody can find the paperwork, get the help or get the counties to pay attention when they apply.

So there is this massively financed army of mega-powerful anti-housing people who have huge law firms working to stop all of your good deeds and manipulate all of your politicians and social service agencies.

How To Win The Battle For Affordable Housing In San Mateo

As California enters what Sacramento calls: "the worst housing crisis in 100 years!", one must look at the big picture. The U.S. housing market is 4 million single-family homes short of what is needed to meet the country's demand, according to a new analysis by mortgage-finance company Freddie Mac. The estimate represents a 52% rise in the nation's home shortage compared with 2018, the first time Freddie Mac quantified the shortfall because states like California have made home-building practically a crime.

Thousands of modern Dwell magazine-type pre-fab home suppliers can deliver amazing modern homes for around \$150K but they are stonewalled, delayed and forced to double or triple those costs because of anti-building rules promoted by California and now mirrored nationally by greedy politicians. Greedy politicians take bribes from real estate lobbies and big developer corporations who HATE affordable homes because they don't make much profit on them.

One approach is to break-up and sue ALL of the real estate broker lobbies and big development corporations. You can sue them and their political lap dogs under RICO and anti-trust laws. Politicians receive bribes from the anti-housing bad guys as: cash, search engine rigging, hookers, dinners and via hundreds of other forms of payola and stock market trades. You would think that using legal tactic to take them all down would be a slam dunk. It isn't. Those politicians control whether or not those legal actions can get launched. So you have to be very creative to counter-measure them. For example, you can shame them into submission using the internet's mass media technologies.

Farmers and Colleges, especially, have tons of extra land. Farmers are losing money on agriculture and could make far more money selling their land for housing. Stanford University is in so much trouble for bribery, sex abuse, mysogyny, politics and other scandals that the State can justify taking back the Stanford campus to build housing on.

If the State of California was serious about solving the housing crisis it would support a SIMPLE program for the hundreds of thousands of renters, who get \$1600.00 a month, forever, from HUD for tiny rental apartments, to EASILY use that money for mortgage to build, or buy, a small home.

By law, there is SUPPOSED to be such a program: The HUD Section 8 Home Ownership Program, is supposed to allow this to happen, but it is shadow-banned across the state. Most county officials don't even know how it works or direct inquiries to dead-ends. The HUD Section 8 Home Ownership Program must be easier to get into, easier to find out about and no longer HIDDEN by County officials.

Don't believe it? Do a test yourself. Call the Housing agency office in each of California's 58 counties. When someone pick's up the phone say: "I am HUD-qualified for the HUD Section 8 Home Ownership Program. I would like to use the program to buy or build a home in your county. What do I need to do to complete the process?". Then experience a hell beyond anything you can imagine. You won't get in, most likely, and it won't be your fault.

You will be kept out. This is a federal law. It is your right to use this law. If you already get HUD money to underwrite your rent, you are per-qualified to use this program. Santa Cruz, Marin, San Francisco and other snooty counties will try to stop you because using it means you might not be white enough for their vision of high tax revenue home owners. You might be a deplorable if you use your federal \$1500.00 for an actual home. The average mortgage payment in America is \$940.00 per month to own a home. HUD pays an average of \$1500.00 per month to your landlord. Do the math! These people will build free home inventory for California, die, and leave that inventory in California. Why won't California help them to help solve California's housing inventory crisis?

A person building their own home is going to make sure it is done right if they are going to live in it. Build-your-own-home singular home-builders can contribute to the home inventory problem faster and more cost-effectively.

Marcia Fudge at HUD said the Biden administration plans to level the playing field for Americans who want to buy a home by providing down payment assistance for people to move from public housing to home-ownership. "We will make sure those who can afford a mortgage are put in a position to be able to buy a home," Fudge said. "Right now we have banks who don't want to lend to people to buy a home for less than \$50,000" — homes, she said, that "poor people" can afford, with monthly mortgage payments often lower than rent.

The Fake Inflated Cost Of A Home In San Mateo Thanks To Big Tech and Developer Bribes

San Francisco built brand new homes across from the Police HQ in San Francisco and these small prefab units ended up costing hundreds of thousands of dollars per unit: They cost twice as much as the same unit in Austin, Texas would cost to build. Why are cities spending the same per apartment for homeless people that you can build a 1600 sq. ft. stand-alone single family modular home for!??? The answer is: Cronyism. They could have cost much less but the process tripled their cost in California.

California spends an average of \$800,000.00 to build each "low income apartment" for low income people. That is what the government pays for each unit. If you are not aware of how much things actually cost, and you are willing to pay all of the mark-ups and inflated numbers of retail prices then your average cost to build a 2,600 sq.ft. single-family home in the U.S. ranges from \$240,000 to \$710,000, with most homeowners spending around \$423,800 for the job.

The high cost is \$1,000,000+ for a 2,600 sq.ft. custom-built home with high-end materials, three-car garage, covered deck, and landscaping. That million dollar+ price is for the yuppie people who pay \$150.00 per month for the same tv channels that smart people get for \$10.00 per month. BUT!...The build-it-yourself cost for this is \$140,000 for a 2,600 sq.ft. builder-grade home with no changes. Every time you change even the tiniest thing in your construction plan, add \$10,000.00, or more, to your cost.

Most people only ACTUALLY need a 1,200 sq. ft. home but they can't let go of the "mine-is-bigger-than-yours" syndrome. That build-it-yourself modular/prefab home at 1,200 sq. ft. can be under \$100,000.00 if you are an EDUCATED general supervising contractor who hires a licensed, top-references, electrician, carpenter and plumber to build it with them. If you build-it-yourself without hiring those seasoned specialists, your project will usually fail. Homes only cost a million dollars if you are a sucker.

2 bedroom stand-alone homes can be built for \$100,000.00 in costs. Realtors, builders, developers and politicians will LIE all day long to keep this fact from being exposed. The bribes, mark-ups, payola, padding, profiteering, etc. make that same house cost \$1.2M on the market. For example, see: <http://ruralstudio.org/project/2020-20k-home/>

In Santa Rosa California, it cost the County \$268,000.00 to build a single seat public toilet. In Alabama it costs \$268,000.00 to build a 2 bedroom house.

San Francisco City Hall found that painting and servicing a white rectangle on the ground for homeless people to put their tent in cost the City \$6000.00 per month per rectangle. That is how much a penthouse luxury apartment with multiple bathrooms costs in Austin, Texas. Why is building something costing more than the thing is worth? Cronyism, kickbacks and self-dealing with buddies.

Many Housing Permit Department and City Hall people in San Francisco have been arrested, recently, but the corrupt practices and bribery continues without pause. Bribery of public officials often doubles the cost of a home.

Encamped Homeless People Don't Want Your Help

Even more interesting: San Francisco took over luxury hotels and offered them to the homeless but 70% of the homeless refused to use the free housing. 70% of the homeless refused a free home in a luxury hotel!!! Why?

The homeless people said why, and it is documented, but **NOBODY IN SACRAMENTO EVER** reads the statements or they hide the statements from the public.

Here is why the homeless said they don't want California's free housing:

- 1.) The rules to live in the housing are not rules they can, or will, comply with.
- 2.) Most of them are addicted to smoking, drinking and drugs and the "free units" have cameras and sensors that record them doing the illicit things. They know that and won't move into a place they know they will get arrested or evicted from as fast as they move in.
- 3.) The vast contracts and regulation documents they must agree to are something they need a lawyer to explain to them and none of them have lawyers.
- 4.) Many of them use sex bartering and the cameras on the units will record sex worker activities.
- 5.) None of them want to be condensed into a tight space with other crazy people because they get set-upon by the worst of the bunch.
- 6.) They don't want multi-unit housing! They hate it. They want individual homes where they control the whole environment. San Francisco is spending at least **TWICE** as much money for short term solutions as it would cost for individual pre-fab stand-alone homes.
- 7.) Many of them are clinically insane and won't cooperate with any form of order or "rules".

Most of all: Drug-soaked crazy people don't want any help from The State. Families, seniors and disabled people want the help from the SSA and Housing people and they are getting ignored.

ALL homeless people should receive a free mental health evaluation and free therapy until their issues are resolved.

California has published a vast number of reports, at a cost of tens of millions of dollars, listing the exact number of homeless people, but California has never spent the \$60,000.00 it would cost to ask each homeless person the 10 questions about what they want! California politicians in Sacramento don't actually care what homeless people want. They care what they can scam out of a "stimulus" fund to scrape their cut off-the-top of.

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS HAVE BEEN SPENT HOUSING THE HOMELESS AND YEARS OF WASTED MONEY HAS PROVEN THAT THE HOMELESS:

- A. Waste the money
- B. Use the homeless housing to sell and buy sex
- C. Return to homeless camps months later

- D. Violate almost every rule set for them by the County
- E. Trash every housing unit given to them
- F. Never get off of their drug and booze addictions

San Mateo's Housing Agencies (PHA's) And Unions Are Blockading Solutions To The Housing Crisis

The San Francisco construction unions and lobbies won't allow the homeless solutions that will work. All of the special interests in San Francisco, from unions, to rich people, to politicians, to realty lobbies, to you-name-it, will block anything that makes housing cheaper. They ALL make their money off of a percentage of the most expensive property values. The Realtor lobby and the big building lobby are probably the most powerful special interest groups in California, after the teachers union. They HATE affordable housing. Anything they say to the contrary is a lie. They bribe 90% of the politicians in the state via Dark Money conduits. They are NOT going to help solve this.

Remember when California shut down it's 400 Redevelopment Agencies because the corruption and bribery was so out of control? It is the same exact thing with California PHA's.

When you call top Housing agency officials in Santa Cruz, Marin, San Francisco, Tulare and other counties to ask them what the main reason is that poor people can't get new homes built, they all pretty much said: "The State and County laws prevent us from building anything these days..."

San Jose got it right by promising a one hour permit time-frame for ADU home construction but other counties are resisting this permit optimization effort because permits are where bribes happen!

Factory OS, Clayton Homes, Homes Direct, and an army of other factory built home companies, have offered homes to Californians for \$150,000.00, or less, if the State will just fix the permit process and give them a pre-order of 200 homes at a time. Banks will finance these...if the State of California will help bundle land and construction financing in the same package.

Marin County staff said: "We have enough open, empty fields in the county to house every single homeless person in the State but we can't get anything built here without a ton of lawsuits, 5 year studies and permit hell-scapes. Every homeless person could get a modern Dwell Magazine-style stand-alone small house if the Country Office's didn't block every single construction project that is attempted!"

The difference between what California says, and does, is the same difference between night and day. San Francisco is an example of how home-building has been halted in the State. The rest of the state is following the profiteering based blockades to keep homes from getting built to deliver permanent supportive rental housing for people living with a serious mental illness who are homeless, chronically homeless, or at-risk of chronic homelessness. The government funds are rarely ACTUALLY used to acquire, design, construct, rehabilitate, or preserve permanent supportive housing, which may rarely include a capitalized operating subsidy reserve.

OK, so say you don't care about the homeless people. "Screw em all" you say. "They are low life drug users and weirdos who won't confirm to our white picket fence social programming..."

Corruption And Cronyism Make It Impossible For San Mateo, California To Help Middle-Class And Low-Income Home Buyers

Want to buy a home or buy a bigger home? Forget it, you are screwed if you live in California. The State has, essentially, "outlawed" construction.

You can't build a home without the process being so painful, expensive, delayed and litigation-focused that it will ruin your life.

If the State of California was serious about solving the housing crisis it would create a single two to three page building permit application, that worked in every County, that a single state office could sign off on within 48 to 60 hours.

If the State of California was serious about solving the housing crisis they would change the zoning codes. Nobody can build in California without being punished for it by California and County regulations.

If the State of California was serious about solving the housing crisis they would turn the tsunami of state-created immigrant unemployment into a positive, Now that California has let half of Mexico in to the State, you have huge clusters of skilled workers hanging around, looking for work, a few blocks away from every Home Depot in the State. Each 20 of them can erect a move-in ready home in one week. Give them an empty pasture and a challenge and turn them loose with a pay-per-house incentive payment structure.

All of the programs listed at: <https://www.hcd.ca.gov/grants-funding/active-funding/index.shtml> need TRIPLE the amount of funds currently allocated and they need to be moved into no less than 3 main programs. The current MASSIVE number of programs guarantees that corruption, duplication, and transparency inefficiency are at a maximum worst-case level. In all of these programs there is nothing for the individual. Almost all of the plans are based on the "Shove-them-all-in-a-big-concrete-building" concept. The public does not want that. NOBODY wants to live in, or see, multi-unit housing. The State needs to also TRIPLE the amount of programs for the SINGLE FAMILY or INDIVIDUAL. County Housing agencies have been found to be corrupt and motivated by bribes. If the State of California was serious about solving the housing crisis it would put a billion dollars of it's freebie COVID CASH from Washington, DC into it's CalHOME fund and restart that fund.

On Broadway and Divisadero streets in San Francisco, giant mansions house two to four people. Those structures, without changing the outside of the buildings one tiny bit, can house hundreds of people. NIMBY's biggest complaint is based on appearance. If you change the inside of structures and keep the outside looking "classic", you get the least amount of NIMBY issues. San Francisco already has ALL of the fully constructed square footage to solve ALL of it's housing issues, if it works from the inside out. Empty office buildings and dead millionaire mansions can deliver the square footage.

Gavin Newsom based his election on providing millions of new homes to California. Nobody has been able to find a single one of these new houses he said he was going to build.

THE BIGGEST TAKE-AWAY: "NOBODY wants to live in a multi-unit concrete building block. Multi-unit project buildings harm people's mental state and create conflict, house gangs and they are bad socially. There is enough empty land for everyone in California to have a 1600 sq. ft. home of their own. Change the rules so that more people at below \$100K income levels can buy or build a home and the public will solve the housing crisis.

Until those kinds of things happen, there is no hope for the State! Greed, payola, special interests and revolving door jobs control your housing opportunities in the state of California. California State has every tool, resource and dollar it already needs to solve every single housing issue in the State except one thing: "Courage". It takes courage to say "No" to the special interests. It takes courage to say "No" to the Silicon Valley billionaires. It takes courage to cut off the spigot of Congressional bribes. Most of the federal cash that comes to California always ends up in a politician's, or their friend's pockets. It takes courage to say that every Californian that invested their lives in California deserves the home in California that they were promised. Fix the HUD Section 8 Home Ownership Program in California. Make an office in every major city that ONLY helps people with the HUD Section 8 Home "Ownership" Program and not just the Section 8 "rental" program.

ALL OF THE MONEY needed to fund that is already paid out in California, by HUD, EVERY MONTH! Give citizens their promised right to build and own a home!

The State of California and HUD housing agencies have long lists of "Certified", "Qualified", "Approved", etc. loan brokers and mortgage brokers that the agencies say will help low-income citizens get single family financing.

So we called everybody on one of those lists provided by the State of California.

In fact, those loan brokers and mortgage companies don't want to hear from you unless you are in a bid war on a \$1.5 million dollar bungalow for which you already have \$500K, or more, in cash in the bank.

Only a small percentage of the loan brokers and mortgage brokers on those lists had EVER done a completed subsidized home loan and even less had any clue how to paper a HUD Home Ownership financed home loan. Over 20 U.S. Bank mortgage brokers even refused to respond to emails or phone calls if one used the words "Cal-FHA USDA" because, as one unusually talkative U.S. Bank employee stated: "To us, those are code-words for 'poor people', the market is, frankly, too hot for banks to bother with the poor because we don't make any money off them".

It does not matter if you have spent years trying to keep your FICO score above 700. It does not matter that you never had a bankruptcy. It does not matter that you have guaranteed income for life from your government benefits. All of those things that the media told you to do to be a "good citizen" with a good social credit score seem to be pointless.

The loan and mortgage brokers on those lists are only on those lists to get a few PR brownie points. They do not want to hear from you or deal with you unless you are making big bucks in tech. They will let you upload your information but they will do little or nothing to help you because they lose money by helping you. They only make money off of the big deals.

On top of that the big real estate developers like Pulte Homes, Berkshire Hathaway (Warren Buffet), Kauffman and Broad (K&B Homes), etc. are bribing the Governor and the heads of all of the agencies to keep you from building a home or getting a home that is not in one of their giant developments.

Most low-income people are the laborers who build the homes in those big real estate developments. Those people know how to build their own homes but State and Federal agency heads are bribed to make sure you NEVER can build your own home. Those people know they can build an incredible home, on their own, for under \$100,000.00. You can see thousands of videos on the internet showing people that do it every day in any state but California. Try to build a home in California. You will find you are blockaded at every turn EXCLUSIVELY by rules that you have to follow but that big developers do not!

Try to buy a modular or factory build home in California ...Same thing.

The political bosses in California have taken so many bribes from big special interests that they can't stop sucking on the graft hose.

Political Bribes By Special Interest Lobbyists Make California Uninhabitable

If the state and federal government were actually serious about solving the housing crisis, they would have a mortgage agency that only serviced subsidized housing!

Low income people: "approved" lenders and mortgage brokers hate you and don't want you bothering them.

US BANK, Wells Fargo, Guild Mortgage, and all the rest, talk a good story when they are on-camera or doing a public presentation but the reality is that they consider you to be a "waste of their time" if you are needing subsidized housing. They all issue press releases where they talk about their "commitments" and "special programs" but they put zero effort into those green-washing intentions. They only say those things to keep the banking regulators off their backs and to make their favorite politicians happy.

When real estate developers are paying politicians and banks to ignore low-income people and 79% of America is now "low income", with more arriving daily, what chance does the public have?

The trend is edging toward disaster.

The Worst Players In The San Mateo County's War Against Affordable Homes

The incipient "Great Reset" is a multi-faceted beast. We talk a lot about vaccine passports and lockdowns and the Covid-related aspects – and we should – but there's more to it than that.

Remember, they want you to "own nothing and be happy". And right at the top of the list of things you definitely shouldn't own, is your own home.

The headlines about this have been steady for the last few years, but it has picked up pace in the wake of the "pandemic" (as has so much else). An agenda hidden on back pages, behind by Covid's meaningless big red numbers, but perhaps no less sinister.

Last month, for example, Bloomberg ran an article headlined: "America Should Become a Nation of Renters"; Which praises what they call "the liquefaction of the housing market" and gleefully expounds on the idea that "The very features that made home buying an affordable and stable investment are coming to an end."

The Atlantic published "Why Its Better To Rent Than Own" in March. Financial pages from Business Insider to Forbes to Yahoo and Bloomberg again are filled with lists titled "9 Ways Renting is Better Than Buying", or similar.

Other publications go more personal with it, with anecdotal columns about ignoring financial advice and refusing to buy your home. Vox, never one to sell their agenda with any kind of subtlety, have a piece titled: "Homeownership can bring out the worst in you"

Which literally argues that buying a house can make you a bad person: "It's the biggest thing you might ever buy. And it could be turning you into a bad person."

So what exactly is the narrative here? What's the story behind the story?

The short answer is fairly simple: It's about greed, and it's about control.

It almost always is, in the end.

The longer answer is rather more complicated. Major investment firms such as Vanguard and Blackrock, along with rental companies such as American Homes 4 Rent, are buying up single-family homes in record numbers – sometimes entire neighbourhoods at a time.

They pay well over market value, pricing families who want to own those homes out of the market, which forces the housing market up whilst the Lockdown-created recession is lowering wages and creating millions of newly unemployed.

Of course, this is motivating people to sell the houses they already own.

People all across America have been saddled with houses worth less than they bought them for since the 2008 economic crash, and are eager to take the cash from private investment firms paying 10-20% over market value. Combine an economic recession with a created housing boom and you have a huge population of motivated sellers.

Of course, many of these sellers don't realise, until it's too late, that even if they attempt to downsize or move to a cheaper area, they may be priced out of the market completely, and forced to rent.

As such, in the last year, the private investment share of single-family home purchases is estimated to have increased ten-fold, going from 2% in 2018 to over 20% this year.

As more and more people are forced to rent, of course, rental properties will be in higher and higher demand. This in turn will drive the cost of renting up.

Market Watch has already reported that, in the last year, rent has increased over 3x faster than the government predicted.

This problem is likely to get worse in the near future.

Congress "accidentally failed" to extend the Covid-related eviction ban.

Which means, this weekend, while Senators adjourn to the summer homes they probably don't rent, the ban will officially end and a lot of people are likely to have their houses foreclosed or their landlords kick them out.

The newly empty buildings will be a feeding frenzy for the massive corporate landlords. Who will descend on the banks like starving hyenas to snap up the foreclosed properties for pennies on the dollar. Just like they did in 2008.

None of this is any secret, it's been covered in the mainstream. Tucker Carlson even did a segment on it in early June.

The Wall Street Journal headlined, back in April, "If You Sell a House These Days, the Buyer Might Be a Pension Fund", and reported: Yield-chasing investors are snapping up single-family homes, competing with ordinary Americans and driving up prices. However, since then, something has clearly changed. The propaganda machine has kicked into gear to defend Wall Street from any backlash.

No better example of this shift can be found than The Atlantic, which ran this story: **WHEN WALL STREET IS YOUR LANDLORD**

With help from the federal government, institutional investors became major players in the rental market. They promised to return profits to their investors and convenience to their tenants. Investors are happy. Tenants are not.

...and this story last month: BLACKROCK IS NOT RUINING THE US HOUSING MARKET, The real villain isn't a faceless Wall Street Goliath; it's your neighbors and local governments stopping the construction of new units.

Going back to the Vox well we have: "Wall Street isn't to blame for the chaotic housing market" Which ran just a few days after the Atlantic article, and is practically identical.

Both these (oddly similar) articles argue that Wall Street and private equity firms can't be blamed for buying up houses, and that the real problem is the lack of supply to meet demand.

You see, all the "selfish" people who already own homes (they did say it makes you a bad person) are blocking the construction of new houses, and thus driving up the cost of property through scarcity.

This has been a logically flawed argument around the housing market for decades.

That there aren't enough houses for people to buy is patently absurd when the US census data says that there are over 15 million houses currently standing empty. That's enough to house all of America's roughly 500,000 homeless people 30x over.

There's plenty of houses, there's just not enough money to buy them.

The reason for that is the same reason the California has massive "homeless camps" in its major cities, and that so many people are having to become renters instead of owners: wage stagnation.

For decades now, wage increases have lagged behind increases in the cost of living. In the 1960s one full-time job could afford a decent standard of living for a family of four or more. These days both parents work, sometimes multiple jobs each.

It was huge amounts of financial de-regulation which created this situation. So, whether you believe Vox's BlackRock apologia or not, one way or another Wall Street very definitely is to blame.

But this isn't just about money. It never is. Just as the war on cash isn't just about efficiency, and the environmental push isn't just about climate change. Ditto veganism. It's about control. Just like vaccines, lockdowns and masks.

It Always Comes Down To Monopoly Control In San Mateo

It's an oft-used cliché, but no less true for that, that homeownership "gives people a stake in society". A family-owned house is a source of security for the future and something to leave your children. It is also sovereignty and privacy. Your own space that no one else can control or take away.

In short: A homeowner is independent. A renter is not. A renter can be controlled. A homeowner can not.

It's the same reasoning behind the way working people were encouraged to take out loans and become debt slaves. If you limit people's options, if you make them rely on you for a roof over their heads, you have control over them.

There's a great article about this situation called "Your New Feudal Overlords".

Under Feudalism, land wasn't owned by the working class, but provided to them by landed barons, hence the term "Land Lord". If you disrespected your Lord, or broke his rules, or he perceived another peasant/farm animal/crop would be a better use of the land, he could take it back.

Essentially, the behaviour of serfs was kept in check by their reliance on the nobility for a place to live. That's very much the dynamic they're going for here.

Rental agreements can be full of any terms and conditions the landlord wants, and the more desperate people get the more of their consumer rights they will sign over.

Maybe you'll agree to smart meters which monitor your internet or power-usage habits, and then sell the data to behavioural modellers and viral marketers.

Maybe you'll have to agree to certain power limitations or water shortages in order to "fight climate change".

Maybe it will get worse than that.

Maybe they'll go full Black Mirror style corporate dystopia. Maybe, through affiliation programs, the mega-equity firm which owns your rental house has ties to McDonald's, and as such will require you to not eat at any competing fast-food franchises, or demand you observe at least ninety seconds of Disney advertisements per day.

Maybe it will be as simple as including vaccine status in the tenancy agreement, making it impossible for the unvaxxed to find a home.

Maybe they just want to make poor people miserable.

After all, the super-wealthy have got all the money they could ever need, and all the luxury they could ever use. Their living standards are as high as physically possible. So maybe the only way they can keep “winning”, is to start driving the living standards of us proles down.

No air travel. No vacations. No going out at all. Live in a tiny house, or a pod. Eat bugs. Get rid of your car. Rent your clothes. Or your furniture. Pay taxes on sugar. And alcohol. And red meat.

They’ve been very clear about this. They’ve told you about the Great Reset and the Internet of Things. That’s the plan.

You won’t own a house. And you’ll be happy...or else the mega-corporation you’re forced to rent from will kick you out.

The lenders said that Wall Street Conglomerates and investment corporations are coming in right behind the California fires and buying up all the fixer uppers and chunks of homes so that individuals cant get them. The contractors that made money flipping homes are saying they can't get enough fixer uppers any more. The lenders also said that "the lenders market is only looking at these \$1.5M home deals where people are overbidding \$200K or more".

There are two conglomerates that already have people on the ground in South Lake Tahoe and Southern Oakland making cash offers for properties, US Bank told us. We can build a nice house for about \$100K. We have done such nice ones in the past that they were on TV. Access to housing in the county is being limited by the conglomerates and banks and the push by lenders to keep the over-priced housing market going for as long as possible. Alameda County and All East Bay counties should make these people buy houses for low income and seniors since they are stealing all of the homes in the area:

<https://nypost.com/2020/07/18/corporations-are-buying-houses-robbing-families-of-american-dream/>

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/magazine/wall-street-landlords.html>

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wall-street/582394/>

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-cant-get-enough-fixer-upper-houses-11631007001>

Reporters from the San Mateo News outlets, friends at the FBI and FINCEN and internal whistle-blowers have revealed that San Mateo Housing Staff and government leaders receive bribes, mostly from real estate developers building in San Mateo County. The bribes are very rarely paid in under-the-table-envelopes. The bribes are paid with stock market tricks. These stock exchanges to primary and family members use the following tactics:

Federal investigators and the nation's top investigative journalists revealed that San Mateo politicians, and government officials at various agencies, were either: ***financed by; friends with; sleeping with; dating the staff of; holding stock market assets in; promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from; partying with; personal friends with, photographed at private events with; exchanging emails with; business associates of, or directed by; applicant's business adversaries; or the Senators and agency politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital search manipulation (ie: Google & Facebook supply web manipulation***

rigging) services to. For example, in one of our biggest cases, every person involved in reviewing, or managing the Department of Energy program worked for, or owned, the competitor, in total violation of RICO and anti-trust laws.

Over 100 government employees and contractors (ie: <https://www.dailywire.com/news/read-it-fbis-brutal-draft-letter-firing-disgraced-agent-peter-strzok-revealed>) have been fired for corruption but it has barely made a dent in the criminal stock market schemes of the politicians.

This is proven by their voting records, family stock ownerships, campaign funding and other financial records. The Housing projects are used as a political payola SLUSH FUND to pay off oligarchs in exchange for political campaign support because it is easy to conduit cash from the DOE to Russian, Chinese and Silicon Valley Oligarchs.

As if that was not bad enough, the investigators also detailed the bribes that these politicians took in order to harm the taxpayers and competitors who were competing with the companies that these politicians covertly owned.

These bribes include: A.) Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; B.) Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; C.) Free office, airfield and condo rent; D.) Male and female prostitutes; E.) Cars; F.) Dinners; G.) Party Financing; H.) Sports Event Tickets; I.) Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; J.) Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes; K.) "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; L.) Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conducted for donors; M.) Private jet rides and use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); N.) Real Estate; O.) Fake mortgages; P.) The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; Q.) Bribes to Stanford officials to admit their kids to college; R.) The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; S.) Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; T.) Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; and other means now documented by forensic experts, FINCEN, The FBI, the FTC, The SEC, The FEC and journalists.

By far, the biggest bribery tactic used by these people is stock market Dark Money exchanges. Every One of these financial scam tricks (https://www.sec.gov/files/Algo_Trading_Report_2020.pdf) is used daily by the suspects in this case via their insider teams at Goldman Sachs, etc. We can all only hope that the Great Stock Crash of 2022 wipes them all out as Karma for their abuses of Democracy.

Here are the stock manipulation tricks these politicians, and their families, use:

***** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Pools"***

Agreements, often written, among a group of traders to delegate authority to a single manager to trade in a specific stock for a specific period of time and then to share in the resulting profits or losses." [5] In

Australia section 1041B prohibits pooling. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-5)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Churning"***

When a trader places both buy and sell orders at about the same price. The increase in activity is intended to attract additional investors, and increase the price.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Stock bashing"***

This scheme is usually orchestrated by savvy online message board posters (a.k.a. "Bashers") who make up false and/or misleading information about the target company in an attempt to get shares for a cheaper price. This activity, in most cases, is conducted by posting libelous posts on multiple public forums. The perpetrators sometimes work directly for unscrupulous Investor Relations firms who have convertible notes that convert for more shares the lower the bid or ask price is; thus the lower these Bashers can drive a stock price down by trying to convince shareholders they have bought a worthless security, the more shares the Investor Relations firm receives as compensation. Immediately after the stock conversion is complete and shares are issued to the Investor Relations firm, consultant, attorney or similar party, the basher/s then become friends of the company and move quickly to ensure they profit on a classic Pump & Dump scheme to liquidate their ill-gotten shares. (see P&D)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Pump and dump"***

A pump and dump scheme is generally part of a more complex grand plan of market manipulation on the targeted security. The Perpetrators (Usually stock promoters) convince company affiliates and large position non-affiliates to release shares into a free trading status as "Payment" for services for promoting the security. Instead of putting out legitimate information about a company the promoter sends out bogus e-mails (the "Pump") to millions of unsophisticated investors (Sometimes called "Retail Investors") in an attempt to drive the price of the stock and volume to higher points. After they accomplish both, the promoter sells their shares (the "Dump") and the stock price falls, taking all the duped investors' money with it.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Runs"***

When a group of traders create activity or rumours in order to drive the price of a security up. An example is the Guinness share-trading fraud of the 1980s. In the US, this activity is usually referred to as painting the tape.[6] Runs may also occur when trader(s) are attempting to drive the price of a certain share down, although this is rare. (see Stock Bashing) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinness_share-trading_fraud)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Ramping (the market)"***

Actions designed to artificially raise the market price of listed securities and give the impression of voluminous trading in order to make a quick profit.[7] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-7)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Wash trade"***

In a wash trade the manipulator sells and repurchases the same or substantially the same security for the purpose of generating activity and increasing the price.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Bear raid"***

In a bear raid there is an attempt to push the price of a stock down by heavy selling or short selling.[8] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-8)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Lure and Squeeze"***

This works with a company that is very distressed on paper, with impossibly high debt, consistently high annual losses but very few assets, making it look as if bankruptcy must be imminent. The stock price gradually falls as people new to the stock short it on the basis of the poor outlook for the company, until the number of shorted shares greatly exceeds the total number of shares that are not held by those aware of the lure and squeeze scheme (call them "people in the know"). In the meantime, people in the know increasingly purchase the stock as it drops to lower and lower prices. When the short interest has reached a maximum, the company announces it has made a deal with its creditors to settle its loans in exchange for shares of stock (or some similar kind of arrangement that leverages the stock price to benefit the company), knowing that those who have short positions will be squeezed as the price of the stock sky-rockets. Near its peak price, people in the know start to sell, and the price gradually falls back down again for the cycle to repeat.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Quote stuffing"***

Quote stuffing is made possible by high-frequency trading programs that can execute market actions with incredible speed. However, high-frequency trading in and of itself is not illegal. The tactic involves using specialized, high-bandwidth hardware to quickly enter and withdraw large quantities of orders in an attempt to flood the market, thereby gaining an advantage over slower market participants. [9] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-9)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Cross-Product Manipulation"***

A type of manipulation possible when financial instruments are settled based on benchmarks set by the trading of physical commodities, for example in United States Natural Gas Markets. The manipulator takes a large long (short) financial position that will benefit from the benchmark settling at a higher (lower) price, then trades in the physical commodity markets at such a large volume as to influence the benchmark price in the direction that will benefit their financial position.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Spoofing (finance)"***

Spoofing is a disruptive algorithmic trading entity employed by traders to outpace other market participants and to manipulate commodity markets. Spoofers feign interest in trading futures, stocks and other products in financial markets creating an illusion of exchange pessimism in the futures market when many offers are being cancelled or withdrawn, or false optimism or demand when many offers are being placed in bad faith. Spoofers bid or offer with intent to cancel before the orders are filled. The flurry of activity around the buy or sell orders is intended to attract other high-frequency traders (HFT) to induce a particular market reaction such as manipulating the market price of a security. Spoofing can be a factor in the rise and fall of the price of shares and can be very profitable to the spoofer who can time buying and selling based on this manipulation.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Price-Fixing"***

A very simple type of fraud where the principles who publish a price or indicator conspire to set it falsely and benefit their own interests. The Libor scandal for example, involved bankers setting the Libor rate to benefit their trader's portfolios or to make certain entities appear more creditworthy than they were.

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "High Closing (finance)"***

High closing is an attempt to manipulate the price of a security at the end of trading day to ensure that it closes higher than it should. This is usually achieved by putting in manipulative trades close to closing.

**** *The Global Stock Scam involving FTX - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mySAoPgi-pg>***

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Cornering the market"***

In cornering the market the manipulators buy sufficiently large amount of a commodity so they can control the price creating in effect a monopoly. For example, the brothers Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt attempted to corner the world silver markets in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at one stage holding the rights to more than half of the world's deliverable silver.[10] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-TEXAS-10) During the Hunts' accumulation of the precious metal, silver prices rose from \$11 an ounce in September 1979 to nearly \$50 an ounce in January 1980.[11] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-NYT-11) Silver prices ultimately collapsed to below \$11 an ounce two months later,[11] much of the fall occurring on a single day now known as Silver Thursday, due to changes made to exchange rules regarding the purchase of commodities on margin.[12] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-TimeBubble-12)

**** *The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "The Conduit Double Blind"***

In this scam, government money is given to a Tesla, Solyndra, etc. who then money launder the cash through executive-held 501 c3 and c4 charities; and company assets and then provide DARK MONEY cash and services to political campaigns like Obama and Clinton election funds. In the case of Tesla, Google (an investor and boyfriend of Musk) supplied billions of dollars of web search rigging. Stock ownership in the companies and deals is traded for campaign funds. David Brock is a master of this kind of Dark Money money-laundering for political campaigns using PACS and pass-through spoofing. Tesla and Solyndra investors have used ALL of the above tactics and more. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have thousands of staff who PROVIDE these stock market manipulation tricks to people like Elon Musk, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, et al. These kinds of financial crimes and corruption account for the manipulation of over ONE TRILLION DOLLARS of ill-gotten profits annually!

Public Comments On These Issues:

- *This is an excellent article which should be blatantly obvious to all by now: Blackstone/BlackRock and the CCP are the major real estate owners — this is the culmination of the 50-year long Rockefeller Plan, hatched by the meetings of Rockefeller and Mao and Zhou when Nixon and Kissinger, David Rockefeller's minions, flew to Beijing with Rockefeller aboard Air Force One!*

Blackstone Group — founded with Rockefeller seed money by DR's minion, Peter G. Peterson — owned 30% of BlackRock which was spun off from the Blackstone Group — who knows what their ownership is today?! In the 1970s Rockefeller and the Chicoms created the Rigged Market of Rigged Markets — the control of capital/labor between these two economies, establishing them as the top 2 economies 50 years later — eventually merging Wall Street and the CCP, which is exactly what happened! IT IS ALL ABOUT the ultra-concentration of ownership — welcome to the Global Neofeudalist State.

- *Vanguard (privately owned) owns most shares of Blackrock as well as most of the other main players. Vanguard sits at the top of the pyramid of power and money and is THE big monopolist in this world. See this video*

<https://www.bitchute.com/video/QdbvR9Wn5HFU/>

- *If you don't own real property, your economic security and independence is weakened. For the last 20 years I've owned at least 2 places to live just for extra safety. At this time I have 3. But then I've been a real estate investor for almost 50 years.*

- *Good analysis. Effectively, the US Constitution was Revolutionary because it made a statement that Individual Rights were going to be protected for everyone. In these Rights is understood the right to own, a key feature of real capitalism. But when we can't make the difference anymore between Major Corporations and Government, and these mega corporations get into a complicit scheme to own everything...our individual rights dissipate. Prior to the US revolution, Individual Rights were closely correlated with social status which is closely related to economic status. You just need to read the Plea (<https://craigwright.net/blog/bitcoin-blockchain-tech/satoshi-and-the-sophists/>) Mega elitists such as Craig Steven Wright, the fake Satoshi Nakamoto and pretend Bitcoin creator, to understand to core of the Big Post Covid Reset...it's running back to your life being a Privilege distributed by the State. In English, 2 words describe the core of our rights: Freedom and Liberty. One carries a exogenous dimension (Liberty), the other an*

Endogenous one (Freedom). In the French language, there is no such nuance. And Liberty and Freedom are only Liberté And it their dictum "Liberté Égalité Fraternité", an Individual Rights incompetency arise. Because with these 3 words persists the idea that we are foremost a community before being Individuals, in line with a Matriarchal concept, but the Antitheses of the American Original vision. Is it surprising that Sarkozy promulgated laws which made it so that even in your House, what you say may be held against you. In France, if more than 3 persons in a house are talking, and that one is not a direct member of the family in the first degree, any hate speech articulated may send you in prison and get you a fine...No sanctity in the Household, even if you are the owner.

- Manfred Max-Neef, the late “Barefoot Economist” from Chile, who lectured at UC Berkeley, said 5 or 10 years ago that USAmerica was the 1st “Undeveloping Nation” and cited formerly affluent homeowners living in vans at the curbside of their foreclosed mansions. An analogue to this, for “dot” collectors, is what Alan Watts called over 50 years ago “the Los Angelization of the world” (himself an L. A. resident, and as a bonus fun fact, interviewed my old man, a profoundly corporatist lawyer — ecjlaw.com — for his services, in 1969, and declined them, despite an intro from his friend Laura Huxley). Both the LosAngelization of the World and Undevelopment are sorry symptoms of the same disease of Organized Greed, without an apparent immune system or other remedy in most societies, since Intel is busily employed with its vast armies of termites to eviscerate all these structures, many ages old.

The controlled demolition of our societies and cultures goes on apace, with accelerants of salivating covetousness, institutionalized sins. I myself have always preferred the nomadic way, the street, rich with the opportunities for unconventional wisdom, such as contented any number of native peoples here in USA, before having even their tribal roots and networks here largely deracinated and decimated by “settlers”. And, even more so, “developers”. All as a fairly recent development into this Age of Undevelopment. I met a guy 50 miles down the coast near the seaside in Bucanneer Park, Oceanside, north San Diego County. We talked a long time one sunny day, he told me from the front seat of his high end Lexus luxury model how he had been living there in his car with his cat for three years, after losing his mansion with custom swimming pool. He had little street savvy and I cringed while he told me, with childlike naiveté, stories of being mistreated by all the usual suspects, health agencies, other street people, and on and on. I tried to warn him, seeing one gnarly red flag after another, but it went in one ear and out the other, from what I could tell.

- Here in the US, the CDC mandated a policy to prohibit eviction of renters for 1 year (that has just now expired). Many landlords sustained huge financial losses or bankruptcy as their renters became squatters. What this might portend for our biowarfare future is the squeezing of individual/small group rental property ownership using onerous regulation, a lack of access to financing, etc. to foster the consolidation of rental property by mega/global corporations who will seamlessly align with any and all tenets of The Great Reset.

- Do they not fear that creating a population that owns nothing, that population also have nothing to lose?

- Why doesn't anyone discuss zero to negative interest rates ? Why has this unprecedented phenomenon been pushed by the banksters ?

- In America, the government owns your home even if you pay the banksters off. Don't pay your property tax and out on the street you go.

- I've given this a lot of thought over the last dozen years. And done a lot of research too. It is one of the most important mechanisms of transforming middle-class life into out and out serfdom in America, this taking away the possibility of home ownership. First they went after the millennials, by way of impossible levels of student debt (so they couldn't buy a house), then they worked on the problem of what to do about the existing tens of millions of homeowners. Private equity entered into the picture big-time and since then has been at it relentlessly. Basically, it is not possible for any normal middle-

class person to buy a home in any desirable part of the country (and increasingly even the less desirable, more remote and inaccessible parts), because you can't compete with the endless cash resources of private equity. The article is very right, and I have had the same thesis in mind for many years: homeownership provides a form of security, a political voice that comes from power, that the new feudal lords have to get rid of at any cost. And they've succeeded without any noise.

-IT IS ALL ownership — not just home ownership! Who owns the banks? In a study of the Rockefeller Financial Group back in the early 1970s by Prof. James Knowles (impossible to find now, although once frequently found in other book citations), Prof. Knowles wrote that the owners of the banks was a carefully guarded secret. Once upon a time we knew. Recall that the original primary investors in Intel, Apple and Microsoft was the Rockefeller family — who are the principal investors today — not the investment firms of BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, etc., but those investing through them???
NOBODY KNOWS!

- “No property rights for private citizens” ? Why so stalinist? It's not necessary at all. They will just make us so poor, that we won't be able to own anything of relevance, everything courtesy of free market inclusive capitalism. <https://qz.com/work/1942727/pope-francis-backs-the-council-for-inclusive-capitalism/> They are well on track, today this is home, in few years you won't be able to afford an electric car, carbon indulgences will impoverish us further... People will have tooth brush and clothes of their Choice. And be happy, yeaaaa

*- ...Where there's *Rent* there are *Rentiers*... “The Cantillon effect..The Cantillon effect was explained by Richard Cantillon (1680s – 1734) an Irish-French economist and author of “Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général” (Essay on the Nature of Trade in General). In his Essay, Cantillon provided an advanced version the quantity theory of money, however he also dug deeper and perceptively into the relative inflation associated with the introduction, circulation and velocity of money. He explained that the original recipients of new money enjoy higher standards of living at the expense of later recipients. This is because of inflation in asset prices e.g. affecting house prices and rents and as a result of time lags impacted by a disproportionate relative inflation in prices of assets and goods decreasing value of money in the hands of non-asset holding individuals i.e. the majority. These concepts of relative inflation, or a differential rise in prices among different goods in an economy, is now known as the Cantillon effect. The Cantillon effect has two components. One is the impact of new money on differential inflation rates between assets and consumption items and, the other, is the real incomes and wealth effects that result in an increasing disparity in incomes and wealth within the country. Under QE this effect has been extreme because banks short-circuited money distribution largely to themselves and a reduced number of large corporate customers to deal in assets and share buy backs. It is self-evident that if rentiers maintain a growth in income that is inflation proof the state of their real income will constantly rise. However, this is not the case of the state of real incomes for an increasing majority of the population.*

This Bank of England “policy” has done little to help the conditions of the working population which is becoming increasingly asset-less. This mechanism constraining asset access and accumulation by the majority is a driver of an inevitable future increasing inequality.” “The nature of asset-derived income...Thostein Veblen identified the problems we now face, back in 1921, well before the 1929 New York Stock Exchange crash, when he examined trends in financialisation and the growth in the rentier class in manufacturing and industry. Financialization is the process whereby all economic considerations are reduced to a nominal financial quantification usually measured in the local

*currency or expressed in a common currency by applying exchange rates. The crucial problem with financialization is that what appear to be distinct policies or even schools of thought, such as Keynesianism or Monetarism, and supply side economics are in fact questions of emphasis on which aspect of financialization is more significant as a policy target. These are aggregate demand (expressed as a quantified monetary aggregate) or money supply (expressed as a quantified monetary aggregate). Increasingly economic activities involve so-called financial engineering where the manipulation of numbers substitutes for real production or services where income is received in return for little effort beyond the holding of some asset which generates an income from those who make use of the asset. This has created a major financial services activity that is made up of über-rentiers.” ... (Emphasis mine...) <http://www.realincomes.org.uk/classdivstab.htm> ...Now tell me, what’s *Wrong* with *This* picture?... – Note the 2008-2020 QE ‘ramp’, then note the 2020-2021 *Spike*... – Then further note the L/H scale is in 1,000s of Billions, ie: *Trillions* (...Pic from University of Michigan’s Federal Reserve Economic Database, sourced from this article: <https://www.zerohedge.com/political/heres-why-new-covid-relief-program-will-turn-working-class-serfs>):...*

*...US M1 Money Supply, 1960-2021: (...Q: – Now just *Where* do y’all think pretty much *Alla* that *Went* (and subsequently *Stayed Put*)?...)*

- First time commenting here. Today I just couldn’t stand. I’ve checked the whole article and comments for instances of ‘capitali’. Until now just 4 instances, not a one in article. Horror!!! No wonder we are in deep shit, since knowledge of who is banging us from behind is almost literally absent. Century+ years ago Marx predicted, capitalism will end in monopoly capitalism and that is exactly what we are experiencing now. They will buy everything, they will control everything. Sadly, even majority of the “left” would probably not agree with me on this point, because they believe monopoly capitalism happened during robber barons times. Never mind that concentration of capital today is unprecedented and is just increasing. And when I hear lamenting about feudalism....I don’t know whether to be sad or angry. From article: “The short answer is fairly simple: It’s about greed, and it’s about control.” Sure, control, power, no doubt. But greed.....Invoking greed is completely useless psychologization. It’s excellent time for an adage, one profane and profound: Why a dog is licking his balls? Because he is able to, because he can!!!! No bs about he likes it or.....ability is first. Therefore the right question is: What is the basis that allows today monopolists to grab? I haven’t been precise enough in the third line from the end. It’s not just that ability is first, it is a necessary condition. To rephrase the final question, a million dollar question, not a rhetorical question, for most people is unfortunately like to ask what 42 means and I predict I won’t get the right answer: What is the ultimate necessary condition for monopolists’ grabbing???

- The investor class has a powerful ally (as if we didn’t know that) in the FHA in the US. Example: the condo community I live in now has so many rentals that the FHA will not approve a loan. Since these are lower end condos, FHA loan approval is absolutely crucial for a prospective buyer. Consequently, one has almost no choice but to sell to an investor – who is able to pay cash. They got you coming and going.

- Yup. Ban ownership all non-resident owned property, along with the existence of all forms of corporate stock ownership, and the “rental” problem resolves in a flash. Of course no one backs these logical remedies, because they’re invested in IMF and World Bank controlled portfolios and pension funds. Who’s zoomin’ who?

- Some guy in libya did it once, does anyone remember what happened to him? Muammar al Ghaddafi. "Today there is swine flu. Perhaps tomorrow there will be fish flu, because sometimes we produce viruses by controlling them. It is a commercial business. Capitalist companies produce viruses so that they can generate and sell vaccinations. That is very shameful and poor ethics. Vaccinations and medicine should not be sold," he said. He went on to say that "medicines should be free of charge and vaccinations given free to children, but capitalist companies produce the viruses and vaccinations and want to make a profit. Why are they not free of charge? We should give them free of charge, and not sell them." Muammar Gaddafi Speech To United Nations - September 23, 2009

- Sure our equally faux Govt will soon roll out this horror show too:
<https://www.rt.com/usa/530813-eviction-blackrock-great-reset/>

- Hello everyone! Re: Housing market in cities. Its fckin scandalous what's going on in cities throughout the world. Average people who work damned hard for their barely minimum wages can't get the mortgages to afford to buy at even the bottom end of the market in the cities they were born in. They can't save enough for a deposit cos the prices are constantly rising. Private rentals are through the roof and there is a very, very long waiting list for cheaper, social housing. This is an excellent documentary I saw on TV not so long ago. Sorry I can't find a link for the whole film. The situation has gotten even worse since this film was made in 2019. 'Push' 2019 trailer:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iLWpuZrd-I> 'Landlords without faces. Apartments without renters. A documentary exploring the new, unlivable city. Housing prices are skyrocketing in cities worldwide. Incomes are not. The working and middle classes are getting pushed out of cities, while financial powerhouses use housing as a place to park money. PUSH is a documentary from award-winning director Fredrik Gertten, investigating why we can't afford to live in our own cities anymore. We follow UN Special Rapporteur on Housing, Leilani Farha, on her quest to understand who's getting squeezed, who's getting rich and why housing has become one of today's most pressing world issues? ' The film had its World Premiere at CPH:DOX, 2019, where it won the coveted Audience Award.

- I don't know how wonderful a mortgage is. My darling ex paid for it for a while. Though as a migrant DownUnder coming from Berlin about 75% rent. The way the city council adminsters a quarter of a million buildings means rent doesn't kill life off as it does in similar sized anglo amerikanized cities like Sydney, which mortgage as the con to freedom when you are almost dead means no life before you get there. Saving for the deposit for instance at a time when you are twenty something should be spent getting ripped into life. Conconvid 19-33 or not. Sitting nowhere to save every penny because you known when you're old blah blah blah leaves no money to get into life. Which is perhaps what the politicians want. As they are proving with the lock up regime of no choice. Furthermore one's money ought if possible to be invested in you choice so that with a better saving amount nationally foreign take overs will less than more. In Australia is it basically non existent. No one invests in anything. When Darwin harbour was up for the 99 yr lease no Australian firm, company or investors stepped up because the money was wasted in non productive real estate. The Chinese won the contract. Now the government is complaining that this is the Chinese Governments infiltration of Australia. Well almost. Implied. Apart from nearly all production DownUnder is US, UK, Holland and then EU, Japan in minerals mainly. The Chinese have stopped buying coal and Russian tenders have won some contracts. If the locals put their money where their mouths were they'd have more local ownership. A mortgage is not a life. Though the banks are laughing without having to try it on to get your life signed away for the

next quarter of century – spent doing nothing cause you got no money. Most inner cities compared to other societies here are basically lame.

*- ...Calling 'em Vampires would be granting them a generous romanticism/glamour that they *Do Not* deserve... – Straight-up-and-down *Leeches* is what they are, in point of fact... ...- *Life-Sucking Leeches*...*

- Two phenomena are occurring in parallel, at least here in Canada. On the one hand, in the cities, what we call “renovictions” are multiplying and throwing hundreds of families out on the street who can't find new housing. New landlords like Blackrock are buying up apartment blocks and shortly afterwards send eviction letters to tenants because major renovation work is needed. These renovations often involve cutting the number of units in a building by half and turning them into deluxe apts. Current tenants can't afford and, as a result, many people are looking for new housing and prices are skyrocketing. On the other hand, more financially comfortable people, mostly retired baby boomers with good pensions, are buying second and third homes in the countryside, which has pushed up house prices by 20-40% in a few months. Add to this refurbishing of primary residences and their new second homes, which is driving up the price of lumber and creating shortages. In addition, covid-19 has created a buying frenzy: cars, RVs, motorcycles, electric bikes, boats, etc., it's completely crazy. Everything is going up except the inflation rate. People are living like there's no tomorrow. Maybe they're right. Personally I see a gloomy tomorrow. There's also dire staff shortages in every sector. Things are not looking good and expect tribulations before owning nothing and being happy.

- 'it's completely crazy. Everything is going up except the inflation rate. People are living like there's no tomorrow. Maybe they're right. Personally I see a gloomy tomorrow.' Yes Jean, I've been discussing this craziness with friends for quite a while now. Zero % interest rates on regular savings accounts, so people are being coerced into 'investing' with any extra cash they may have. The stock markets and housing markets are booming it seems. Mortgage rates have been at an all time low for years. If (or more likely when) there is a massive crash it will be the small 'investors' who will suffer after naively risking all their hard-earned savings. It may be quite lucrative for some right now, but I don't see how it can carry on like this. This surely can't be a sign of a healthy economy....or maybe it is, but only for wealthy people. I don't know.

- A book called The Thought Experiment shows the quantum outcome of changing these things using thought patterning of the masses that Google and Facebook use every second of every day: 1) Obfuscation: Just basic confusion of one thing for another- a smoke and mirrors game. 2) World View Poisoning: Conditioning the way people view human nature and their own self-value. 3) Conditioning of Primal Fear: The exploitation of primal fears. 4) Divide and Conquer Strategy: Highlight any perceived differences between people and then exploit those differences to create infighting so they are easier to control and conquer. 5) Indoctrination of Education System: A left brain form of Nazis called it mastery learning. grade school, HS and university. Trivium and quadrivium education could counteract this. 6) Controlled Opposition: Basic dialectics - dialectical mechanics or Hegelianism Creating conflict that you already have an outcome management system for. Create the conflict and wait for a type of reaction to the conflict (usually chaotic that demands a resolution) and then you step in and resolve it. Artificial conflict resolution. 7) Monetary System of Control: Debt based fiat currency fractional reserve banking a system of illusion that we call money yet people believe in it like its a

religion or god. People seem to be the most powerless to come out of. It exists purely in the mind. 8) Control of Mass Media: If you can control the info that people get to see hear and read you control their perception of reality. If you limit the scope of what they can take into their minds and awareness you limit their possibilities of solutions. Human perception management. 9) Food and Medicine: attack on the physical aspects of the body relates to how our brain development goes. You affect thought and consciousness you are what you eat. Use techniques that are damaging to consciousness through the modern medical system 10) Illusion of Time: Very important for people to grasp. Play on people's seeming inability to live in true present moment awareness-- getting people to live in regret over the past or anxiety over the future. Its a fear based technique. Takes us out of true present awareness. Being fully present now to take on what is happening now. If our consciousness can be manipulated into always looking into what has happened. It takes away effectiveness of dealing with the current situation. 11) The DHR Factor: Denial, Hassle, Ridicule: What other people perceive about you. Denial, hassle ridicule factor. Things are fine the way they are I don't want to rock the boat because I may have to deal with hassle of other people. The hassle free zone is-- I don't want all the uncomfortable aspects of life that come with standing up for truth. These are all fear based. Heightening those three forms of mental instability. Trap of inactivity and not really doing anything to make things better. 12) Religion: We need to understand these last three the best. Religion is a form of binding. To tie back Re-Ligare tying back. Forms of modern religion are mind control based on astro-theology. Giving people an exoteric version of something that was once esoteric or internal. Government is the binding on the left brain... religion is the binding of the right brain. 13) Use of Subversive Symbolism: Based on ancient sacred symbolism. Based on symbols that have been with us from antiquity. Solar symbolism, life force symbols, energy, blood, or anything we need for existence and life. They use these in modern institutions--- banks, police, media, stores. We're drenched in it. Basic symbols have a powerful psychic influence. They can speak to us without words. A wordless form of communication. Connects to occultism. 14) Problem-Reaction-Solution (Chaos Sorcery): A mass demonstration or a public display of the dark aspects of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegelian dialectic can be used in a positive or negative sense. Chaos sorcery or false flag terrorism. This is ritual magic being used openly in the light of day. You are creating a chaotic situation in the light of day and you know it will elicit an extreme reaction of fear and chaos that demands order be brought as soon as possible. You are manipulating the fear in the limbic system-- people are not in a state that they can reason. They are demanding solutions purely out of emotions. They are in a reactive mode of consciousness. They want the outcome of the game known before the game is played. Interject chaos, you know the reaction its going to cause and you know. A leap in consciousness will subvert this technique. This technique works over and over again. Humanity won't wake up. 9-11 was chaos sorcery.

- The astronomical prices for houses in the USA is caused almost 100% by the Fed buying a minimum of \$40 billion a month in mortgage backed securities, the very instruments responsible for the GFC of 2008. Hard to make this shit up. For those who are not familiar with them, the banks make Ninja loans to deadbeats, then they immediately sell them to the Wall Street megabanks, who package them together as MBS. In 2008 the megabanks sold them to brain dead bureaucrats who run pension funds around the world. Now even they are to wary to buy them, so the Fed just prints the money out of thin air and buys them, adding them to their exponentially growing balance sheet. "Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws."~ Mayer Amschel Rothschild [Mayer Amschel Bauer] (1744 -1812), Godfather of the Rothschild Banking Cartel of Europe

- Fed: "That's a nice housing market you have there. Be a shame if somethin' happened to it." They did much the same early last year when they helpfully stepped in with generous loans to the flailing paper industry. The dread virus locked everyone up, paper usage took a tumble, the fed issued loans and bought up tumbling bonds, the year moved on and things re-opened, the fed sells back the bonds at interest PLUS gets the interest from the ongoing loans. Rinse, repeat, forever.

- US Federal Reserve provided over \$16 trillion in financial assistance to some of the largest financial institutions and businesses, in USA and abroad, a clear case of socialism for the rich. – Bernie Sanders, 2011. Our investigation reveals that Federal Reserve provided at least \$29.6 trillion in aid. Only one of these facilities, amounting to 12.9%, was within its mandate to protect the commercial banking system. The rest was an attempt to rescue the shadow banking sector, which is highly leveraged and hardly regulated or supervised. – Andrew Felkerson & Nicola Matthews, 2011

San Mateo's Self-Imposed Scarcity Of Nice Places

Every advocate for making urban design more [pick one: walkable, bikeable, beautiful, lovable, inviting, human-scale] has at some point or another faced the charge of elitism. Virtually every feature of public space that makes it more pleasant to linger in, stroll through, or simply view, has at some point been associated by someone with gentrification, or simply culturally coded as upscale.

This belief is rooted in the following true observation: The best American examples of top-notch urbanism are mostly places inhabited by well-to-do Americans, and their real-estate prices and rents are usually prohibitive for most others. This includes the majority of places that are currently walkable, bikeable, have attractive human-scale architecture, have attractive greenery, aren't pockmarked with parking lots, and are full of small storefronts suited for local businesses.

However, we go badly astray if the lesson we take from that observation is that the design features of such places are themselves exclusionary and elitist. Or, even worse, that basic quality-of-life things like pedestrian safety or generous public space are inherently elite concerns.

We need to learn how to separate form from (current) function. In fact, our shortage of nice places is almost totally self-imposed. And it's precisely because 98% of the North American built environment is so blah that the 2% of places that are really well-designed environments quickly get bid up by the rich and become inaccessible to the rest of us. The solution to this isn't to stop creating such places, but to create vastly more of them.

A Bygone Era's Working-Class Housing

The locally-famous Milwaukee Avenue in Minneapolis is a great example. This unusual street is a Rorschach Test when it comes to how people interpret the urban environment around them.

Milwaukee Avenue is a pedestrian street. It's fronted by these cute, historic brick bungalows, most of which were extensively renovated in the 1970s. The houses all have front porches facing a central walkway and lawn, a design which encourages neighborly socialization and a sense of cozy shared space. Car access is via shared parking lots at the end of each block; there is no direct alley or garage access to the individual houses. It's kind of an urbanist paradise for those of us who fantasize of living somewhere that relegates cars and all their nuisances and dangers to the margins of our environment.

(Strong Towns has published a piece on Milwaukee Avenue before, specifically addressing the financial benefits to the community of allowing such living arrangements—this place is much more valuable than a comparably-sized normal residential block in the same neighborhood.)

Socially, however, Milwaukee Avenue has the following reputation: It's a cutesy, self-consciously quaint, historic district populated by well-to-do snobs who paid way too much for small houses lacking many modern conveniences. By some accounts it has an overbearing HOA. I've heard it described as everything you hate about a suburban gated community, just in the city and without the gate.

Those who disdain Milwaukee Avenue for this reason should consider its origins. This street was built in the 1880s as cheap housing (due to the unusually small lots) for working-class immigrants, many of whom worked at the nearby railyards. Through most of the 20th century, it would not have been considered quaint, kitschy, or precious, nor snobbish, upscale, or uptight. And, if we had dozens or hundreds of Milwaukee Avenues, there's a good chance nobody would consider it any of those things today, either.

These homes today are quite expensive for their size and amenities. But here's the crucial thing to understand: They're not expensive because they're cute. Or because their architecture is traditional rather than modern. It's not even because the street is pedestrianized—it's not any of those things directly.

No, the explanation is simpler. Places like this are expensive because places like this are scarce, and scarce things almost always become expensive.

The same story applies to the countless row house neighborhoods of the Northeast, Chicago, and San Francisco. In city after city, the mass-market, working-class housing of its time has acquired a distinctly bourgeois reputation today. In all cases, the reason lies in economics, not design. What's abundant becomes culturally coded as middlebrow; what's scarce becomes culturally coded as elite.

There is abundant evidence that nearly the entirety of the U.S. and Canada are dramatically undersupplied, not just in quaint historic places, but in walkable urban places, period. It's our "shortage of cities" that makes urbanism a hot commodity. Even if car-free design to the extent of Milwaukee Avenue isn't a majority preference—and it likely isn't—if a product serving a niche preference is rare enough, its price is liable to be bid up by those who hold that preference.

The answer to this isn't to lower our standards for design or to be dismissive of the things that are really lovable about these places. The answer is simply to allow a lot more Milwaukee Avenues to exist. And the same goes for the likes of all of today's beloved, "charming" historic districts.

Seaside Syndrome

Those familiar with the New Urbanist movement are likely well acquainted with this "elitism" critique leveled at the town of Seaside, Florida (a Gulf Coast resort community regarded as the first New Urbanist town, and famous for being the setting for *The Truman Show*), where it is often explicitly used to argue that Seaside has been a failure. In fact, the argument is extended to discredit New Urbanism itself. To paraphrase: "The original flagship New Urbanist project is a snobby resort community, so why should I believe this whole design movement has anything to offer normal folks?"

Seaside is a resort community that's quite expensive to buy a house in or even stay the night in, and I wouldn't be surprised if some of its second-home owners hold "snobby" attitudes, for what that's worth. But we have to understand the cause-and-effect here in the right order:

The wrong reasoning: Seaside is expensive and exclusive. —> Seaside's design must be causing it to be expensive and exclusive. —> Don't build more places like Seaside; build places that look like those that are currently inexpensive to vacation in.

The right reasoning: Seaside is expensive and exclusive. —> Seaside is so appealing that rich people will pay a lot to have a house there. —> Maybe middle- and working-class people would also like that kind of opportunity. —> Build a lot more places like Seaside.

Cute, traditional, walkable, safe, pleasant: all of those features of place can be built cheaply, and thus could be possessed cheaply if there were simply enough to go around.

Scarcity Makes It Harder to Tell What Communities Really Want

None of this, by the way, means that there aren't meaningful differences in preference between the kinds of communities the rich want and the kinds of communities the working classes want. Or that those differences shouldn't be understood and honored. They should, largely through trial and error and learning from how people actually respond to spaces, once allowed to experience them.

There are also important differences in how different groups of people experience space. For example, women have different safety concerns than men in public, and people of color may experience the "natural surveillance" of eyes on the street differently than white people do. Single-family homes make sense for families, and not so much for other household arrangements. So design should always stem from actual community needs and preferences.

All I'm saying is that the existing distribution of places—who gets the option of walkable urbanism and who doesn't, who gets safe streets and who doesn't, who gets human-scale and missing-middle options and who doesn't, who gets local shops and cafés and who doesn't—does not give us an accurate picture of those needs and preferences. Rather, it primarily gives us a picture of artificial, enforced scarcity distorting the market.

Abundance as an Answer

You can play Mad Libs somewhere like Twitter with the phrase "[x] is gentrification," where x is literally anything potentially nice. Streetlights that work? Sidewalk repair? And so forth. The *reductio ad absurdum* is that we, as a society, shouldn't attempt to build nice things for the masses—even comparatively cheap nice things like sidewalks that don't suck—because rich people will just end up hoarding the nice things. Nobody actually believes this in its starkest form, but people making an argument where that is the logical end point should examine their underlying assumptions a little more closely.

What is true: As long as there is a private market in real estate, comparatively desirable, unique, and scarce places will be bid up by those who can afford them. There are policies that can push back somewhat on this reality. We can create below-market-rate and/or social housing. Cities can ensure quality public amenities like neighborhood parks, street trees, and working streetlights are in every

neighborhood, and not make public investment decisions on the basis of neighbors' wealth or political influence. But short of Fully Automated Luxury Communism, there are limits to our ability to push against the realities of the market. What we can do, though, is create more of the nice stuff until the bar for "nice" simply moves higher.

This of course doesn't apply to things that we, as a society, can't financially sustain. A private country estate for everyone isn't in the cards (even if that was basically the marketing pitch for suburbia).

But the good news about walkable urbanism and streets where you won't get killed by a car: these things aren't expensive to provide. They're cheap to provide!

Neighborhood parks are a downright bargain. It's stuff like NYC's Little Island that isn't.

When I spoke with the developer of Serenbe, an affluent community outside Atlanta being built on traditional town design principles, he told me that the public investment required to build in that way offers a 60% savings over conventional suburbia. Let me stress that: Urbanism is substantially cheaper to build than suburbia. (So why is Serenbe an affluent community? If you've been reading this far, you know the answer.)

Where we've allowed cheaper-to-build, cheaper-to-maintain, quality-of-life-enhancing things to become luxuries, that is on us. That is our failure, and it's a failure brought about to a large extent by bad policy that tells us we can't have nice things, because nice things are for the rich.

San Mateo Stops The Public From Building A House For Under \$200k Because The County Wants To Tax-Rape High Ticket Homes

- Here is the home anybody in San Mateo County COULD build EXCEPT San Mateo BLOCKADES Affordable construction:

Home prices in America are rising every year and the median price doesn't seem like there is any sign of it slowing down. Just about any homeowner would build a house for under \$200k if the market made it easier. Luckily, you can build a house for under \$200k, so follow along as we explore the easiest way to do so.



Designing and building your dream home is an exciting prospect. It can seem unattainable and overly expensive to many people, but it does not need to be. You can build your dream home for under \$200k.

The average selling price for houses today is \$300k. If you carefully choose your floor plans, square footage, location, materials, and the property it sits on, you can build a house for under \$200k that will save you money.

If you want to build a house for under \$200k, there are several things that you need to do, such as:

- **Minimize the square footage**
- **Choose cheap materials**
- **Keep it to one story**
- **Build simple**

More than anything, the biggest expense in building a home is the labor and materials. If you choose a lot that is already developed, that can save you a fortune that goes towards materials and labor.

Let's take a close look at everything that goes into [building a house](#) on a budget.

Do You Need to Hire an Architect or a Builder?

Get free, zero-commitment quotes from pro contractors near you.

Where to Begin

What region are you located in? Depending on where you are located, building a home can vary greatly in cost. That comes down to everything from lot costs, local regulations, and the average cost of square foot in the effected region.

The location of the lot that you are trying to build on plays a key role as well. If you want the costs of your new home to be under \$200k once all is said and done, choose a developed lot.


More often than not, developed lots are already in prime condition for a house to be raised. That includes easy plumbing set up, gas lines and ease of access for the workers building the house.

If you are dead set on building your new house on an undeveloped lot, it will be extremely hard to stay on budget due to added cost. That is because you will be paying for labor for a longer period of time.

Undeveloped lots require excavation which can cost **up \$4,000 for small lots**.

Floor Plan Pricing for Your 200K Budget

Building a home will cost **at least \$153 per square foot**, which means you'll be right under the 200K budget. This means you can expect to build **a home that's around 1,200 square feet**.



1,200 square foot home floor plan

The Design Phase & Cost Per Square Foot

How many square feet do you want your new house to be? The [average cost per square foot differs depending on where you are located](#). On average, the **cost per square foot is \$153 when building a home** in the United States.

With that number in mind, consider how much of your budget you want to go towards square footage. If you wanted to build a **1,200 square foot at \$153 per foot**, for example, it would **cost \$183,600**. It could be more or less varying state to state.

That would leave you room in your budget to spend money on furnishing and new appliances. However, going with 1,000 square feet instead leaves you with more room to put the remainder of your budget towards settling into your new home.

Going down from 1,200 to 1000 square feet could **trim around \$30,000** on building your house.

Square footage also affects the cost of the design. On average, architects' cost **\$1.50 per square foot** in the design phase. If your new house you are planning is going to be 1,200 square feet, that will cost you at least \$1800.

Building Cost Per Square Foot (By State)

State	Building Cost Per Square Foot
California	\$165.66
Connecticut	\$172.17
Florida	\$129.90
Georgia	\$116.66
Illinois	\$132.91
New Jersey	\$162.64
New York	\$165.01
Pennsylvania	\$127.15
Texas	\$112.98
Virginia	\$133.94

Choosing the Right Materials

Considering that labor and materials account for the majority of the costs of [building a new house](#), it is important to choose wisely. There are several cheap materials that are also durable and aesthetically-pleasing, including:

- Reclaimed wood
- Prefabricated materials
- Brick
- Bamboo
- Concrete

Not only are those materials big money-savers, but they also each have a distinct look. More and more, homeowners have been building houses built with concrete. It creates a modern look while also saving money.

Prefabricated materials may just be the biggest way to build a new house for under \$200k. Modular homes are wildly popular today, and it is because of how cost-effective it is.

A modular home is one that is mostly constructed section by section at a different location then brought in and installed on site. There are many possibilities for style and layout without modular homes and it does not only limit you to one story.

You can even have a modular home built atop a basement if you want to add value to your new house. Besides modular homes, choosing materials like reclaimed wood, classic brick or bamboo can save you as well.

Building a Garage

Do you want your new house to have a garage? [Building a garage costs](#) roughly **\$49 per square foot** but can vary based on materials. A **one car garage can cost up to \$14,200**.

If you want a **two-car garage**, however, the least you will spend is **likely \$19,600**, with \$28,200 or more being the highest. To be cost-effective, you could choose to build a one car garage and if there is room for a driveway or street parking, park the other car or cars there.

Spending up to \$28,200 or more for a two-car garage is more than 10% of your budget and may not be worth it.

Every Choice Counts

If you want to stay on budget, stay simple with all of your design choices. Each decision adds to the cost, whether it be those extra square feet or the roof that you choose. The **roof alone will cost you roughly \$7,200** minimum on average, if not more.

Every single choice in building a house adds to the price tag, right down to the foundation. There are only a few options for foundations, but the cheapest one is the classic slab foundation.

Typically, you only **spend \$5-\$7 per square foot for a slab foundation**. If you want a basement, however, you will need a costly full basement foundation. A **basement foundation** costs anywhere from **\$10 to \$25 per square foot**.

[Basements add cost](#) besides just the foundation, such as plumbing and electrical work, so you should consider whether or not you need a basement for the budget. **Basements can cost up to \$30,000** or more when all the costs are totaled.

Be Frugal With Finishes

Your new house can look great without having to overspend. One of the big costs that comes late in the process of building a house is the finishes.

While marble and granite tops do look great, they are also extremely expensive. **Marble alone costs between \$125 and \$200 per square foot** and depending on the size of the kitchen, that can get quite pricey.

You would be spending **at least \$1,000 and \$10,000** depending on the size of the kitchen with premium materials like marble or granite.

A great alternative to granite that can save you a fortune is tile. **Tile costs between \$5 and \$30** and has a classic yet modern look. You are usually not going to spend more than **\$3000 for tile countertops** including the cost of labor.

Another great countertop finish option that is inexpensive is laminate. **Laminate countertops** are a little bit more expensive than tile, coming in at **\$25-\$50 per square foot**, but they are still a great deal.

The best thing about laminate besides the price is that there are many designs to choose from. Laminate countertops can look just as great as granite or marble countertops.

Installation and materials together won't cost more than \$2000, on average, and your counters will look gorgeous.

Plumbing Costs

Plumbing is one of the bigger costs in building a house. If you want to build your house for under \$200k, consider the plumbing when choosing your square footage. The bigger the house and the more sinks, bathrooms, and showers it has, the more costly the plumbing will be.

Plumbers and contractors charge you per sink, toilet, water heater, shower, washer/dryer, bathtub, and water line. Typically, you will have to spend between **\$600 and \$1,600 per sink toilet**, shower, etc., etc. Keep that in mind when you are deciding on floor plans.

The type of piping that you choose for your house's plumbing affects the total cost. Copper is the most common and popular type of pipes for plumbing. That is because **copper** is durable and long lasting and **can cost up to \$5 per square foot**.

When compared to **PEX pipes that cost \$1.50 per square foot** on the low end, copper is not an ideal plumbing material to stay on budget. The cost of PEX plumbing is rarely more than \$6,000 at the high end.

Copper piping, on the other hand, **costs between \$8,000 and \$10,000**. PVC is another cheap alternative to copper that costs **\$1.25 per square foot** on average and can **save you up to \$5,000** when compared to copper.

Flooring Costs

Floors, much like countertops, are only as expensive as the materials that you choose. There are several budget floor materials that can keep your building costs under \$200k, such as:

- Vinyl sheets
- Vinyl planks
- Oak wood
- Laminate

Laminate flooring, for example, only costs **between \$2 and \$8 per square foot**. If the house you are building is 1000 square feet and you wanted laminate floors throughout it all, materials would cost no more than \$8,000 at the most, excluding labor.

One of the cheapest flooring material options available is vinyl sheet flooring. You can spend **between .50 cents and \$2.00 per square foot for vinyl sheet flooring**. It is a cheaper alternative to vinyl plank flooring which costs roughly \$5.00 per square foot.

Vinyl plank flooring may cost more than vinyl sheet, but it is still much less than the \$10 to \$20 per square foot that marble would cost.

While it may seem expensive because of how great they look, oak wood flooring is a great budget option when [building a house](#). Regular **oak wood floors cost \$2 to \$6 per square foot**. If you want to go with a different, brighter style, you could go with **white oak floors that cost \$5 to \$8 per square foot**.

Painting Costs

When your house is finally built, it is time to get it painted. Interior and exterior painting costs are different. If your new house is **1,000 square feet**, for example, painting the **exterior could cost between \$1,000 and \$3,000**.

To **paint the interiors** of the same **1,000 square foot house could cost between \$1,500 and \$3,000**. Prices vary depending on labor, type of paint and how much is being painted. Depending on the materials that you chose, the exterior may not need to be painted.

If you went with classic brick, stone, or prefabricated materials, you probably do not need to paint the outside at all. The interior is more expensive than the exterior because generally there are more surfaces to be painted inside.

Because of that, the painter or painters have to spend much more time priming and preparing the walls for the paint. The **paint itself** is fairly inexpensive **ranging from \$25 to \$70 per gallon roughly**. In general, two gallons of paint is considered enough to cover 800 square feet.

If your house is 1,000 square feet, that means you would be between \$50 and \$140 for the necessary paint. That is not as expensive as the **labor which makes up for \$1,200-\$2,860 cost** of having a 1000 square foot interior painted.

Electric Costs

Electrical work is a huge expense in building a house. Generally, **workers will charge you between \$40 and \$100 per hour/100 square feet**. That is before the costs of materials, parts, wiring, or individual fixtures, such as lights.

Outlets and lighting fixtures cost up to \$150 to have installed by an electrician. To have a **1000 square foot house wired** can cost you **between \$2,000 and \$6,000**. If the house has a garage, it will be an additional \$1,000 to \$4,000 to get it wired as well.

What Did We Learn?

Building a house for under \$200k is easier than it seems. All that you have to do is carefully consider the square footage and materials.

Cutting back on unnecessary frills like granite or marble and choosing to build on a developed lot can save you a fortune.

You can truly build a beautiful home for \$200k with a little bit of ingenuity and careful planning.

So... you, with the same amount of money, can either build a **poop-hole**:

\$268,000 public restroom opens in downtown Santa Rosa



The single-stall 24-hour restroom was installed on Santa Rosa Avenue after months of controversy over its location.

Or a nice little home:

Marin Low-Income, Rapid-build Homes Proposed



The Political Bribery In San Mateo Is Killing Housing Affordability

When you ask a County official if developers are paying bribes to County officials, those County officials always say: *"uh, no, not in our County..that must be in San Francisco or one of those OTHER counties..."*

If you ask the FBI, or any major forensic investigator, you get the opposite answer: *"Yes, bribes are paid pretty much every day.."*

As an average citizen, you may not care so much at first. You might think that those bribes are just for office buildings or shopping malls and why should you care?

You should care because those bribes are costing you your home!

Developers HATE affordable or reasonably priced homes. So do realtors. So do banks. THEY ALL MAKE MONEY OFF OF INFLATING THE VALUE OF REAL ESTATE.

None of them are on your side!

Ask yourself this: Why do Counties bill \$900,000.00 to build a "low-income" studio apartment. Developers sell that same studio apartment for \$1,600,000.00 and yet it only costs you \$200,000.00 to build a whole 2 bedroom single family home if you are the GC?

It's an organized real estate crime racket!

If the developers didn't blockade your ability, or the small builder's ability, to build, you could build a \$200,000.00 home in San Francisco, San Mateo, Marin or Alameda County.

For example, Alameda Naval Airbase in Oakland was going to be turned into a lovely "green city". All these small developers came in with great low-cost plans but the developer who got the contract was the one that paid the most bribes.

Bribes are paid to the Governor, the Mayor, the Supervisors. the agency bosses and staff. The bribes are paid through trusts, shell corporations, real estate, billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; Free rent; Male and female prostitutes; Cars; Dinners; Party Financing; Sports Event Tickets; Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Who Take Bribes; "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conduited for donors; Gallery art; Private jet rides and the use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); Recreational drugs; Real Estate; Fake mortgages; The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman

Sachs and Deutsche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; Payroll W2 and 1099 payments which were actually bribe payments for political work such as character assassinations and internet rigging; and other means.

The bribes pay permit offices to delay you or deny you, they pay zoning offices to zone you out, they pay insurance companies to not insure you, they banks to not finance you or to make your terms too harsh, they pay neighbors to sue your project, they pay every City, State and County office to stop, delay or cost-expand your single family home project so that you are not making the developers look bad!

YOU, with your \$200,000.00 stand-alone home completely F*ck the market for all the \$1,600,000.00 tiny condo's that the developers are hawking, particularly in the Bay Area!

All those Californian's that moved to Texas are the ones that finally worked out the math on this.

A nexus, though, was reached. The developer greed hole has sucked the entire American housing market into it's swampy dark whirlpool and now the emperor has no clothes.

Entire houses cost \$200K to build. That is the fact that every American has become aware of. The developers and realty associations have hired a billion dollars worth of pundits, TV shells and fake bloggers to try to tell you that you must spend two million dollars to get a home...but they are lying scumbags!

In another example: There are national HUD Home Ownership Voucher HCV Homeownership Regulations (24 CFR Part 982, Subpart M) - HCV homeownership regulations are found in Sections 982.625-982.643 per the Statement of Homeowner Obligations.

A woman named Marcia Fudge is in charge of it in Washington, DC.

Many people have applied to the county on a monthly basis via the web, email, in-person visits, letter and phone calls.

Applicants participated with HUD and USDA in multiple qualification hearings and appraisals for the HUD and USDA home ownership vouchers and they were deemed "100% qualified", under those agencies guidelines at every point.

When your name comes up, if you meet the criteria, you get \$1600.00 per month of your mortgage paid for by the government. You have to pay the rest of your monthly mortgage, over and above, the \$1600.00, or so. In many areas, on top of that, you can get up to \$200K of your down-payment advanced by the feds. (ie: AC Boost, etc.)

The Developers and the real estate associations hate this! They pay part of their bribes to keep this program as inactive as possible. This program blows up their organized real estate crime racket. Marcia Fudge was supposed to have increased this program by 1000%, but the developers and real estate broker lobbies have blockaded every effort.

County agencies removed, deleted, hid, shadow-banned, held back or otherwise reprisal-harmed Applicant's from the waiting lists, holding databases and application programs in an intentional or malicious manner.

The developers hired their own hit-squads of ex-intelligence operatives including: Cardinal & Pine; Pacronym, Acronym; The Americano; Investing in US; Shadow Inc; Courier Newsroom; IN-Q-Tel; Gawker Media; Jalopnik; Gizmodo Media; K2 Intelligence; WikiStrat; Podesta Group; Fusion GPS; Google; YouTube; Alphabet; Facebook; Twitter; Think Progress; Media Matters); Black Cube; Correct The Record; Orbis Business Intelligence, Undercover Global Ltd; Stratfor; Jigsaw; ShareBlue/Acronym; Versa LLC; American Ledger; Supermajority News; New Venture Fund; Sixteen Thirty Fund; Cambridge Analytica; Sid Blumenthal; States Newsroom; Hopewell Fund; Open Society.; David Brock; AmpliFire News; American Bridge; Plouffe Consulting; Pantsuit Nation; MotiveAI; American Bridge 21st Century Foundation; Priorities USA; Kroll Tactical; PR Firm Sunshine Sachs; The American Independent Foundation; Covington and Burling; Buzzfeed; The American Independent; Perkins Coie; Secondary Infektion; Wilson Sonsini and thousands more to run hit-jobs, character assassinations, dirty tricks and economic reprisal attacks on any targets who reported their crimes or messed with the County officials they "OWN".

Using FBI and FINCEN quality forensic databases to check the stock market and investment banking ownerships of County officials and their families, which includes those entities that are financier/beneficiary oligarchs and tech companies, you can easily see the crime links.

Any developer or realty group who is, a USA and California governmental entity, doing business in the State of California, both, legitimately, and, covertly with an organized crime 'enterprise' operating within our Government that makes any revenue can now be tracked.

Pre-Fab and off-site built homes are targeted for death, in California, by developer and real estate lobbies because those kinds of homes cut the cost off of homes.

Nearly 40 Congress people have bailed out of the 2022 elections because they got tracked. Now a number of forensic groups are tracking EVERY county official in the Bay Area. Did you notice that Nancy Pelosi's kid got busted in a real estate scam? That was only the beginning?

Have you noticed all those FBI arrests at San Francisco City Hall? That was only the beginning?

There is no County official in the Bay Area who should not think their phone was not bugged for the last two years!

This is all going to end badly. Crooked politicians never just stop being crooked. None of them ever say: *"Just stop paying my bribes..I don't need those hookers"*.

It won't end until it all just utterly and catastrophically breaks. That point is on the very near horizon unless real estate lobbies and developers are outlawed.

In San Mateo, Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers Cause You To Be Homeless - The Total Failure Of The San Mateo Housing Program!

By Carla Lee

- Landlords won't accept them because they are punished with extra rules if they do. There are no reasonable incentives for landlords to participate and every reason for them not to participate. HUD must increase the cash and tax incentives for landlords.
- The Section 8 program does not screen for meth and heroin use so the 10% of Section 8 people on drugs create a bad reputation that ruins it for the 90% that are not on drugs. HUD and the County must blood test for drugs.
- People with excellent credit scores, perfect landlord references, nice personalities, a lifetime of past work and the ability to fix their own rental units are lumped in with gang members and deviants. There should be a "Gold Star" rating for high-quality applicants.
- There is no centralized rent board to find all of the Section 8 offerings. The State must fund and build such a web based rent board, properly staff it and advertise it.
- California does not support pre-fab homes, glampers, RV's or other modern housing systems because the Unions, builders and real estate agents lobby against them for competitive purposes. Public officials must be arrested for taking bribes from these anti-affordable housing groups.
- Google, Facebook, Netflix, Linkedin, Twitter, etc. and the Tech Mafia have lobbied to take over, bus into and ransack the local housing system because they have anti-trust violating monopolistic power, armies of lobbyists and they pay bribes to everyone. While minor rules have been applied to them for media optics, nothing has been required of them to offset the tens of thousands of housing losses they have caused. Google, Facebook, Netflix, Linkedin, Twitter, etc. and the Tech Mafia must be forced to pay double the amount allocated for a Section 8 voucher in California.
- In the crisis areas of California the Tech Mafia has forced the rents to be so high that the current Section 8 voucher amounts can't pay for any of the rents. Section 8 Vouchers in Northern California and the LA basin must pay at least \$2000.00 of the person's rent or there is now no possibility for anyone to rent anything. The Tech Mafia must be required to pay at least half of the subsidy.
- There is zero transparency in the 'Waiting List' programs and the Lists are tainted with bribes to officials, sex-for-Section-8, Political bias, reprisal delays and other unfair process. List transparency and standardized metrics must be deployed.
- There is enough property available to build and house four times as many people as those who currently need Section 8 but counties won't issue the permits to allow green, sustainable pre-fab builders to build those modern, safe, classy, pre-fab units because they would break the existing crony, payola, bribe kick-back schemes that Supervisors and Mayors get in many counties. The State must

order the counties to issue the permits and begin immediate punitive lawsuits against the individuals and counties who do not issue those permits within the next 14 days.

- The raw criminality and bribery in HUD and County offices is staggering. The FBI must be ordered to conduct a deep investigation of California housing bribes, skims and stock market payola.

- Town Hall public meetings are no more than PR optics sessions that pretend to be offering solutions but never end with any hard plans being committed to by officials.

How San Mateo Housing Policy Is Failing The County

Section 8 was intended to help people escape poverty, but instead it's trapping them in it.

[Alana Semuels](#)

When a woman in McKinney, Texas, told Tatiana Rhodes and her friends to “go back to your Section 8 homes” at a public pool earlier this month, she inadvertently spoke volumes about the failure of a program that was designed to help America’s poor.

Created by Congress in 1974, the “Section 8” Housing Choice Voucher Program was supposed to help families move out of broken urban neighborhoods to places where they could live without the constant threat of violence and their kids could attend good schools.

But somewhere along the way, “Section 8” became a colloquialism for housing that is, to many, indistinguishable from the public-housing properties the program was designed to help families escape.

- [Has America Given Up on the Dream of Racial Integration?](#)
 - [Where Should Poor People Live?](#)
 - [A Lonely Life for Immigrants in America's Rust Belt](#)
-

How did this happen? To begin with, Section 8 is poorly designed. It works like this: Families lucky enough to get off lengthy waiting lists are allowed to look for apartments up to a certain rent, which varies for each metro region. This figure is called the “fair market rent,” and is calculated by HUD every year for each metro area. The tenant pays about 30 percent of his income, and the voucher covers the rest of the rent (this is based on the idea that families should not spend more than one-third of their income on rent).

But the fair market rent cut-off point often consigns voucher-holders to impoverished neighborhoods. This is in part because of how that number is calculated: HUD draws the line at the 40th percentile of rents for “typical” units occupied by “recent movers” in an entire metropolitan area, which includes far-flung suburbs with long commutes and, as a result, makes the Fair Market Rent relatively low. In New York City, for example, the Fair Market Rent for a one-bedroom is \$1,249, a price that would relegate voucher-holders to the [neighborhood of Brownsville](#) in Brooklyn, one of the most dangerous places in the city, and where the most public housing is located.

Technically, voucher holders can live anywhere in a region that meets the price restrictions. But the tendency is for people to stay in neighborhoods that are familiar to them, though a few areas have created robust mobility-counseling programs to try and mitigate this. Additionally, as Eva Rosen [has](#)

[detailed](#), landlords in low-income areas aggressively recruit voucher-holders, as the vouchers are a much more reliable source of rent than other low-income tenants have available.

The failings of Section 8 go far beyond flaws in how the program was designed to how the the states have implemented it. People can argue all they want about the merits of subsidized housing, but given that Section 8 exists, it would seem advantageous for states and municipalities to take advantage of federal funds to help families find better housing. But many states seem especially determined to keep voucher-holders in areas of concentrated poverty.

“The whole idea of Section 8 in the beginning was that it was going to allow people to get out of the ghetto,” said Mike Daniel, a lawyer for the Inclusive Communities Project, told me. (Daniel has sued HUD over the way it is carrying out the program in Dallas.) “But there’s tremendous political pressure on housing authorities and HUD to not let it become an instrument of desegregation.”

For example, in much of the country, landlords can refuse to take Section 8 vouchers, even if the voucher covers the rent. And, unlike the landlords in poor neighborhoods in Eva Rosen’s study, many landlords of buildings in nicer neighborhoods will do anything to keep voucher-holders out. The result is that Section 8 traps families in the poorest neighborhoods.

[One study](#) in Austin found that there were plenty of apartments around the city that voucher-holders could afford. But only a small portion of those apartments would rent to voucher-holders.

The report, by the Austin Tenant’s Council, found that 78,217 units in the Austin metro area—about 56 percent of those surveyed—had rents within the Fair Market Rent limits. But only 8,590 of those units accepted vouchers and did not have minimum income requirements for tenants. Most were located on the east side of Austin, in high-poverty areas with underperforming schools and high crime rates. (The survey only looked at apartment complexes with at least 50 units.)

“Families don’t have very many choices as to where they can actually use the voucher,” said Nekesha Phoenix, the Fair Housing Program Director at the Austin Tenants’ Council. “Although there are properties north and west that they could actually afford to live in, they can’t do it because the properties won’t take the voucher.”

Some cities have tried to prevent this. Last year Austin passed a “Source of Income” ordinance that prohibited landlords from refusing to rent to people solely because they have a voucher. And 12 states, as well as the cities of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington D.C., Chicago, and Philadelphia have all done the same.

But in Austin the landlords successfully pushed back. The Austin Apartment Association sued the city over the ordinance, asking for an injunction to block it. The apartment owners say that being forced to accept Section 8 meant more paperwork, onerous lease terms, and “[burdensome inspections](#).” (Section 8 properties have to be inspected to ensure they are sanitary and safe.)

After a district judge left the law standing, the Texas legislature in May [passed a bill](#) banning any municipality from passing Source of Income ordinances. Source of Income discrimination will once again become legal in Austin when the state law goes into effect in September.

“A housing authority that on its own set out to use housing choice voucher as an instrument of desegregation would be brought to its knees by the elected officials of the cities that they’re in,” Daniel told me.

Why do some landlords try so hard to attract voucher-holders and others try so hard to avoid them? Section 8 tenants pay the rent reliably and stay in apartments for longer than market-rate tenants, according to Isabelle Headrick, the executive director of Accessible Housing Austin!, who is also a property owner. Though the apartment owners’ lobby had said that Section 8 requires landlords to sign a 400-page document and makes it more difficult to evict tenants, Headrick says that the contract is only 12 pages, and that the inspections required are “no more difficult than what a responsible landlord should be doing anyway.”

“Having Section 8 tenants makes my job easier, not harder,” she said.

But in Dallas, the Inclusive Communities Project found that some landlords who owned many units throughout the city would rent to voucher-holders in low-income neighborhoods, but not in high-income neighborhoods, even if the tenants could afford both apartments. Though the landlords would say they refused the vouchers because they didn’t want to deal with the paperwork, housing advocates say that property owners don’t want Section 8 tenants (read: minorities) in buildings because they might drive away market-rate tenants.

The Inclusive Communities Project sued HUD over the way it calculated Fair Market Rents in Dallas. It is now trying to make an arrangement with Dallas-area landlords so that it can rent apartments from them and then sublease them to Section 8 tenants, taking away landlords’ excuses for not wanting to deal with Section 8 paperwork. (Daniel also sued the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs over how it distributed tax credits for low-income housing, a case the Supreme Court will [rule on](#) in the next few days.)

“The idea that Section 8 people should be required to stay in areas of slum and blight—at some point they’re going to realize that’s just racial segregation,” Daniel told me.

Often, voucher-holders in Austin have such a hard time finding housing that they need to ask for multiple extensions to find housing. Tenants lose the voucher if they don’t use it in 60 to 90 days.

David Wittie, a voucher-holder in Austin, ran into this problem when he was looking for a new place last year. Wittie called around and found a few places that said they took vouchers. But by the time he got on a bus and arrived at the apartment building to sign a lease, the units would be rented. Wittie, who has been in a wheelchair since he contracted from polio in 1956, said that he had to ask for three extensions before he found a place.

“All I wanted was to find a nice place to live,” he told me.

In cities such as Austin, where rents are rapidly rising because of an influx of new, affluent residents, voucher holders may be having even tougher times finding a place to rent because the cost of housing has gotten so expensive. There are no rent-control laws in the state of Texas, and rents in Austin have

gone up [7 percent](#) over the past year, making it nearly impossible to find a place that is affordable with a voucher.

The result is that voucher-holders are pushed farther out from a city's core, and into buildings that are dilapidated and have multiple code violations: In 2012, city enforcement officers ordered an apartment complex in Austin evacuated after a second-floor walkway [sagged and then collapsed](#). Officials blamed termite damage, and said the low-income and Section 8 voucher-holders were hesitant to report unsafe conditions because they knew how hard it was to find an affordable place to live and didn't want to be evicted.

Rufus Jones, a 51-year-old visually-impaired voucher-holder, had to look for a new apartment two years ago when the building where he'd lived for 13 years was sold to a new owner who quickly raised the rent. After months of searching, Jones moved into a place that soon became nightmarish when he discovered it was infested with cockroaches. The apartment was located in a noisy building where the hot water often didn't work and where the sewage pipes leaked, but the final straw came when a roach crawled into Jones's ear when he was sleeping and he had to go to the ER to get it out.

It took Jones a long time to find the place he now lives, since fewer and fewer apartments would accept vouchers. But when I visited him at the apartment, a low-slung building on the far north side of Austin, he told me it wasn't much better.

His new place is infested with rodents, which crawl into his bedroom and bathroom through holes in the wall, waking Jones's service dog and Jones himself. Jones's current place is only on one bus line, and he's now once again going through the process of finding his way around a new neighborhood.

"It's just so horrible right now—I can't sleep, and I'm stressed out the whole time," he told me.

* * *

The Housing Choice Voucher program is the nation's largest housing subsidy, serving 2.2 million families, which is still only about 25 percent of eligible households. It makes up a big part of the government's efforts to improve housing conditions for America's poorest families. Advocates have called time and again for HUD to alter the Housing Choice Voucher program to make it a better tool for families to improve their lots in life, and some changes are afoot.

"There's a growing recognition that there's a shortage of affordable housing, and that families with vouchers have a hard time using them in neighborhoods and communities that haven't traditionally had voucher families in them," said Phil Tegeler, the executive director of the Poverty & Race Research Action Council.

As the result of a settlement, HUD tested a new program in Dallas and a few other metro areas that calculates fair market rent based on zip codes, rather than for a metro area as a whole. Called the Small Area Fair Market Rent Program, the idea is to make the voucher more valuable to landlords in nicer neighborhoods. Under the program, if a voucher holder wants to rent a place in the 75231 zip code, the Vickery Park area of Dallas, the voucher would support a rent up to \$580 for a one-bedroom. Vickery Park is a lower-income area that gained notoriety as the home of America's first Ebola victim. But if a

voucher holder wants to rent an apartment in Forney, Texas, zip code 75126, the voucher would cover rent of a one-bedroom up to \$1,090. Forney has some of the lowest crime rates in the state, and has also been designated the “Antique Capital of Texas.”

A [study](#) out of Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies found that the Dallas small-area fair market rent program was successful in helping voucher families move to neighborhoods with lower violent-crime rates and lower poverty rates. Kathy O’Regan, HUD’s Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Research, told me that the results of that study motivated HUD to use small-area Fair Market Rents in more areas. Earlier this month, HUD [sought comments](#) the idea of potentially changing the way Fair Market Rents are calculated.

“We agree with critics—we believe that we should be able to do better,” she told me. “It doesn’t look from geographic patterns as though households are getting enough choice.”

A HUD study also found that public housing authorities are significantly underfunded when it comes to managing Section 8. Administrative costs, which are used to pay for mobility counseling, have been limited by Congress. HUD is [asking Congress](#) to consider changing the limits on administrative costs for voucher programs.

“We want to give households choice, choices that help them in improving their lives,” she said.

If Section 8 can be fixed, it’ll be money well spent. The government spends billions of dollars each year creating a program that, for some families, is akin to winning the lottery. But what’s the point of winning the lottery if there’s nowhere safe to spend it?

Political Corruption In San Mateo County Is Endless And Passed On From Dynastic Family To Dynastic Family

Michael G. Stogner has made a career out of investigating and documenting the massive political corruption in San Mateo County (<https://sanmateocountynews.com/category/corruption-and-organized-crime-in-san-mateo-county/>).

County officials are terrified of him looking into them.

A. Silvestris is an old outdoor furniture store in San Francisco that was once a ‘gambling establishment’. It is famous for having a yellow line painted down the middle of the building. The yellow line is still there. On one side of the line is San Francisco County and on the other side of the line is San Mateo County. When the police would raid this speak-easy, in the old days, all the hookers and mobsters would step over to the San Mateo side of the line because crime and mobsterism was always legal in San Mateo County.

The greed for big tech money and mansions has kept the corruption alive and well in San Mateo. The only solution would seem to be a mass FBI raid of all of the San Mateo County offices.

The origin of San Mateo County provides many twists and turns in the telling. We had government corruption, unscrupulous motives, fraudulent elections, murder, vigilantism, lawsuits and, presumably, the good guys winning in the end. It would make a good book. That’s why Mitchell Postel will be publishing one this summer.

Originally, San Francisco County included the northern Peninsula. In 1856, the city of San Francisco held most of the population, as our bucolic area had only about 2,500 people, mostly involved in agriculture. There was some feeling among the locals that San Francisco was too far to travel to the county seat, so a separate county might be a good idea. There was a feeble effort to split off into the county of Raymundo. This plan was not exactly a major issue at the time, however.

It was San Francisco that precipitated the division, although this was not really their intent. San Francisco wanted to consolidate their city and county governments to make them more efficient and less prone to corruption. When their plan went to the state Legislature, the split was part of a compromise in this proposal. The men that had been involved in San Francisco’s graft and corruption saw this as an opportunity to create their own fiefdom here on the Peninsula.

To assure their control, the gang of crooks demanded immediate elections. They utilized armed intimidation at the polls, ballot box stuffing and outright fraud in the vote counting to accomplish their ends. The elections turned out as they had expected.

In an unrelated incident, one of their numbers happened to shoot a newspaperman in San Francisco the day after the elections. This event pushed the population of the city over the edge, and they revived the

Committee of Vigilance to see that justice was done. The committee hanged the transgressor, and their cleanup efforts caused most of the rest of the gang to disappear from the local scene.

Just to keep the legal matters in order, civil lawsuits were filed challenging the election results. It was fairly moot, as some of the newly elected officials were no longer to be found. When scrutinized under the law, it seems that the elections were invalid anyway, since they took place before the effective date of the creation of the new county. The gang of crooks had been just a little too eager to take over in the first place.

One of the election issues had been the location of the county seat. Redwood City and Belmont were both on the ballot. In the fraudulent election, Belmont was selected. This was due to the interest of one property holder and his connection to the thugs rather than popular choice. After the fraud was eliminated, Redwood City was named the seat of county government. Redwood City was at least a growing community. Belmont at that time didn't even have any business establishments other than a hotel.

The men who would have been elected if the elections had been fair or valid handled temporary government. Legitimate elections were finally held and confirmed most of the presumed office holders. One exception was a man who decided, after all, not to run for election. Finally, the real representatives legally took over the operation of the newly established county. That was our beginning.

Rediscovering the Peninsula appears in the Monday edition of the Daily Journal. For more information on this or related topics, visit the San Mateo County History Museum, 750 Middlefield Road, Redwood City.

This current election for Sheriff is a perfect example Illegally Appointed Sheriff Carlos Bolanos (July 12, 2016) filed his political papers with San Mateo County Elections Office, Statement of Organization on November 18, 2015 about a week before Sheriff Greg Munks announced that he would not be running for re-election in three years and he endorses Carlos Bolanos. That looks like at least those two conspired to have Carlos Bolanos be the next Sheriff of San Mateo County. It accomplished two things, it made Mr. Bolanos the **longest running candidate** in San Mateo County's history. It also put all Sheriff Deputies on notice, if you want to succeed in your career you had better support Bolanos. Former brave Sheriff Deputy Juan P. Lopez ran as a Write In candidate for Sheriff in 2014. He missed the filing deadline by 4-6 minutes and **Mark Church** would not allow his name to be on the ballot. He choose to be a **Write In** candidate for Sheriff a very costly decision. He was investigated by the Sheriff's Office, The District Attorney's Office, and even **David Silberman** of the County Counsel Office helped. Juan Lopez was arrested twice once with **guns to his head** in his front yard in front of his children. District Attorney Steve Wagstaffe held a press conference for TV media and announced to the world that Juan Lopez **smuggled a cell phone and drugs to an inmate**, and not just any inmate he was a gang member. After more than 3 years in the Court System and \$120,000 legal fees spent, the Judge threw out those charges. The reason was **Prosecutorial Misconduct it turns out both the Sheriff's Office and the District Attorney's Office knew there was ZERO evidence that connected**

Juan P. Lopez to the cell phone and drugs. That didn't seem to matter to Carlos Bolanos or Steve Wagstaffe. Think about "Those Who Matter."

Those Who Matter: People who **control investigations**, who to investigate, who not to investigate, edit reports, submit recommendations to the District Attorney's Office for prosecution, filing charges with the Court when you know they are false. Lying to a Judge and submitting a false affidavit, **That is a Criminal Act.**

Here we are approaching 4 years in the legal system and this finally gets filed.

Detective Armando Perjuriously Alleged that Mr. Lopez Placed a Telephone Call to the Contraband Cell Phone in Order to Obtain a Search Warrant.

He made the phone calls himself. Who knows about this besides San Mateo County District Attorney Steve Wagstaffe, Deputy Chief Karen Guidotti, Sheriff Carlos Bolanos, Continued 4 times.

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7 Attorneys for Defendant
8 JUAN PABLO LOPEZ

9 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
10 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

11 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, No. NF 433910

12 Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH/TRaverse
(Cal. Pen. Code §1538.5, *Franks v.*
Delaney)

13 v.

14 JUAN PABLO LOPEZ

Date:

Time:

Dept:

15 Defendant.

16
17
18 **I. Detective Armando's Perjuriously Alleged that Mr. Lopez Placed a Telephone
19 Call to the Contraband Cell Phone in Order to Obtain a Search Warrant.**

20 In his affidavit for a search warrant, Detective Armando alleged that "the most suspicious call"
21 made to Dionicio Lopez's cell phone was a call "from a blocked number on 12-01-13 at
22 approximately 1755 hours. The call was not answered (because the phone had been earlier seized by
23 law enforcement.)" *Exhibit A* at 12. The Call Detail Log is attached herein. See *Exhibit C*.

24 In his affidavit, Det. Armando states that after he seized the phone at 1715, he call tested the
25 phone two times to confirm the listed cell phone number. See *Exhibit A* at 3-4.

26 In the Call Detail Log, it is clear that there are only two calls from the trunked Sheriff's Line
27 on December 1, 2013 after 5:00 p.m.. Those phone calls were made at 1755 and 1804 hours,
28 corresponding to Det. Armando's phone testing. These are the only calls made on December 1, 2013
after 1715.

1 The allegation that the 1755 hour call was suspicious and somehow could point to Mr. Lopez
2 is a perjurious and intentionally false conclusion geared to induce the magistrate to sign off on a
3 search warrant utterly lacking in probable cause.

4 This "conclusion" exemplifies Detective Armando's reckless disregard for the truth in his
5 pursuit of obtaining Mr. Lopez's personal cell phone records. It is particularly jarring when combined
6 with his other "conclusions," such as attributing Dionicio Lopez's out of context statements that make
7 no reference to Mr. Lopez to a conspiracy between Mr. Lopez and Dionicio. Det. Armando also
8 makes uncorroborated allegations that Stephanie Torres was referring to Mr. Lopez in her text about
9 "Juan," despite the fact that prior to the writing and execution of the search warrant in question, Det.
10 Acosta and Det. Armando interviewed Ms. Torres and had every opportunity to further investigate and
11 corroborate this claim. *See Exhibit B.*

12 As stated in Mr. Lopez's moving papers, the egregious nature of Det. Armando's false
13 statements and mischaracterizations do not fall under the *Leon* exception. The prosecution has the
14 burden of establishing "objectively reasonable" reliance. An officer cannot rely on a magistrate's
15 acceptance of a warrant to establish objective reasonableness. Instead, the test is "whether a
16 reasonably well-trained officer [in the affiant's] position would have known that the affidavit failed to
17 provide probable cause. *Malley v. Briggs* (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 345.

18 In *People v. Camarella*, the California Supreme Court distilled *Leon* in the following manner:

19 If a well-trained officer should reasonably have known that the affidavit failed to establish
20 probable cause (and hence that the officer should not have sought a warrant), exclusion is
21 required under the third situation described in *Leon*, and a court may not rely on the fact that
22 a warrant was issued in assessing objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in seeking
23 the warrant.

24 *People v. Camarella* (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 592, 596.

25 In *Camarella*, the search warrant affidavit stated that the affiant officer received an anonymous
26 telephone call stating that the defendant was a known cocaine dealer; the caller stated that she had
27 purchased cocaine from the defendant and that in the last seventy-two hours, a relative of hers had
28 purchased cocaine from him as well. *Id.* at 597. The informant told the affiant where the defendant
worked and gave an approximate location of where the defendant lived. *Id.* The affiant then checked

1 the Sheriff's records and saw that approximately a year before the call, another confidential informant
2 told the affiant that he knew someone fitting the defendant's description, including his name and
3 where he worked, to be an active dealer of cocaine. *Id.* at 598. The affiant then uncovered a police
4 report, which he incorporated into the search warrant affidavit that showed that three and a half years
5 before the phone call, the defendant had been arrested for cocaine possession and that at the time of
6 his arrest, he had "score sheets" which recorded sales of controlled substances. *Id.* The booking sheet
7 for the defendant confirmed his name and place of employment; the affiant also showed the
8 defendant's photo to another detective who confirmed the defendant's identity and place of
9 employment. *Id.* The affiant also confirmed the defendant's address and his vehicle by driving by the
10 defendant's address and checking the vehicle license plate with the DMV. *Id.*

11 In analyzing whether the search could be upheld, neither side contested the fact that the
12 affidavit, on its own, was lacking probable cause; the sole question was whether the *Leon* good faith
13 exception applied. *Id.* at 601.

14 The Court explained that the question to be addressed is whether a reasonably well-trained
15 officer . . . would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he
16 should not have applied for the warrant. If such was the case, the officer's application for a
17 warrant was not objectively reasonable, because it created the unnecessary danger of an
18 unlawful arrest . . . ours is not an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working
19 under docket pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should. *We find it reasonable to*
require the officer applying for the warrant to minimize this danger by exercising reasonable
professional judgment.

20 *Id.* at 604, citing *Malley v. Briggs*, 475 U.S. 335, 346 (1986).

21 In holding that a well-trained officer "could have believed that the affidavit presented a close
22 or debatable question on the issue of probable cause" and thus not able to determine that the officer
23 should have known that the affidavit lacked probable cause, the California Supreme Court pointed to
24 the fact that the officer in the case obtained "substantial corroborating information" rather than

1 in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found" in
2 Mr. Lopez's phone. See *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238.

3 In fact, Det. Armando explicitly states that he believes that the records "will either place Juan
4 Lopez within the proximity of 1050 Mission Road . . . on 12-01-2013 or help exclude him from
5 involvement in this criminal investigation." See *Exhibit A* at 2.

6 There was no good faith investigation. Even when he had the opportunity to corroborate or
7 exclude his conclusions, such as with the interview with Ms. Torres, Det. Armando failed to
8 investigate his claims that she was referring to Juan Lopez. Similarly, no investigation was done into
9 to whom Dioncio Lopez was referencing in his conversations and letter. Here, Det. Armando relied
10 solely on uncorroborated conclusions, speculation, conjecture and outright false statements to obtain
11 this search warrant affidavit.


12 As the fruit of this search warrant affidavit lay the foundation for all further searches against
13 Mr. Lopez in this case, all evidence seized as a result of this and all subsequent searches must be
14 suppressed.

15 **CONCLUSION**

16 Based on the foregoing, Mr. Lopez has made the showing required to quash the search
17 warrant; he has also made the requisite showing for traversal and an evidentiary hearing under *Franks*
18 *v. Delaware*. He requests that this Court grant this motion.

19 Date: May 1, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

20 
21 J. TONY SERRA
22 MARIA BELYI
23 Attorneys for Defendant
24 JUAN PABLO LOPEZ

metropcs

Call Details

Records for Target Number: 4156856685

Search Number: 4156856685 Search Dates: 9/26/2012 - 11/15/2014

GMT	Time	Direction	DIR	Orig Number	Dest Number	Status	Special Features	CallID
11/30/2013	23:22:58	0:06	Incoming		4156856685	Answered	None (2A)	
11/30/2013	23:22:58	0:06	Outgoing		1805637249	Answered	None (2B)	
11/30/2013	23:22:58	0:06	Call		2512229999	Answered		
11/30/2013	23:31:46	1:46	Outgoing		4156400745	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
11/30/2013	23:31:46	1:46	Call		4156400745	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
12/1/2013	09:44:31	0:38	Outgoing		6314806689	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
12/1/2013	09:44:31	0:38	Call		6314806689	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
12/1/2013	10:30:46	0:44	Outgoing		4156400745	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
12/1/2013	10:30:46	0:44	Call		4156400745	Answered	Calling Line ID Presentation	
12/1/2013	14:31:12	0:07	Outgoing		1805637249	Answered	None (2B)	
12/1/2013	14:31:12	0:07	Call		1805637249	Answered	None (2B)	
12/1/2013	14:31:12	0:07	Incoming		4156856685	Answered	None (2B)	
12/1/2013	17:55:36	0:10	Incoming		4156856685	Not Answered	Call Forward	6508767152
12/1/2013	17:55:36	0:10	Call		4156856685	Not Answered	Call Forward	6508767152
12/2/2013	09:13:40	0:05	Incoming		4156856685	Not Answered	Call Forward	6508767152
12/2/2013	09:13:40	0:05	Call		4156856685	Not Answered	Call Forward	6508767152
12/2/2013	09:13:40	0:05	Outgoing		1805637249	Answered	None (2B)	
12/2/2013	09:13:40	0:05	Call		2512229999	Answered	None (2B)	
12/2/2014	11:50:03	0:34	Outgoing		7075961913	Answered	None	
12/2/2014	11:50:03	0:34	Call		7075961913	Answered	None	
12/2/2014	11:55:42	0:12	Outgoing		4087053452	Answered	None	
12/2/2014	11:55:42	0:12	Call		4087053452	Answered	None	

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PROOF OF SERVICE

The undersigned declares:

I am a citizen of the United States. My business address is 506 Broadway, San Francisco, California 94133. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action.

On the date below, I caused a true copy of the:

SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH/TRaverse (Cal. Pen. Code §1538.5, *Franks v. Delaware*)

to be served on the following parties in the following manner:

San Mateo District Attorney
ATTN: Bryan Abanto
400 County Center
Redwood City, CA 94063

Via Personal Service

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration is executed on May 1, 2018 at San Francisco, California.



MARIA BELYI

To all good and concerned citizens Please join us in San Mateo County Superior Court June 28, 2018 9:00AM as the Judge rules on this filing. Juan P. Lopez finally found a law firm to file this important document.

Thank You to Tony Serra and Maria Belyi.

One County Housing Director's Thoughts

Corrupt political families conspire to give government funds, contracts, tax waivers, buildings, stock market profits and other insider perks to themselves and their friends. They also conspire to blockade, harm, sabotage and black-list those who compete with them and their friends. These corrupt politicians are never prosecuted for their crimes, and can laugh in the face of those who point out their crimes, because they control the prosecution system. Their Quid Pro Quo criminal corruption is the single largest cause of the taxpayer hatred of Congress.

ONE SOLUTION: <https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/california-legislators-want-to-help-you-buy-a-house-with-down-payment-sha/>

Why the State can't build anything: ***Four towns and four stories frame housing crunch***
Three economists go deer hunting. They travel all day until they find a deer standing in the middle of the prairie. The first shoots wide right, the second shoots wide left and the third exclaims, "I think we finally have it!"

Economics, by definition, seeks to predict how humans behave when faced with limited resources. To achieve these objectives, economists use complicated mathematical models to predict economic outcomes. This concludes that economic forecasts are flawed because their models' methodologies do not account for human individuality and use math to predict future outcomes. This results in faulty forecasts because math relies on deductive reasoning: making a conclusion dependent on their premises.

Prakash Loungani of the International Monetary Fund concluded economists failed to predict 148 out of 150 recessions. According to the Financial Times, the IMF accurately predicted five economic contractions occurring in October for the past 27 years. However, the IMF's predictions were off and failed to forecast 81% of recessions that occurred that month.

Forecasting failure is not quarantined to the IMF. Even Nobel Prize-winning economists are not error-proof. For example, in 1998, Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman predicted the internet would have no greater impact than the fax machine. This prediction did not happen, and the internet revolutionized the way information is dispersed.

SILICON VALLEY'S TRILLION DOLLAR CULTURE OF BRIBERY; CENSORSHIP; SEX TRAFFICKING; ELECTION MANIPULATION; PAYOLA TO CITY, STATE, COUNTY AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS; LUDICROUS EXCESS AND REVOLVING DOOR PAY-OFFS TO GOVERNMENT INSIDERS HAS DESTROYED HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS BY NEGATING HUMAN RIGHTS OVER OLIGARCH LUXURIES!

---- In California, The government refuses to fund the CALHOME fund, the only fund that helps normal people get a home. California politi-bosses give all the money to their big developer friends

---- The Silicon Valley solution to “The Housing Crisis” is all talk, window dressing, dog-and-pony, un-responded to white papers and absolutely no meaningful action.

---- California has the worst housing crisis in HISTORY!

---- California citizens must DEMAND that the STATE fund the CALHOME PROGRAM for at least One Billion Dollars. It is the ONLY program that helps families directly and it has been blockaded by lobbyists!

---- California politicians make lots of WINDOW DRESSING, PR statements about helping individuals but then they only give the government money to developers who financed the politicians campaigns!

---- ONLY BIG DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES THAT PAYOFF GOVERNORS EVER GET ANY FEDERAL FUNDS - CITIZENS GET NOTHING!!!!

---- Nobody can get government support to build a home because in California it would compete with the developers who financed the politicians campaigns!

---- Billions of dollars were sent to California, by the feds, to help individual citizens. The money came from the citizens own pockets via taxes. 99% of that money was given to developers who financed the politicians campaigns and none of it went to citizens to build homes.

---- Investigators traced the federal funds back to the family bank accounts and stock market accounts of the politicians that control California!

---- – Fair Housing Advocates have identified over 200,000 people that already have lifetime mortgage payment funds IN THEIR HANDS but The State Of California blockades these people from building homes...

EVEN THOUGH CALIFORNIA SAYS “THE HOUSING CRISIS IS BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT GOT ENOUGH HOMES!!!” HUD says this is illegal but HUD has yet to sue California to stop the blockades.

---- All of the land on the Stanford Campus could solve all of Silicon Valley’s housing crisis. The State of California should take all the land away from criminally corrupt Stanford University and build housing for average income on it. Corrupt Stanford University (now almost entirely based on bribes by rich oligarchs who engage in human rights abuses) doesn’t “deserve” anything any more.

---- The State politicians will do anything to stop those 200,000 people, with mortgage cash in hand, from building their homes because developers who financed the politicians campaigns will shit their pants if their political quid pro quo payola conduits are cut off.

---- Part of the housing crisis is because California politicians invited half of South America to move in in hopes of rigging the voter rolls. Most of the people that showed up are actually construction labor people, but California won’t let them build homes because they are not in a union and because they compete with developers who financed the politicians campaigns. The irony is mind-boggling!

---- In California the laws, and ‘rules’ have been staged to make it impossible for a single family to build a home. Why are the laws and rules staged that way?: To protect developers who financed the politicians campaigns!

---- REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS, OLIGARCHS AND REAL ESTATE BANKS PAY BRIBES TO COUNTY OFFICIALS TO KEEP AFFORDABLE HOUSING FROM GETTING BUILT BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THEIR SCHEMES!

---- BIG BANKS, BIG BUILDING DEVELOPERS AND TECH BILLIONAIRES ARE BRIBING COUNTY OFFICIALS TO STOP THEM FROM DOING ANYTHING!

----S .F. Chronicle: Broken Homes, By Joaquin Palomino and Trisha Thadani / San Francisco spends millions of dollars to shelter its most vulnerable residents in dilapidated hotels. With little oversight or support, the results are disastrous.

---- San Jose Spotlight: Santa Clara County faces silver tsunami of homelessness, By Tran Nguyen / Brenda Nichols was among 145 homeless seniors who died in Santa Clara County between December 2020 and November 2021—a record high number as the region witnessed 250 homeless deaths over the same period.

----- Is this more smoke-and-mirrors WINDOW DRESSING: Rural Partners Network to Empower Rural Communities to Access Federal Resources, / The Rural Partners Network (RPN) is a new whole-of-government effort led by the USDA to transform the way federal agencies partner with rural places to create economic opportunity.

---- GlobeSt.: The Share of Millennials Owning Homes Is Dwindling, By Paul Bergeron // This generation’s homeownership rate doesn’t match up with Gen X or Baby Boomers. Big Tech companies should be limited from paying any worker over \$50,000.00 per year.

---- Earth Day: 52 Years of Individual Environmental Action Hasn’t Fixed It And Proven That Nothing You Do Will Help, By Melanie Curry // Earth Day was born at a time when teach-ins and radical protests were forcing changes in the status quo...But over time – 52 years being a lot of that – corporate sponsorship and greenwashing shifted the focus of Earth Day to individual responsibility and to volunteerism.

---- BATHROOMS IN CALIFORNIA COST AS MUCH AS A TWO BEDROOM HOUSE COSTS IN THE REST OF AMERICA!

---- There are hundreds of millions of people in America. The same 120 of them are all involved in operating the same crimes and corruption including: the Sony Pictures corruption; the Afghanistan rare earth mine scandals operated through The Energy Department political slush fund that involves the lithium battery cover-ups (headed by Elon Musk); the Big Tech Brotopia rape, sex trafficking, bribery, exclusionism, racism and misogyny issues they were taught at Stanford University; The Facebook – Meta – Google – Alphabet – Netflix, et al, coordinated news manipulation and domestic spying that they engage in; the hiring of Fusion GPS – Black Cube – Gizmodo/Gawker assassins; the destruction of the housing market by their mass real estate manipulations; patent theft and industrial espionage; and the bribery of almost every politician all the way up to the Oval Office.

---- So, while the categories covered in this investigation may seem diverse. They are connected through an enterprise of criminality and illicit, coordinated operations.

We list, by name, the 120 most complicit individuals organizing these crimes, in the evidence documents already submitted to the FBI, FINCEN, DOJ, FTC, SEC, FEC, Congress, InterPol and other authorities. Digital financial tracking of those persons and all of their family members should be assumed to have been under way for some time. Wire-taps and device taps of those persons and all of their family members should be assumed to have been under way for some time.

Many people don't know that their new home can be more affordable than they might think!

– California has the worst housing crisis in HISTORY! Call Sacramento and insist that the State fund the CALHOME fund and DOUBLE the budget for CALHOME. It is the ONLY program that can directly help individual families! Habitat for Humanity, myself, my peers and the public may have gotten CALHOME restarted. Take a look at this: [CalHome-and-Serna-Homeownership-Public-Comment-Notice-Memo](#)

– Many politicians make lots of WINDOW DRESSING, PR statements about helping individuals but then only give the government money to developers who financed their politicians campaigns!

– We contacted EVERY COUNTY in California and got different info from each one. We found there was no single aligned strategy.

– <https://www.calhfa.ca.gov/homeownership/programs/ForgivableLoan.pdf> CAN GET YOU A HOUSE NOW!

– Nobody can get government support to built a home because it would compete with the developers who financed the dirty politicians campaigns!

– Billions of dollars were sent to California, by the feds, to help individual citizens. The money came from the citizens own pockets. 99% of that money was given to developers who financed the politicians campaigns and none of it went to citizens to build homes.

– Investigators traced the federal funds back to the family bank accounts and stock market accounts of the politicians that control California!

– Fair Housing Advocates have identified over 200,000 people that already have lifetime mortgage payment funds HUD housing funds IN THEIR HANDS but The State Of California blockades these people from building homes... EVEN THOUGH CALIFORNIA SAYS “THE HOUSING CRISIS IS BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT GOT ENOUGH HOMES!!!” HUD says this is illegal but HUD has yet to sue California to stop the blockades.

See: [HUD S8 HOME OWNERSHIP PROGRAM](#)

– All of the land on the Stanford Campus could solve all of Silicon Valley's housing crisis. The State of California should take all the land away from criminally corrupt Stanford University and build housing

for average income on it. Corrupt Stanford University (now almost entirely based on bribes) doesn't "deserve" anything any more.

– The State politicians will do anything to stop those 200K people, with mortgage cash, from building their homes because developers who financed the politicians campaigns will poop their pants if their payola conduits are cut off. Are you stuck in this loop? Then take a look at: [Could_your_clients_benefit_from_USDAs_Rehab_Repair_Guaranteed_Loan_Feature](#)

– Part of the housing crisis is because California politicians invited half of South America to move in in hopes of rigging the voter rolls. Most of the people that showed up are actually construction labor people, but California won't let them build homes because they are not in a union and because they compete with developers who financed the politicians campaigns. The irony is mind-boggling!

– We called EVERY housing counseling agency, every PHA, every county housing agency and California Housing manager and everyone else. They all said that there is "NO WAY" to build a home in California because the laws, and 'rules' have been staged to make it impossible. Why are the laws and rules staged that way?: To protect developers who financed the politicians campaigns!

– What happens in California generally spreads across America. If you want it like this in your town. DO NOTHING. If you want this fixed: FIRE YOUR POLITICIANS IN THE NEXT ELECTION!

Certain people don't want you to know that you can build a home in 2022, ANYWHERE in America, for \$200,000.00 (or less). In the Bay Area and New York, they want you to think that a home should cost you three million dollars+.

Here is our Team's challenge to your county:

We will build a home in your county for \$200,000.00 and post all of the HOW TO instructions online, in your county, and give weekend classes in the DIY. Then your county, or anybody in your county, can copy it, over and over, until the housing crisis in your county is solved!

In California, New York and many other places, counties have recently spent over \$900,000.00, PER UNIT!!!, to build a single studio apartment for their citizens. San Francisco spends over \$70,000.00 per year to spray a white square on the ground per homeless tent. You can rent 3 whole Section 8 apartments in Tracy, California for that much money.

How about a single-family two bedroom home for \$200,000.00? Many people can qualify to receive \$1600.00 per month from HUD to help pay the mortgage on their home! You can receive this money under the national HUD Home Ownership Voucher HCV Homeownership Regulations (24 CFR Part 982, Subpart M) – HCV homeownership regulations are found in Sections 982.625-982.643 per the Statement of Homeowner Obligations. A woman named Marcia Fudge is in charge of getting these funds to every single American that qualifies. She is the head of HUD in Washington, DC. This is her #1 job. Give her a shout. There are many other programs like this, ask her to double-up on the HUD Home Ownership programs... now, more than ever! Counties have HUNDREDS of acres of empty, or unused, land. The housing crisis is in such an emergency state that shocking new approaches must be considered.

With a little ‘sweat equity’ and some creative land use, YOU can get your \$200K house!

Better?

San Francisco County, Alameda County, San Mateo County, Marin County, Westchester County...all counties... let’s talk!

We are targeting the California Coast for our next showcase home that anybody can copy... stay tuned as we try to find a County official who will be the San Mateo County evangelist. We will blog the progress as we slog through the process...

Special interest groups and officials on-the-take hate this project because they don’t get to skim payola off it, but 330 MILLION American citizens love this project!

If you are the head of a county housing agency give us a shout. If you are a citizen who wants one of these homes, give the head of your county housing agency a shout and have them call us! We have been on national TV and media doing this previously.

Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac recently announced that First-time buyers need as little as 3% down and can use rent payments to qualify for an ADU construction loan.

It just got a lot easier to qualify for a mortgage covering the construction costs of an accessory dwelling unit, commonly called casitas, in-law units and granny flats.

Freddie Mac announced ADU rental income on a single-unit primary residence can be used to qualify for a mortgage. Previously, rental income could be used only by disabled borrowers to qualify for loans to purchase, renovate or refinance ADUs for their caregivers.

Additionally, Freddie expanded its mortgage menu to provide purchase or refinance loans for one ADU on 2- and 3-unit properties. Previously, it was single-unit ADU financing only.

The big opportunity is a combination loan covering the purchase of a home and the construction of an ADU.

Freddie’s Choice Renovation Mortgage ([cs-272_choicerenovation_fact_sheet_final2](#)) allows “first-time” buyers who haven’t owned a home in the past three years to put as little as 3% down and build an ADU. Repeat buyers who have owned a property within three years need to put 5% down.

The down payment is based upon the completed value of the property or the sales price plus the cost of the project, whichever is less.

For example, say the purchase price is \$475,000 and ADU construction costs \$150,000. That’s a total cost of \$625,000. If the appraised value of the home and the completed ADU is projected to be \$700,000, the down payment would be based on the lower value of \$625,000 – or \$18,750 for a first-time buyer or \$31,250 for a repeat buyer.

There are no income restrictions. And being able to consider the ADU rents may mean the difference between a loan denial and qualifying in high-cost California. ADU rents cannot exceed 30% of your total qualifying income.

Choice Renovation can also be used to refinance your existing first mortgage and pay off short-term debt used for ADU construction.

ADU construction costs run about \$200 per square foot in Orange and San Diego counties, compared with \$329 per square foot in the Bay Area, according to Dan Dunmoyer, president and CEO of the California Building Industry Association. The average ADU size is 700-750 square feet, and the average rent is \$2,000 to \$2,800 a month.

Let's say you added a 725 square foot ADU at \$200 per square foot, for a total cost of \$145,000. Assuming you get a 30-year mortgage at 5%, the payment would be about \$925 per month, including taxes and insurance. If the rent totals \$2,400 per month, you just made yourself a handsome \$1,475 per month. Can you say smart investment?

It got a lot easier to add ADUs in California in 2020 after state lawmakers removed lots of red tape and timeline restrictions.

ADUs will help the California rental property shortage.

Figures from state and industry officials show the number of new ADUs jumped from no more than 9,000 in 2018 to more than 19,000 in 2021. Seventy thousand U.S. homes sold in 2019 had an ADU, up from 8,000 in 2000, according to a 2020 Freddie Mac report.

"The growth of accessory dwelling units (ADUs) in the United States has been dramatic, particularly in high-cost areas seeing significant population growth," the report said. ADU demand is highest in California, Florida, Texas and Georgia.

The devil is in the details.

For example, Freddie financing requires ADUs to have a separate entrance, a kitchen and a bathroom. The borrower can occupy the ADU and rent out the home. Attached or detached ADUs are acceptable. Even a garage conversion works.

Besides stick-built ADUs, there are manufactured ADUs that are trucked in and hoisted into place with a crane. Even some homebuilders are adding ADUs as an option, Dunmoyer said.

When picking a contractor, be prudent, cautious and careful. Take the time to tour their completed projects. Thoroughly interview references and check licensing. Finding a competent, dependable and reasonably priced professional is key.

Freddie Mac rate news: The 30-year fixed rate averaged 5.23%, 14 basis points higher than last week. The 15-year fixed rate averaged 4.38%, 6 basis points higher than last week. The 5-year ARM averaged 4.12%, 8 basis points higher than last week.

The Mortgage Bankers Association reported a 6.5% decrease in mortgage application volume from the previous week.

Bottom line: Assuming a borrower gets the average 30-year fixed rate on a conforming \$647,200 loan, last year's payment was \$785 less than this week's payment of \$3,510.

What I see: Locally, well-qualified borrowers can get the following fixed-rate mortgages without points: A 30-year FHA at 4.625%, a 15-year conventional at 4.375%, a 30-year conventional at 5.25%, a 15-year conventional high-balance (\$647,201 to \$970,800) at 5.25%, a 30-year conventional high-balance at 5.625% and a 30-year purchase jumbo at 4.75%.

ONWARD AND UPWARD.

The “whiners” like to put out a lot of hot-air about how this is “impossible”. Just to head them off at the pass, here is a very rudimentary overview of one of a hundred ways to validate that \$200K number:




Image source: Getty Images.

1. There aren't enough affordable homes

The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), a not-for-profit organization focused on advocating for affordable housing, found in its 2021 GAP report that for every 100 extremely low-income renter households, which are those who earn 30% or less than the median income for the area, there were only 37 available homes for rent in 2019. Those earning 50% or less of the median income had 60 homes for every 100 households.

THE GAP

AFFORDABLE AND AVAILABLE RENTAL HOMES
PER 100 RENTER HOUSEHOLDS, 2019



AMI = Area Median Income.
Source: NLIHC tabulations of 2019 ACS PUMS data.
©2021 National Low Income Housing Coalition

<https://nlihc.org/gap>



Image source: National Low Income Housing Coalition.

Today's affordable housing crisis goes a lot further than housing the nation's poorest families. The number of those who can no longer afford to buy or rent without majorly exceeding the recommended income threshold of 30% is rising due to the movement of the markets over the last two years.

2. The number of burdened households is expanding

Rapid rent growth has been spurred by record demand and a [shortage of homes](#) across the board. Homes that were once considered affordable as related to the median income for the area have increased pricing to match market rents, further reducing the supply of affordable homes. The cost of rent jumped 10.1% from 2020 to 2021, with some markets seeing rent prices climb in the 20% to 40% range year over year.

As of January 2022, wages grew at a national average of 4.5% from December 2020, clearly not enough to overcome higher costs for housing. When coupled with inflation, which reached 7% by the end of 2021, it's clear the burden on housing costs is only getting more severe.

A recent report from Vio Smart Security shows that close to half of the country has a rent-to-income ratio of 30% or higher. Florida has the highest percentage of residents paying 30% of their median income on rent, with other expensive states following close behind, like California, Oregon, and New York, to name a few.

Each State's Rent to Income Ratio




Image source: Vio Smart Security.


Cities like Tampa, Florida; Phoenix; Fort Worth, Texas; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Las Vegas, which have seen a huge uptick in inward migration over the past two years, are among the leaders in the greatest change in housing affordability year over year. Notoriously expensive markets on the West Coast like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle, as well as those on the East Coast, including cities like Boston, Washington D.C., and New York City, continue to be among the worst U.S. cities for affordable housing.

These markets aren't alone. In Q4 2021, 77% of the 575 counties surveyed are less affordable than their historical average, and one in five counties require an income of \$75,000 or more to afford the median-priced home.

3. The golden rule is no longer a rule — more like a pipe dream

No state has an adequate supply of affordable housing for its lowest-income earners, but it's no longer just the lowest-income earners who can't afford to rent or buy. The nation is getting alarmingly close to needing half of all residents to pay 30% or more of their income to rent. Spending 30% or less of income, which is considered the target range for the cost of housing, is no longer the gold standard but an idyllic goal that is unattainable for the average American.

When consumers are forced to spend 30% or more on housing costs, they are considered "house burdened," which means they have less money to spend on items like child care, healthcare, food, gas, and other necessities for living. A recent Statista report shows the number of households that are cost burdened due to housing has increased steadily since 2013, except for 2017. Today, there are an estimated 44.01 million rental households considered cost burdened.



The faces of those who are most impacted are diverse, with a mix of reasons for the financial hardships. This issue disproportionately affects people of color, but seniors and people with disabilities make up around 48% of low-income households impacted by the lack of affordable housing. The issue is widespread, and it impacts all of us. When there is a lack of affordable housing, people can be forced into unsafe living conditions or experience homelessness. This situation can also negatively impact quality of life.

Federal policies and local public housing initiatives are one way to combat the issue, but it won't be enough to fill the growing gap. Those in the [private real estate investing market](#) will need to take part in creating and preserving affordable housing units to ensure everyone has a home. Using [creative structures](#) to help tenants become homeowners for the long term could be a beneficial play for all involved. And exploring alternative housing constructs, including [3D printed houses](#), prefab homes,

and mobile home communities, could help alleviate construction costs and make housing more affordable for investors, developers, and ultimately tenants.

NEWS UPDATES ON THE EFFORT:

[Knock L.A.: New \\$1 Billion NoHo Development Will Have Segregated Affordable Housing](#)

By Madison Parsley [4-10-22] // The North Hollywood development, dubbed “District NoHo,” will replace the park-and-ride lot at the NoHo metro station. Twenty percent of the housing (311 units of 1,527) will be affordable, but they will be separate from the rest of the units.

[San Jose Spotlight: Affordable housing in Los Gatos faces uphill battle](#)

By Tran Nguyen [4-9-22] // Andrea Osgood, a senior vice president of Eden Housing, said some of the biggest affordable housing constraints in Los Gatos are land and funding.

[L.A. Times: A snapshot of new state government efforts to tackle California’s housing crisis](#)

By Hannah Wiley [4-11-22] // Assemblymember Buffy Wicks (D-Oakland), Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Development chair, said lawmakers this year are most worried about California’s intense affordability crisis and how it’s driving families out of communities.

[San Diego Union-Tribune: Santee must overturn approval of 3,000-home Fanita Ranch project, judge rules](#)

By Blake Nelson [4-11-22] // Developer says they’ll take a closer look at how new homes could affect wildfire evacuations.

[Mercury News: Housing proposed in East Bay hills derailed by court ruling](#)

By Joseph Geha [4-10-22] // State appeal court rules Livermore environmental review process was flawed.

[Turner Center Webinar: Lessons from California’s Homekey Program](#)

Thursday, April 14, 12-1.

[KQED Podcast: Sold Out: Rethinking Housing in America](#)

[3-14-22] // In this final episode of the season, Erin Baldassari and Molly Solomon look at the promise, the problems and the history of Section 8, as well as the push for guaranteed income.

[ABC: To keep family together, Inland Empire woman chooses to stay on streets](#)

By Leticia Juarez [4-10-22] // (Video) “I understand if people have no compassion for me as a 34-year-old woman and my mother as a 64-year-old, but my son deserves better,” said Courtney Lee. Even working 60 hours in a warehouse was not enough income. Assistance is only available if the multigenerational family separates.

[CalMatters: Duplex housing law met with fierce resistance by California cities](#)

By Manuela Tobias [4-11-22] // Cities around the state are trying to circumvent California’s new law allowing duplexes to be built on properties previously zoned as single family. Their methods include everything from removing parking and forbidding vehicle ownership to requiring arbitrary amounts of mature vegetation.

[San Gabriel Valley Tribune: Most LA and Orange County residents support higher-density housing, poll shows](#)

By Jeff Collins [4-11-22] // Eighty-four percent of respondents in Los Angeles and Orange counties support duplexes, triplexes and “accessory dwelling units” in their neighborhoods, while 63% support medium-sized apartment buildings.

[Fortune: The housing market just hit a level not seen since 2007](#)

By Lance Lambert [4-10-22] // Now that [mortgage rates have returned to pre-pandemic levels](#), new homebuyers are starting to feel the full weight of record prices.

[GlobeSt.: Home Sellers Are Starting to Drop Their Asking Price](#)

By Paul Bergeron [4-11-22] // Redfin reported 12% of homes for sale had price drops in the past four weeks, the highest level since early December.

[OC Register: Million-dollar homebuyers getting cheaper mortgage rates](#)

By Prashant Gopal [4-12-22] // The average for a 30-year fixed jumbo mortgage was 4.48% last week, compared with 4.95% for a conventional loan, the widest advantage for high-end borrowers in data from Bankrate.com going back to 1998.

[Federal Housing Finance Agency: Foreclosure Suspension for Borrowers Applying for Relief through the Homeowner Assistance Fund](#)

[4-6-22] // Servicers with mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must delay the foreclosure process for up to 60 days.

[HUD – PD&R: Exploring Homelessness Among People Living in Encampments and Associated Cost](#)

By Lauren Dunton et al. [4-5-21] // This study lays out a novel framework for approaches to encampments in cities around the country: clearance with support, clearance with little or no support, tacit acceptance, and formal sanctioning. Local officials in Chicago, Houston, Tacoma, and San Jose generally converged on a common strategy for responding to their most visible encampments “clearance and closure with support.”

[CityLab: Elon Musk Throws Spotlight on Homelessness with Twitter Office Idea](#)

By Sarah Holder [4-12-22] // San Francisco’s tech billionaires have tried to address the crisis before, with limited effect.

[ABC: America’s homeless ranks graying as more retire on streets](#)

By Anita Snow [4-10-22] // Fifty-five-year-old Karla Finocchio’s slide into homelessness began when she split with her partner of 18 years and temporarily moved in with a cousin.

[Reuters: Fed to raise rates aggressively in coming months, say economists](#)

By Indradip Ghosh & Prerana Bhat [4-11-22] // The Federal Reserve is expected to deliver two back-to-back half-point interest rate hikes in May and June to tackle runaway inflation, according to economists polled by Reuters who also say the probability of a recession next year is 40%.

[GlobeSt.: Wage Growth Has Helped Offset Rent Increases in the Sunbelt](#)

By K.M. Borland [4-11-22] // Higher wages in the Sunbelt region are helping renters mitigate increased housing costs.

[Fast Company: Revolutionary changes in transportation could slow global warming—if they’re done right, IPCC says](#)

By Alan Jenn [4-9-22] // Transportation accounted for 23% of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions worldwide in 2019.

[Planetizen: American Airlines Latest to Replace Flights With Bus Service](#)

By James Brasuell [4-12-22] // A trend is emerging in intercity travel in an era of pilot shortages and high fuel prices: intercity buses are replacing flights for shorter regional trips.

[Slate: How Japan Built Cities Where You Could Send Your Toddler On An Errand](#)

By Henry Grabar [4-11-22] // The Netflix show Old Enough! offers a glimpse of an alternate reality.

[Planetizen: San Diego County Development Turns Inward](#)

By Diana Ionescu [4-10-22] // Formerly a bastion of sprawling suburban developments, the San Diego region is experiencing a renaissance of urban infill development and higher-density, mixed use construction projects.

[Urbanize L.A: Micro-unit apartments begin construction in Downtown L.A.](#)

By Steven Sharp [4-12-22] // With a \$29.1-million loan in hand, developer [Housing Diversity Corporation](#) (HDC) has broken ground on [a micro-unit apartment building in Downtown Los Angeles](#) – one of five projects the Seattle-based firm currently has in the works for the region.

[North Bay Business Journal: Investors are buying mobile home parks. Residents are paying a price](#)

By Sophie Kasakove

When Sarah Clement and her seven-year-old daughter moved to a mobile home park two years ago, she felt she'd won the lottery. But just six months after she moved in, the plot of land and all of the stability and comfort that came with it seemed suddenly ripped out from under her.

More than half a dozen affordable housing projects in California are costing more than \$1 million per apartment to build, a record-breaking sum that makes it harder to house the growing numbers of low-income Californians who need help paying rent, a Times review of state data found.

The seven subsidized housing developments, all in Northern California, received state funding within the last two years and are under construction or close to breaking ground. When completed, they will provide homes for more than 600 families.

But their exorbitant price tags mean that taxpayers are subsidizing fewer apartments than they otherwise could [while waiting lists of renters needing affordable housing continue to grow](#).

“That is untenable,” said Assemblyman Tim Grayson (D-Concord), who is writing legislation aimed at simplifying state affordable housing financing. “That is not a sustainable model. We have got to do something to reduce the cost.”

A key driver of the increases is labor and material prices, which have soared because of inflation, supply-chain problems and worker shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic. But [a Times investigation published in 2020](#) found numerous factors within the control of state and local governments also to blame for the high cost of building affordable housing in California.

In comparison with private sector development, low-income housing is often saddled with more stringent environmental and labor standards. Affordable housing projects also frequently face high parking requirements, lengthy local approval processes and a byzantine bureaucracy to secure financing.

Despite promises by Gov. Gavin Newsom and other state officials to rein in costs, they haven't made comprehensive changes to address the factors cited by The Times, whose findings are similar to those of [auditors](#) and [academic researchers](#) in recent years.

“We haven't seen any relief on any of those [cost] drivers,” said Elizabeth Kneebone, research director for UC Berkeley's Turner Center for Housing Innovation, which published [one of the reports](#). “We've only seen more challenges piling on top of each other. There's been nothing to bend the curve. It just rises further upward.”

To support housing for low-income residents, federal, state and local governments provide direct financing and tax credits, which reduce what banks and other large investors owe the Internal Revenue Service and the state treasury if they help pay for housing projects. The funding requires developers to cap what tenants pay in rent.

One of the seven projects at issue, a rehabilitation of an 84-unit public housing complex in San Francisco's Hayes Valley neighborhood, will offer two-, three- and four-bedroom apartments for between \$1,186 and \$2,805 a month.

The amounts are far below market rates in San Francisco, where the median rent for a two-bedroom apartment is \$2,592 a month, according to real estate firm Apartment List. The Hayes Valley apartments are only available to families earning less than 60% of the region's median income. The project, which is a partnership between the city of San Francisco and St. Louis for-profit developer McCormack Baron Salazar, costs \$91.7 million, which translates to almost \$1.1 million per apartment. Previously, The Times identified one other — much smaller — proposed affordable housing development in California that eclipsed \$1 million per apartment to build. But that project, which called for the construction of 10 units for low-income families in Solana Beach along the San Diego coast, collapsed in 2020 because it grew too expensive.

The seven projects that now top \$1 million per unit would be the costliest built in California and probably the country. They are in the San Francisco Bay Area, the state's priciest region, with three in San Francisco, two in Oakland and one apiece in San Jose and Concord, a Contra Costa County suburb. The most expensive is a rehabilitation of 69 public housing units in San Francisco at a cost of more than \$1.2 million per apartment.

Developers and supporters of each project emphasize they're sorely needed to provide safe and secure homes for lower-income and homeless residents. A proposed 80-unit complex in San Jose for formerly homeless foster youth and families will serve a neighborhood rife with overcrowding with two or three households frequently sharing a single apartment, said Geoff Morgan, president of First Community Housing, the complex's nonprofit developer.

But Morgan conceded the price tag of just over \$80 million is hard to stomach.

"It's nauseating," Morgan said. "I hate it."

Many of the factors contributing to the high cost of the project, known as Roosevelt Park, were identified by The Times in 2020. The complex has a two-level underground parking garage and the highest level of environmental certification by the U.S. Green Building Council, and developers will pay construction workers union-level wages. San Jose officials also wanted commercial space included in the project, which required more parking and a separate elevator, Morgan said.

The project additionally struggled to get financing through the state's affordable housing system and is relying on six government funding sources to pay for its construction.

The Turner Center study on the cost to build low-income housing found that projects paying union-level wages to construction workers could cost \$50,000 more per apartment and those built to stricter environmental standards cost \$17,000 more per apartment than those that aren't. The study examined developments the state funded between 2008 and 2019.

The Times analysis of a similar set of projects found that for each additional funding source a project needed, the average per-unit cost increased by more than \$6,000.

A significant part of the cost comes from developers paying attorneys and consultants to navigate state and local bureaucracies to secure financing.

Most large states have one agency that hands out affordable housing dollars. California has five — with varying requirements for what gets funded. Those agencies report to different elected officials, leaving no one in charge of overseeing the system as a whole. A 2018 study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that 14% of the price tag for California’s affordable housing projects was made up of consulting fees and other administrative costs — the highest in the country and more than developers spend on land.

When unveiling his state budget proposal in January 2020, Newsom pledged to lead an effort to streamline how developers get their funding.

“I’ve just had enough with TCAC and CDLAC and OPRs and CalVets and HCDs and CalHFAs,” the governor said, name-dropping the alphabet soup of departments involved in financing housing projects. “Six of you understand what the hell I just said. No one else does. And that’s the point.” But Newsom and others have not overhauled that process. Instead, they have implemented smaller reforms, such as consolidating funding streams within agencies and modifying regulations for evaluating individual projects to better account for costs.

This year, Grayson’s legislation to centralize state affordable housing funding under the governor failed in a fiscal committee. He’s introduced a new version, Assembly Bill 2305, which passed the Assembly last month and is awaiting a Senate committee hearing.

“We should be looking at where we could save money on the government side so that we can fund these projects and make it pencil out for the developer on the building side,” Grayson said. Doing so, he said, is necessary “so that the people that need it the most are not the ones that suffer the most because the housing’s not built.”

In the meantime, Newsom and state lawmakers have pumped unprecedented sums into affordable housing construction. This year’s budget includes a record \$17 billion for housing and homelessness programs, including \$1.75 billion in federal COVID-19 relief funds to finance proposed low-income developments that had stalled before breaking ground. Five of the 27 developments funded so far through that program are among those that cost more than \$1 million per apartment to build. The governor’s office declined an interview request. Gustavo Velasquez, a Newsom appointee who heads the California Department of Housing and Community Development, said the \$1.75-billion effort is meeting its goal of accelerating construction of developments that had been stuck.

“It is what it is,” Velasquez said. “Yes, there are some projects that were very expensive, arguably, in the Bay Area, many of them because the cost of housing there is more than in other parts of the state.” Newsom has not taken a position on Grayson’s legislation.

State Treasurer Fiona Ma, whose office is responsible for allocating affordable housing tax credits to developers, also declined an interview request. In response to written questions from The Times, Ma said she opposed Grayson’s bill, which would diminish her power over the financing process, calling the effort “overly simplistic.”

“Bureaucratic structures are the least of California’s problems,” Ma said. “Streamlining local government land-use approvals and federal tax law constraints is the more effective approach.”

Ma said that the agencies under her control prioritize cost concerns when handing out funding and that land values and inflation have driven recent increases. During the pandemic, developers have had to contend with historic surges in material and labor prices. Those costs have gone up nearly 30% since February 2020, according to [the state's California Construction Cost Index](#). Last year's 13.4% annual increase was the highest since the index began tracking costs more than a quarter-century ago. This year's cost escalations are on pace to exceed that amount.

“What really hit people was in the beginning of the year, all of a sudden within a few months, we had a 15% increase,” said Morgan, the developer in San Jose. “That was crazy. I've never seen that in my career, and I've been doing this for over 20 years.”

Others blame high building costs on the historic lack of investment in low-income housing.

The three San Francisco projects costing more than \$1 million per apartment will rebuild 310 units from the city's public housing stock, which has deteriorated over decades. Included in the total are the millions developers must spend to temporarily relocate existing tenants during construction. So is the value of the existing properties, even though, in these cases, they're publicly owned.

But the projects' price tags also encompass layers of city requirements for affordable housing that go beyond the state's, such as some mandates to include public art, increase access for people with disabilities and hire local construction workers, including those from disadvantaged neighborhoods. “Each of these issues has its own constituency and has its own advocacy and its own social benefit,” said Lydia Ely, a top San Francisco housing official. “Each one on its own is worthy, and added up all together, they start to make an impact.”

Though the price tag for low-income housing in Greater Los Angeles has not reached \$1 million per apartment, it's also rising. One 79-unit development under construction in Hollywood is costing nearly \$848,000 per apartment to build, the highest on record of state-funded projects in the region. These cost escalations show no signs of abating. Besides the seven projects already funded at more than \$1 million per apartment, half a dozen other proposed projects identified by The Times across the Bay Area also eclipse that amount.

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